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This thesis contains four independent essays in heterogeneous agent macroeconomics. They explore the
sources of income inequality and income risk and study the optimal design of public redistribution and
insurance.
The first chapter, joint with Filip Rozsypal, studies the origins of idiosyncratic earnings risk in
frictional labor markets, with a particular focus on the role of firms for worker earnings risk. First, using
administrative matched employer-employee data from Denmark, we document key properties of the
worker earnings growth distribution, the firm revenue growth distribution, and their joint distribution.
The worker earnings and firm revenue growth distributions exhibit strong deviations from normality,
in particular excess kurtosis, with many workers and firms experiencing very small changes to their
earnings/revenues, but a significant minority experiencing very large changes. Large earnings losses
are more likely for workers in firms with negative revenue growth, driven both by separations to
unemployment and earnings losses on the job. Second, we develop a model framework consistent
with the data, with four key features: i) frictional labor markets and on the job search to capture
unemployment risk and wage growth through a job ladder, ii) multi-worker firms to capture gross
and net worker flows, iii) risk averse workers such that earnings risk matters, and iv) contracting with
two-sided limited commitment because earnings of job stayers are changing infrequently in the data.
Third, we use the model to explore policies designed to mitigate earnings fluctuations.
The second chapter, joint with Annika Bacher and Lukas Nord, studies one particular private
insurance margin against individual income risk only available to couples, which is the so called added
worker effect. Specifically, we study how this intra-household insurance against individual job loss
through increased spousal labor market participation varies over the life cycle. We show in U.S. data
that the added worker effect is much stronger for young than for old households. A stochastic life cycle
model of two-member households with job search in a frictional labor market is capable of replicating
this finding. The model suggests that a lower added worker effect for the old is driven primarily by
better insurance through asset holdings. Human capital differences between employed young and old
contribute to the difference but are quantitatively less important, while differences in job arrival rates
play a limited role.
In the third chapter, joint with Axelle Ferriere, Gaston Navarro, and Oliko Vardishvili, we study
optimal redistribution, taking into account not just the large income and wealth inequality in the data,
but also the distribution of income risk that is key in the first two chapters. The U.S. fiscal system
redistributes through a rich set of taxes and transfers, the latter accounting for a large part of the income
of the poor. Motivated by this, we study the optimal joint design of transfers and income taxes. Within
a simple heterogeneous-household framework, we derive analytical results on the optimal relationship
between transfers and tax progressivity. Higher transfers are associated with lower optimal income
tax progressivity. Redistribution is achieved with generous transfers while efficiency is preserved via
a lower progressivity of income taxes. As such, the optimal tax-and-transfer system features larger
progressivity of average than of marginal tax rates. We then quantify the optimal tax-and-transfer system
in a rich incomplete-market model with realistic distributions of income, wealth, and income risk. The
model features a novel flexible functional form for progressive income taxes and means-tested transfers.
Relative to the current U.S. fiscal system, the optimal policy consists of more generous means-tested
transfers, which phase-out at a slower rate. These larger transfers are financed with higher tax rates, but
the taxes are not more progressive than the current system.
The fourth chapter, joint with Axelle Ferriere and Dominik Sachs, also studies optimal redistribution,
but instead of considering a stationary environment it analyzes the dynamics of the equity-efficiency
trade-off along the growth path. To do so, we incorporate the optimal income taxation problem
into a state-of-the-art multi-sector structural change general equilibrium model with non-homothetic
preferences. We identify two key opposing forces. First, long-run productivity growth allows households
to shift their consumption expenditures away from necessities. This implies a reduction in the dispersion
of marginal utilities, and therefore calls for a welfare state that declines along the growth path. Yet,
economic growth is also systematically associated with an increase in the skill premium, which raises
inequality and the desire to redistribute. We quantitatively analyze these opposing forces for two
countries: the U.S. from 1950 to 2010, and China from 1989 to 2009. Optimal redistribution decreases
at early stages of development, as the role of non-homotheticities prevails. At later stages of development
the rising income inequality dominates and the welfare state should become more generous.
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Chapter 1
Firm Dynamics and Earnings Risk1
Abstract We study the sources of individual earnings risk in frictional labor markets, focusing on the
role firms play for their workers’ earnings risk. First, using administrative matched employer-employee
data from Denmark, we document key properties of the worker earnings growth distribution, the
firm revenue growth distribution, and their joint distribution. The worker earnings and firm revenue
growth distributions exhibit strong deviations from normality, in particular excess kurtosis, with many
workers and firms experiencing very small changes to their earnings/revenues, but a significant minority
experiencing very large changes. Large earnings losses are more likely for workers in firms with
negative revenue growth, driven both by separations to unemployment and earnings losses on the job.
Second, we develop a model framework consistent with the data, with four key features: i) frictional
labor markets and on the job search to capture unemployment risk and wage growth through a job
ladder, ii) multi-worker firms to capture gross and net worker flows, iii) risk averse workers such that
earnings risk matters, and iv) contracting with two-sided limited commitment because earnings of job
stayers are changing infrequently in the data. Third, we use the model to explore policies designed to
mitigate earnings fluctuations.
1.1 Introduction
The welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk faced by individuals are large. Constantinides (2021) estimates
that the benefits of eliminating idiosyncratic consumption shocks are up to 50% of household utility.
For the majority of households the most important source of income to finance their consumption is
1This paper uses data from administrative registers from Denmark collected by Statistics Denmark. It also
uses data from the Longitudinal Model (version 1993 – 2014) of the Linked Employer-Employee Data from the
IAB. This data was accessed on-site at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment
Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and via remote data access at the FDZ.
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their labor earnings. In this paper we investigate the determinants of labor income risk in frictional
labor markets. What does the labor income process households face look like? How important are
unemployment, wages, and hours in explaining earnings fluctuations? How closely are worker earnings
related to the performance of the firms individuals are employed in? Which policies can be employed to
efficiently reduce labor earnings risk and mitigate costly consumption fluctuations?
To answer these questions, we proceed in two steps. First, we document key features of individual
earnings risk using administrative registry data from Denmark. We show that higher order moments
of the earnings growth distribution are key for understanding the nature of individual earnings risk,
as in Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2021) for the U.S. While the data for many countries
contains information only on total earnings, the detailed Danish registry data allows us to zoom in on
the contribution of unemployment, wages, and hours to individual earnings risk. Also, exploiting the
matched employer-employee dimension of the data, we explore the link between the performance of
firms and the earnings growth distribution of the workers employed at these firms. Second, we develop
a model of multi-worker firms operating in frictional labor markets featuring risk averse workers who
search on- and off-the-job. We calibrate the model to the Danish data in order to have a framework
in which we can think about the design of policies efficiently mitigating earnings fluctuations of
households.
We start in the empirical part by documenting key properties of the annual labor earnings growth
distribution of workers. As has been shown for many countries in the recent literature on earnings
risk, the earnings growth distribution exhibits important deviations from normality, which has been the
standard assumption about the distribution of earnings shocks until recently. Under the assumption
of Gaussian labor income risk many people experience medium sized earnings changes most of the
time. Compared to such a normal distribution the empirical earnings growth distribution contains
many more individuals with very small earnings changes, many fewer individuals with medium sized
earnings changes, and a significantly fatter tail of individuals who experience very large earnings
changes: The earnings growth distribution exhibits excess kurtosis. To better understand the nature of
individual income risk, we investigate whether these properties are exclusively driven by unemployment
risk. When we restrict ourselves to a sample of workers who are continuously employed and have no
unemployment spells, we recover similar properties of the earnings growth distribution. While the
dispersion of earnings growth is significantly lower for this subsample because the very largest earnings
changes are associated with unemployment spells, the distribution still exhibits excess kurtosis. This
is also the case when we consider the hourly wage growth distribution instead of the annual earnings
growth distribution for continuously employed individuals.
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In the second step of the empirical part we investigate the relation of firms to the earnings growth
distribution of their workers. The firm revenue growth distribution has very similar features compared to
the earnings growth distribution of workers. There are many firms whose revenues do not change much,
but there is also a significant share of firms having large revenue changes from one year to the next.
How are these two distributions linked? It is well known that on average there is pass-through from
firm-level shocks to worker wages (Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi, 2005). We add to this evidence
by taking a broader view in considering the entire distribution of earnings growth and by considering
both unemployment risk and wage changes. We show that indeed in the Danish data mean earnings
growth of workers who are employed in firms whose revenues go down is significantly lower than mean
earnings growth of workers in firms that are growing. There is, however, significant heterogeneity when
looking at the entire distribution. When comparing the earnings growth distributions of workers in
shrinking and growing firms there is significant overlap. In particular, in both groups there are many
workers whose earnings are very stable. However, the probability of large earnings drops is much
higher in shrinking firms. Again we zoom in on the role of unemployment, wages, and hours for this
pattern. First, workers employed in firms with shrinking revenues are much more likely to experience a
transition to unemployment, which is associated with the very largest earnings drops. Second, the fact
that large earnings drops are more likely in shrinking firms remains true when restricting the sample to
workers who are continuously employed at the same firm without unemployment spell. Third, for these
workers this pattern is mostly driven by changes to their wages, not their hours.
Motivated by this evidence, we develop a model of firm and worker dynamics in a frictional labor
market. Key model ingredients are search on- and off-the-job, multi-worker firms, risk averse workers,
and meaningful contracting between workers and firms. Frictional labor markets are key to capture
unemployment risk, which is important for capturing the very largest earnings changes. On-the-job
search is important because job-to-job transitions are associated with many of the largest earnings
gains. We model multi-worker firms as this gives us a meaningful counterpart to revenue in the data
and also allows firms to adjust by both laying off people and reducing earnings of some others within
the same firm, which we could not speak to with a model of single worker firms. On the worker side,
risk aversion is important to think about earnings risk. With risk neutral workers, it would not matter to
individuals whether earnings fluctuate a lot or not. Finally, we want the model to have a reasonable
wage setting mechanism to capture the fact that also some individuals who are continuously employed
experience very large earnings changes. We model contracting under the assumption of two-sided
limited commitment such that wages will be renegotiated infrequently.
3
Specifically, we develop an infinite horizon random search model in discrete time building on work
by Lise and Robin (2017) and Gulyas (2020). Risk averse workers can be unemployed or employed
and search on- and off-the-job. In addition to differences in their employment status they differ in
their stochastic productivity. They receive unemployment benefits while unemployed and wages while
employed. Risk-neutral firms differ in their stochastic productivity and firm size. Firms grow through
costly vacancy posting and shrink if productivity shocks make some matches infeasible. Matches
are created through random search, where meeting probabilities are governed by a standard matching
function. Workers are paid a fixed wage, which can be renegotiated if one side has a credible threat to
leave the match or the worker has an outside offer from another firm, as in Thomas and Worrall (1988)
and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
We calibrate the model to match key features of the Danish labor market such as labor market flows,
wage inequality, the firm size distribution, and gross and net job creation and destruction. While the
model calibration is still work in progress and the model does not yet match all targets well, it already
does a very good job at endogenously reproducing key features of earnings risk, firm dynamics, and
their interaction from the data. The worker earnings growth distribution is characterized by excess
kurtosis such that many workers have stable earnings but some face very large changes. The same is
true for the firm revenue growth distribution. The distributions of worker earnings growth in growing
and shrinking firms have significant overlap with many individuals’ earnings unaffected by their firms’
performance. However, firms that experience negative productivity shocks reduce their workforce
as some matches become infeasible and have a credible threat to renegotiate wages with some other
workers. For these reasons the earnings growth distribution in shrinking firms has a significantly fatter
left tail, as in the data.
With the calibrated model at hand, it is natural to ask which policies could be used to efficiently
stabilize worker earnings and reduce the large welfare costs of idiosyncratic income risk. There
are two categories of policies that could be used. First, policies can directly target worker earnings.
Prominent examples that are used in most countries including Denmark are unemployment benefits and
progressive income taxes, both of which are modeled. Second, given the strong relationship between
firm growth and worker earnings growth, alternative policies could target firms in order to avoid or
shorten unemployment spells. Such policies include layoff taxes or vacancy subsidies. We have run
very preliminary experiments with progressive taxes and vacancy subsidies, which illustrate some key
trade-offs. Progressive taxes have a very direct effect on reducing after-tax dispersion in earnings and
earnings changes. However, there is a classic equity-efficiency trade-off with progressive taxes because
high progressivity lowers vacancy posting and thereby increases unemployment in equilibrium. On
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the other hand, vacancy subsidies encourage vacancy posting, which lowers the unemployment rate
in equilibrium. However, this is a costly policy, which has to be financed, thereby imposing other
distortions. We plan to use the model to compare these and other policies rigorously in the future.
Related Literature. This paper is related to large literatures on earnings and firm dynamics on the
empirical side and on firm and worker dynamics in frictional labor markets on the theoretical side.
Traditionally, earnings dynamics are modeled with innovations drawn from Gaussian distributions.
This is the case for the literature estimating income processes following the seminal works of Lillard
and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy (1981), and Abowd and Card (1989).2 Normally distributed shocks are
also the most common assumption for the income process used as input in incomplete markets models
à la Bewley (1977), Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994). More recent empirical evidence, however,
strongly rejects the assumption of normality for income dynamics. Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and
Song (2021) document stark deviations from normality such as negative skewness and excess kurtosis
of the earnings growth distribution applying non-parametric methods to administrative social security
data from the U.S.3 Arellano, Blundell, and Bonhomme (2017) provide evidence for nonlinear and
nonnormal earnings dynamics using parametric methods applied to the PSID.
A number of papers investigate different dimensions of heterogeneity that are important for earnings
risk. Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song (2014) study the cyclicality of earnings risk and argue that a key feature
of cyclical earnings risk is countercyclical left-skewness of the earnings growth distribution (see also
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), Pruitt and Turner (2020), and Busch, Domeij, Guvenen, and
Madera (2021) for evidence on the cyclicality of earnings risk). Carrillo-Tudela, Visschers, and Wiczer
(2021) investigate how employment and occupation changes affect earnings growth at different stages
of the business cycle. Tanaka, Warren, and Wiczer (2020) link earnings growth to job flows. While
most of the literature focuses on annual earnings, there are a few papers who decompose changes into
hours and wages. Using French and Italian data, respectively, Pora and Wilner (2020) and Hoffmann
and Malacrino (2019) find a dominant role of hours and unemployment in accounting for higher order
moments of the earnings change distribution. Using Dutch data De Nardi, Fella, Knoef, Paz-Pardo, and
2For a summary of many studies in this literature, see the handbook chapter by Meghir and Pistaferri (2011).
3Earnings dynamics across a variety of countries are documented in the Global Income Dynamics Project
organized by Guvenen, Pistaferri, and Violante. The project so far has produced evidence for Argentina (Blanco,
Diaz de Astarloa, Drenik, Moser, and Trupkin, 2021), Brazil (Engbom, Gonzaga, Moser, and Olivieri, 2021),
Canada (Bowlus, Gouin-Bonenfant, Liu, Lochner, and Park, 2021), Denmark (Leth-Petersen and Sæverud,
2021), France (Kramarz, Nimier-David, and Delemotte, 2021), Germany (Drechsel-Grau, Peichl, Schmieder,
Schmid, Walz, and Wolter, 2021), Italy (Hoffmann, Malacrino, and Pistaferri, 2021), Mexico (Puggioni, Calderón,
Zurita, Bujanda, González, and Jaume, 2021), Norway (Halvorsen, Ozkan, and Salgado, 2021), the United States
(McKinney, Abowd, and Janicki, 2021), the United Kingdom (Bell, Bloom, and Blundell, 2021), Spain (Arellano,
Bonhomme, De Vera, Hospido, and Wei, 2021), and Sweden (Friedrich, Laun, and Meghir, 2021).
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Van Ooijen (2021) find some role for wages, but also argue in favor of a more important role for hours.
Halvorsen, Holter, Ozkan, and Storesletten (2020) find important contributions of hours, wages, and
their covariance to higher order moments of earnings dynamics in Norway. We also find that while
unemployment spells are responsible for the very largest earnings drops, for continuously employed
workers wage changes play an important role.
A separate empirical literature documents higher order moments for key economic outcomes on
the firm side. Salgado, Guvenen, and Bloom (2019) provide evidence of procyclical skewness of sales
growth for a variety of countries. Ilut, Kehrig, and Schneider (2018) document negative skewness
in employment growth. Bachmann and Bayer (2013) and Kehrig (2015) focus on the cyclicality of
productivity dispersion.
Finally on the empirical side there is a large literature linking worker wages to their firms. Card,
Heining, and Kline (2013) and Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom, and Von Wachter (2018) show that firm
effects and sorting between workers and firms is important for understanding income inequality in levels
using the methodology of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi
(2005) estimate that there is significant pass-through from firm-level TFP shocks to wages. Their
results have been replicated for a wide variety of countries.4 Most closely related to this project Chan,
Salgado, and Xu (2019) estimate heterogeneous pass-through from TFP to wages using Danish matched
employer-employee data. In contrast to them, we also consider unemployment risk in addition to wages
empirically and then move to a theoretical investigation using a random search model with large firms.
On the theoretical side, this paper is related to a large literature on firm and worker dynamics in
frictional labor markets. Here, we highlight the relationship to two parts of this literature. First, this
paper relates to a number of modeling contributions interested in endogenously producing the earnings
process in search and matching models. Hubmer (2018) proposes a job ladder framework to replicate
the evidence of Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2021) on earnings risk over the life cycle. Lentz
(2015), Tsuyuhara (2016), Ábrahám, Alvarez-Parra, and Forstner (2017), and Balke and Lamadon
(2020) investigate optimal contracting between firms and workers in frictional labor markets. A number
of papers proposes search and matching models to match the cyclical properties of the earnings growth
distribution (Ai and Bhandari, 2021; Graber, 2018; Harmenberg and Sievertsen, 2017; McKay and
Papp, 2012; Pascal, 2019).
Second, we contribute to a growing literature on search models with multi-worker firms. In the
directed search tradition, important contributions are by Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014), Kaas and
4See for example Lagakos and Ordonez (2011) and Juhn, McCue, Monti, and Pierce (2018) for the U.S.,
Guertzgen (2014) for Germany, Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2017) for Norway, and Friedrich, Laun, Meghir,
and Pistaferri (2019) for Sweden.
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Kircher (2015), and Schaal (2017). In the random search tradition, key papers include Elsby and
Michaels (2013), Elsby and Gottfries (2019), and Bilal, Engbom, Mongey, and Violante (2019). Our
framework builds in particular on the random search model of Gulyas (2020).
Roadmap. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1.2 we provide empirical evidence using the
Danish matched employer-employee data on firm and earnings dynamics and their interaction. In
section 1.3 we introduce and quantify the model and take a preliminary look at policies. Section 1.4
concludes.
1.2 An Anatomy of Firm Dynamics and Earnings Risk
We start by providing evidence on worker earnings risk, firm dynamics, and their interaction using
matched employer-employee data from Denmark.
1.2.1 Data
We use data from several Danish registries. Here, we describe only the most important features of the
data. Details on the different data sources are relegated to Appendix A.1.
We focus on the time period from 2008 to 2018 because for that time period we have the highest
quality information on employment spells and earnings. On the worker side, we observe labor earnings
at a monthly frequency. We observe the start and end date of an employment spell within a month and an
identifier for the firm at which the worker is employed. If a worker is employed at several firms within a
single month we observe all these spells. The earnings measure is of high quality as it is third-party
reported by tax authorities. Earnings are not top-coded. There is also an hours measure available, which
allows us to construct a measure of hourly wages. The data set covers the entire population.
On the firm side, we observe the universe of firms. We can link the workers to the firms. In addition
to the information on workers employed at the firms, we have information from accounting data on the
firms. The key variable that we are going to focus on here to measure firm dynamics is firm revenue.
1.2.2 Evidence on Individual Earnings Risk
As a first step we provide evidence on the worker earnings growth distribution. This is similar to the
evidence provided by Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2021) for the United States. The measure
of earnings that we use first is total annual earnings, in line with previous literature. To get this measure,
we add up earnings from all monthly employment spells within a year that we observe in the data. We
7
Figure 1.1 Annual Earnings Growth Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the annual earnings growth distribution for the entire sample. Growth rates are based on
residual earnings taking out age, gender, and education effects. The green line compares a normal distribution
with the same mean and standard deviation.
transform nominal to real earnings using the consumer price index. We impose a few sample restrictions
that are standard in the earnings risk literature. We restrict ourselves to individuals who are between
25 and 60 years old. Minimum annual earnings are set to DKK20,000, which corresponds to roughly
C2,700. We also impose that individuals work for at least 200 hours within a year. We compute earnings
growth rates as log-differences.
The annual earnings growth distribution is shown in Figure 1.1. For this figure we use residualized
earnings, where we take out age, gender, and education effects. However, in Appendix A.2 we show that
the main features of the earnings growth distribution do not depend on this. Specifically, we replicate
Figure 1.1 using raw labor earnings and also taking out occupation, industry, and location effects.
Figure 1.1 clearly shows that the earnings growth distribution is poorly approximated by a normal
distribution, which is a common assumption in heterogeneous agent macroeconomics. A normal
distribution implies that there are many people with medium sized earnings changes. In the data,
however, there is much more mass around zero earnings changes than a normal distribution would
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Figure 1.2 Annual Earnings Growth Distribution: Full-Year Employed
Notes: This figure shows the annual earnings growth distribution for individuals who are employed every month
in two consecutive years. Growth rates are based on residual earnings taking out age, gender, and education
effects. The green line compares a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation.
imply. On the other hand, there is also more mass in the extreme tails of the distribution. These
features translate into excess kurtosis of the earnings growth distribution. The kurtosis of the annual
earnings growth distribution is roughly 15, in contrast to 3 for a normal distribution. In slight contrast
to the evidence of Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2021) for the U.S. the distribution is almost
symmetric. The coefficient of skewness is only very slightly negative with a value of -0.03.5
The key feature of the earnings growth distribution thus is that individuals experience very small
earnings changes most of the time, but face a significant chance of a very large change to their earnings.
This result could in principle be only driven by transitions to and out of unemployment. Individuals
who lose their jobs see their earnings drop drastically and see a large rise when they are employed again.
To investigate whether the deviations from normality are only driven by unemployment, we next restrict
5The skewness of the earnings growth distribution exhibits the cyclical properties that have been documented
in other countries. The skewness is lower, and significantly negative, in the recession year 2009 and higher in
the expansion years later in the sample. We show the earnings growth distributions for the years 2009 and 2015
in Appendix A.2. There are many more individuals with very large earnings drops in recessions, whereas the
likelihood of earnings being stable or going up significantly is higher in expansions.
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Figure 1.3 Annual Wage Growth Distribution: Full-Year Employed
Notes: This figure shows the annual wage growth distribution for individuals who are employed every month in
two consecutive years. Growth rates are based on residual wages taking out age, gender, and education effects.
The green line compares a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation.
our sample to individuals who are employed in every month of two consecutive years. The earnings
growth distribution for this group is shown in Figure 1.2. The standard deviation of earnings growth
for this subsample is significantly lower than for the entire population, 0.15 instead of 0.34, indicating
that unemployment risk is a key part of earnings risk. However, the earnings growth distribution of the
full-year employed exhibits otherwise similar features compared to the earnings growth distribution of
the entire population. Relative to a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation it is
much more likely to have very small or very large earnings changes.
Finally on the worker side, we investigate the distribution of growth rates of hourly wages. The
definition of the hourly wage is annual earnings divided by annual hours. Again, the standard deviation
of the hourly wage growth distribution is significantly lower than that of the annual earnings growth
distribution because unemployment spells play an important role in driving up earnings variability.
However, the hourly wage growth distribution shares with the annual earnings growth distribution
excess kurtosis as a key feature.
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Figure 1.4 Annual Revenue Growth Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the annual revenue growth distribution. The green line compares a normal distribution
with the same mean and standard deviation.
1.2.3 Evidence on Firm Dynamics
Before investigating the relationship between firms and the worker earnings growth distribution we
provide evidence on the key variable that we are going to use on the firm side, which is firm revenue.
For our main analysis, we are going to focus on revenue that we obtain from accounting/tax information.
This is not available for all firms; in particular, while this information is available for the majority
of large firms, it is available only for a small subset of small firms. However, the firms for which
the information is available account for the majority of employment. In Appendix A.2 we provide
additional evidence where we compute revenues from value added tax forms. This is available for many
more firms. None of our main conclusions are affected by the ex- or inclusion of these firms.
In Figure 1.4 we show the distribution of annual firm revenue growth.6 The distribution shares
many features with the distribution of worker earnings growth. There is a lot of mass around zero
revenue changes, much more than implied by a normal distribution. Also, the distribution is fat tailed.
6In the appendix we also provide evidence on the value added growth distribution.
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Excess kurtosis is even higher than for the worker earnings growth distribution. There is a significant
mass of firms whose revenues shrink and grow drastically, while most firms have very stable revenues.
This raises the question about the relationship between firm growth and the worker earnings growth
distribution. Are all the worker who experience large earnings drops employed in shrinking firms?
Or is the earnings growth distribution largely decoupled from firm outcomes as firms buffer workers
from large earnings fluctuations due to firm-level revenue changes? We now turn to addressing these
questions.
1.2.4 Evidence from Matched Firm-Worker Data
To analyze the comovement of worker earnings and firm revenues we match workers to firms in year
t −1. Then, we group firms by their revenue growth from t −1 to t. We compute the worker earnings
growth distribution from t −1 to t by firm group. In t −1 we impose the following sample restrictions:
Workers have to be employed for the entire year. Furthermore, they may only be employed at one firm
during the entire year. Then, we consider four cases. First, we compute the earnings growth distribution
not conditioning on anything in year t. That is, a worker may still be employed at the same firm as in
t −1, she may be employed at a different firm, she may be unemployed, or any combination of these.
Second, we compute the earnings growth distribution by firm group, conditional on also being employed
in the same firm for the entire year t. Then, we want to decompose earnings changes into changes to
wages and changes to hours. Hence, third we consider the wage growth distribution for those who are
employed in two consecutive years at the same firm by firm growth group. Fourth, we compute the
hours growth distribution.
In Figure 1.5 we show the earnings growth distribution for two firm groups, a firm group whose
revenues shrink by 25 to 30% and a firm group whose revenues grow by 25 to 30%. Note that because of
the restriction that workers have to be full-year employed at the firm in year t−1 but can be unemployed
in year t average earnings growth tends to be negative. Mean earnings growth is, however, significantly
different across firm groups. In the firms whose revenues shrink by 25 to 30%, mean annual earnings
growth of workers is around -7%. By contrast, in the growing firms mean earnings growth is roughly
zero. However, there is significant overlap in the earnings growth distributions. Even in the firms that
shrink quite strongly there are many workers whose earnings are either barely affected or even grow.
However, large earnings growth is much more likely in the growing firms, whereas the likelihood of
large earnings drops is much higher in shrinking firms
We provide a different visualization taking into account all firm groups in Figure 1.6. In the upper
left panel we plot the coefficients from an OLS regression of earnings growth on firm group and year
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Figure 1.5 Worker Earnings Growth by Firm Revenue Growth
Notes: This figure shows the annual worker earnings growth distribution conditional on firm revenue growth.
dummies. The omitted firm group is the one with the lowest growth rate. Hence, we can see that average
earnings growth is monotonically increasing in firm revenue growth. The average difference between
the lowest and the highest firm revenue growth group is almost ten percentage points. In the other
panels of the figure we repeat the regression exercise, but instead of running an OLS regression we use
quantile regressions (upper right panel: 10th percentile; lower left panel: 50th percentile; lower right
panel: 90th percentile).
This figure also clearly shows that what is most affected by firm growth is the bottom of the earnings
growth distribution. The difference in the 10th percentile of the earnings growth distribution between
the lowest and the highest firm group is almost twenty percentage points. The median and the 90th
percentile of the earnings growth distribution are much less affected.
As already shown for the distribution of worker earnings growth on its own, unemployment risk
is an important driver of the tails of the earnings growth distribution. The likelihood of having an
unemployment spell is also closely associated with the growth of the firm at which an individual is
employed. Out of the workers who are employed in the lowest firm group roughly 14% spend at least
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Figure 1.6 Worker Earnings Growth by Firm Revenue Growth
Notes: This figure shows the the relationship between firm performance and different parts of the earnings growth
distribution.
one month unemployed in the next year. In the median firm groups this probability is only 6.5%. It
does not change much, however, from the median firm groups to the very top firm groups.
Thus, firm growth matters for the earnings growth distribution through its association with the
probability of becoming unemployed. In Figure 1.7 we show that firm growth is also related to the
earnings growth distribution of the workers who are continuously employed at the same firm for two
full consecutive years. For that purpose, we impose the additional restriction that a worker is employed
also in year t at the same firm for the entire year and at no other firm.
Because we are now looking at a sample of continuously employed individuals average earnings
growth is not negative by construction anymore. A sizeable difference between average earnings growth
depending on firm growth, however, remains. Mean earnings growth of workers employed in firms with
a revenue drop of 25 to 30% is -1.3%, while it is +2.0% for workers employed in firms with a revenue
increase of 25 to 30%. Again, this difference in means is mostly driven by a much larger chance of large
earnings rises in growing firms and a much larger probability of large earnings losses in shrinking firms,
whereas there is a lot of overlap in the distribution with many workers in both firm groups experiencing
14
Figure 1.7 Worker Earnings Growth by Firm Revenue Growth: Stayers
Notes: This figure shows the annual worker earnings growth distribution conditional on firm revenue growth for
workers who are continuously employed at the same firm for two years.
very small earnings changes. We relegate the corresponding figure with regression coefficients for all
firm groups to the appendix.
Finally, we investigate whether these earnings changes of individuals who are continuously em-
ployed are mostly due to wages or hours. Figure 1.8 shows the wage growth distribution, where wages
are annual earnings divided by annual hours, for the two firm groups, conditioning on workers being
continuously employed at the same firm. The picture that emerges is quite similar to the earnings
growth distribution: Mean wage changes are -0.7% and 2.2% in the two groups. While there is again
considerable overlap among the two distributions, the distribution in the growing firms has a much
larger right tail, whereas the distribution in the shrinking firms has a much larger left tail. Again, the
figure for all firm groups is in the appendix.
By contrast, there is no strong relationship between hours growth of workers and firm growth. This
is shown in Figure 1.9. While there is a weak positive relationship between hours growth of workers
and firm growth, this relationship is not strong enough to explain the strong association between firm
growth and worker earnings growth. In the main text we restrict ourselves to workers for whom hours
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Figure 1.8 Worker Wage Growth by Firm Revenue Growth: Stayers
Notes: This figure shows the worker wage growth distribution conditional on firm revenue growth for workers
who are continuously employed at the same firm for two years.
worked are reported. In the appendix, we replicate the figure using an hours measure that is imputed
by Statistics Denmark, so that more workers are part of the sample. While hours growth based on this
measure is more dispersed overall, there is still no strong enough relationship between firm growth and
hours growth to account for the sizeable association between firm growth and annual earnings growth.
1.2.5 Taking Stock
In the empirical part we have documented that the individual earnings process exhibits stark deviations
from normality. Most individuals have very stable earnings from year to year, but every once in a while
there are very large changes. This is the case for the annual earnings growth distribution (including
unemployment spells), but also holds (with an overall lower standard deviation) for the annual earnings
growth and wage growth distributions of the continuously full-year employed. We also show that there
is a strong relationship between firm growth and the worker earnings growth distribution. There is a
much longer left tail of the earnings growth distribution in shrinking firms. This is partially driven by
separations, but also by wages.
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Figure 1.9 Worker Hours Growth by Firm Revenue Growth: Stayers
Notes: This figure shows the hours growth distribution conditional on firm revenue growth for workers who are
continuously employed at the same firm for two years.
These patterns are not unique to Denmark. In Appendix A.3, we include similar evidence on the
basis of German matched employer-employee data. While we cannot compute everything we compute
for the Danish case with the German data because there is no information on hours/wages, we confirm
with this data the relationship between worker earnings growth and firm revenue growth that we see in
the Danish data, both when including unemployment spells and when restricting attention to job stayers.
Motivated by this evidence, we now turn to a model of firm dynamics and earnings risk.
1.3 A Model of Firm Dynamics and Earnings Risk
1.3.1 Model Setup
The model is a random search model with multi-worker firms and heterogeneous workers in discrete
time. It builds on Lise and Robin (2017) and in particular on Gulyas (2020).
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Workers. The economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived workers, who are heterogeneous
in their labor productivity x. Worker productivity is stochastic with stationary distribution φx (x). It
follows a first order Markov process with conditional transition probabilities denoted by p(x′ | x).
Workers can be either employed or unemployed. If unemployed, they receive an unemployment benefit
b(x) and search for jobs. If employed, they receive a wage w and search on the job with exogenously
lower search intensity s. Arrival rates of job offers are determined in equilibrium.
Workers are assumed to be hand-to-mouth; they cannot save or borrow. Hence, consumption is
equal to the wage or benefit they receive every period. Households value consumption according to
a utility function u(c), which is assumed to be increasing and concave in c such that workers are risk
averse. Workers’ discount factor is β .
Firms. There is a mass M of firms, who can employ many workers. Firm productivity y is also
stochastic with stationary distribution φy (y). Firm productivity is also first order Markov with transition
probabilities p(y′ | y). Firms create jobs, which can be either vacant or filled. Job creation is a costly
process: The job creation cost function c(v j), where v j denotes the measure of newly created jobs of
firm j, is increasing and convex in v j. Jobs are costless to maintain, but are destroyed exogenously with
probability δ . A job filled with a worker of type x produces output f (x,y). This output is independent
of other matches, so that output of firm j is given by the integral of output over all its matches
Fj (y) =
∫
f (x,y)dψ j (x) . (1.1)
Vacant jobs meet a searching worker with a probability that is determined in equilibrium. Firms
maximize expected profits and are risk-neutral. They also discount future profits with discount factor β .
Government. The government pays unemployment benefits to unemployed workers. These benefits
potentially depend on worker type and are denoted b(x). Furthermore, the government raises income
taxes using a progressive income tax function T (w). Additionally, the government has access to a
vacancy subsidy τV , which proportionally reduces the cost of creating a vacancy, and a layoff tax τL,
which has to be paid if there is an endogenous separation. These latter two instruments are zero in the
calibration, but will be explored in the policy exercises.
Search and Matching. In a steady state equilibrium, there are distributions of unemployed µx (x),
of vacant jobs µy (y), and of matches at the search stage ψs (x,y). We denote the total measure of
unemployed with u, the measure of employed at the search stage as es, and the measure of vacant jobs
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as v. Because on the job search is assumed to have exogenously lower search intensity s, effective
search units are given by
L = u+ ses. (1.2)
The number of meetings is given by a standard matching function
M = min{M (L,v) ,L,v} . (1.3)
Then, the probability of a vacant job meeting a worker λ f , the probability of an unemployed worker

















If a vacant job and an unemployed worker meet, given firm and worker productivity there is a
maximum wage the firm is willing to pay, w̄y (x,y), and a minimum wage the worker is willing to accept,
¯
wx (x,y). As long as the firm can pay more than the worker requires, the match is created. If a vacant
job meets an employed worker, there will be a job-to-job transition if the potential employer can pay a
higher wage than the incumbent. Otherwise, the worker stays at the incumbent firm.
Wage Setting. If an unemployed worker meets a vacant job and it is possible to create a match, the
assumption is that the worker has some bargaining power to extract a share of the surplus. Specifically,
we assume that the initial wage negotiated between a firm of type y and a worker of type x is an average
between the maximum wage the firm would pay and the minimum the worker would accept:
winit (x,y) = (1−α)
¯
wx (x,y)+αw̄y (x,y) . (1.5)
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We will explain how to compute
¯
wx (x,y) and w̄y (x,y) below, after having introduced the value functions.
Employed workers can renegotiate their wages if they receive a relevant outside offer. Suppose a
worker employed at a firm with productivity y, which is able to pay at most w̄y (x,y), meets another
firm with productivity ỹ being able to pay w̄y (x, ỹ). Three cases can occur. First, if the maximum the
potential poaching firm can pay is below the current wage, this is an irrelevant outside offer and nothing
will happen. Second, the current firm is able to pay more than the potential new firm, but the current
wage is lower than the wage this firm could pay. Then, the wage is increased to this level, but the worker
stays at the old firm. Third, if the new firm can pay a higher wage than the old firm, there will be a
job-to-job transition and the worker will receive the maximum wage the old firm could have paid as
the starting wage at the new firm. If the two firms have the same productivity, the tie breaking rule we
assume is that there is a job-to-job transition in 50% of the cases.
Even without an outside offer wages may change while a worker is employed. We assume that
either party can demand a renegotiation of the wage if it has a credible threat to leave the match. For the
worker that means that the wage can be renegotiated if quitting to unemployment is preferable to staying
in the match at the current wage. For the firm it means that it can ask for a renegotiation if expected
profits are lower than the layoff tax. In both cases, wages are reset such that the agent demanding the
renegotiation is just indifferent between staying in the match or leaving.
Timing. The order of events in a period is as follows. At the beginning of the period there is the
production stage. The distribution of matches at the production stage is denoted with ψ (x,y). Output is
produced, wages and benefits are paid out, and consumption takes place. Furthermore, firms decide
how many new vacant jobs to create.
After production and the creation of new vacant jobs, exogenous job destruction shocks occur. This
implies that a newly created vacant job can be destroyed immediately. If a filled job is destroyed, the
worker becomes unemployed. A newly separated worker cannot search immediately but only in the
next period, so that a separated worker will be unemployed for at least one period.
Next, productivity shocks realize. This can lead to endogenous separations. If a match is dissolved,
the job becomes vacant and the worker transitions to unemployment. Again, unemployed workers have
to be unemployed for at least one period and the job also has to be vacant for a period.
A period concludes with the matching stage. Meetings realize, new matches between unemployed
searchers and vacant jobs are created, and job-to-job transitions take place. The relevant distributions at
this stage are the distribution of matches at the search stage, ψS (x,y), the distribution of unemployed
workers µx (x), and the distribution of vacant jobs µy (y).
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Value Functions. We can now write the value functions of an unemployed worker, an employed worker,
a vacant job, and a filled job. We start with the value function of an unemployed worker:























































The value of unemployment consists of four components. An unemployed worker obtains instantaneous
utility from consuming the unemployment benefit, which can be read off the first line of Equation (1.6).
The next three lines of Equation (1.6) sum up to the continuation value. There are three relevant
scenarios to consider for an unemployed worker. First, the worker may not meet a vacant job, so that
she will remain unemployed. In that case, she will continue to receive the value of unemployment
tomorrow, taking into account potential productivity shocks (line 2). Second, the worker may meet a
new firm, but productivities are such that no match is created. Let AU (x,y) denote the probability that a
match between a worker of type x and a firm with productivity y is created. This probability is one if
the firm is able to pay a higher wage than the minimum wage the worker requires to enter the match and
zero otherwise. For whether a match is created or not, the worker has to take into account her potential
productivity states one period ahead and the probabilities of meeting a vacant job of a certain type from
the distribution of vacant jobs µy. If no match is created, the worker will continue to receive the value of
unemployment (line 3). Line 4 covers the last possibility: The worker meets a vacant job and a match is
created, in which case the worker’s continuation utility is W
(
x′, ỹ,winit (x′, ỹ)
)
, the value of employment
given worker productivity, firm productivity, and the wage.
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The value of employment can be written as follows:





















































































































































Again, the first line of Equation (1.7) describes the instantaneous utility. The worker consumes the
after tax wage. With probability δ , the worker is exogenously separated from the job and transitions
to unemployment, which is covered in line 2. Furthermore, note the probability 1− δ , which is the
probability of not being exogenously separated, in line 2, which applies to all the following cases. If the
worker is not exogenously separated, four more cases have to be considered. Line 3 takes care of the
case in which there is an endogenous separation. AS (x,y) denotes the probability of a match continuing
to exist, so that 1−AS (x,y) is the probability of an endogenous separation. Note that absent a layoff
tax AS (x,y) = AU (x,y). Line 4 deals with job-to-job transitions. A job-to-job transition requires that an
employed worker is not endogenously separated before new meetings take place and that a meeting
with a vacant job occurs, which is the case with probability λE . Then, AE (x,y, ỹ) denotes the probability
that a worker transitions to the new job given worker productivity x, incumbent firm productivity y,
and potential employer productivity ỹ. This probability is one if the potential poacher can pay a higher
wage than the incumbent and zero otherwise. The worker receives the maximum wage the incumbent
employer could have paid, w̄y (x′,y′). An outside offer that does not lead to a job-to-job transition may
still trigger a wage renegotiation, which is considered in line 5. AOO (x,y,w, ỹ) is the probability of a
wage renegotiation between a worker of productivity x employed at a firm of productivity y with wage
w, who meets a vacant job with productivity ỹ. Then, the wage the worker receives is the maximum the
potential new employer would have been willing to pay, w̄y (x′, ỹ). The continuation utility from the
scenario in which the worker is neither exogenously nor endogenously separated and does not receive a
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relevant outside offer triggering either a job-to-job transition or a renegotiation is covered in the last
two lines. If the worker’s value of employment falls below the outside option, which is the value of
unemployment, the wage is reset such that the worker receives the value of unemployment. If, by
contrast, the wage is higher than what the firm can maximally pay after productivity shocks, the wage
will be lowered to this maximum. If neither of these things happen, the wage will remain the same.
The value functions for a vacant job and for a filled job follow a similar logic. Consider first the
value of a vacant job:





































































































A vacant job delivers no instantaneous value and is costless to maintain. The continuation values are
discounted with discount factor β and a vacant job is destroyed with probability δ . Only if the job is
not exogenously destroyed is there a continuation value. Line 1 of Equation (1.8) gives the continuation
value for the case in which the vacant job does not meet a worker. In that case, the vacant job continues
to exist, but is subject to firm-level productivity shocks. The remaining four cases all deal with instances
in which the vacant job meets a worker. In the first two of these cases, the worker is unemployed. Line 2
gives the continuation value for the productivities in which a match is not created. Line 3 provides the
continuation value for the case in which the job is filled with the unemployed worker. The last two
cases account for meetings with employed workers. Line 4 takes care of the cases in which the worker
does not do a job-to-job transition towards the firm characterized by future productivity y′, so that the
continuation value remains the value of a vacant job. Line 5 finally accounts for filling the vacant job
through poaching a worker from a different firm.
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Finally, consider the value of a filled job:













































































































































The instantaneous value of a filled job, given in line 1 of Equation (1.9), is the output of the match
between the firm with productivity y and the worker with productivity x minus the wage paid to the
worker. Note that if the job is exogenously destroyed there is no continuation value for the firm in
contrast to the worker, who transitions to unemployment. Line 2 deals with endogenous separations: If
productivity shocks are such that an endogenous separation is optimal, the firm will have a vacant job
and has to pay the layoff tax. Lines 3 and 4 account for the cases in which the worker meets another
vacant job. Such an outside offer may result in either a job-to-job transition, so that the firm is left with
a vacant job (line 3), or in a renegotiation, so that the firm keeps the worker but has to increase the
wage (line 4). Finally, lines 5 and 6 take care of the case in which there is no exogenous separation,
endogenous separation, or relevant outside offer. If the firm prefers a separation at the current wage, the
wage will be reset such that the firm is indifferent between an endogenous separation and continuing
the match. If the worker has a credible threat to leave the match at the current wage, the wage will be
increased to make the worker indifferent between leaving and staying. If neither agent has a credible
threat, the match will continue at the current wage.
The value functions can be used to compute the maximum wage a firm is willing to pay and the
minimum wage a worker is willing to accept. The lowest wage a worker of type x accepts at a firm of
type y is defined as follows:
¯
wx (x,y) : W (x,y, ¯
wx (x,y)) =U (x) . (1.10)
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The highest wage a firm of type y is willing to pay to a worker of type x is given by
w̄y (x,y) : J (x,y, w̄y (x,y)) =V (y) . (1.11)
In a model with risk neutral workers such as Gulyas (2020) it would be possible to simplify the
problem drastically and solve for allocations only using the surplus function, which would only be a
function of productivities but not of wages. Because of risk neutrality the wage is just a transfer between
firm and worker without any effect on the surplus. The assumptions on wage setting ensure that outside
offers do not matter for the joint continuation value.
This cannot be done with risk averse workers and income taxes. The wage is not a one-for-one
transfer between workers and firms. Therefore, we cannot just use the surplus function, but have to
solve for the value functions and wages simultaneously.
Distributions. Besides the value functions, the other key objects to be solved for are four distributions.
These are the distribution of unemployed workers µx (x), the distribution of vacant jobs µy (y), the
distribution of matches at the production stage ψ (x,y), and the distribution of matches at the search
stage ψS (x,y). Note that in principle the distributions of matches could have an additional dimension in
form of the wage. However, in this setup, the only thing that matters for determining transitions and for
which wages have to be paid in case of job-to-job transitions and outside offers is how much employers
can potentially pay, which is pinned down by the productivities. It does not matter what the current
wage is. Therefore, we can omit wages as an argument from these distributions.
Consider first the distribution of matches at the production stage. This is updated based on inflows
from unemployment, inflows from employment, and retained matches.























An unemployed worker of productivity x from the distribution µx (x) meets a vacant job with probability
λu. This vacant job is of type y with probability µy (y)/v. A match between these productivity types is
created with probability AU (x,y). Note that productivity shocks do not have to be taken into account
here. Timing is such that productivity shocks happen between the production and the search stage.
Therefore, the matches created at the search stage between unemployed workers and vacant jobs enter
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the distribution of matches at the production stage with their respective productivities. This case is
taken care of in line 1 of Equation (1.12).
Line 2 deals with inflows from employment. A worker of type x can be employed at any firm
productivity type ỹ according to the distribution of matches at the search stage ψS. This worker will
become part of ψ (x,y) because of a job-to-job transition if there is a meeting (probability λe), the
meeting is with a vacancy of type y (probability µy (y)/v), and the match is created with this new firm,
which happens with probability AE (x, ỹ,y). Again, no productivity shocks happen between the creation
of these matches and the production stage.
Line 3 accounts for retained matches. A match at the search stage stays in place for the next
production stage if the worker does not meet a vacant job leading to a job-to-job transition. Also here, it
is not necessary to account for productivity shocks.
The second important distribution is the distribution of matches at the search stage. This differs
from the distribution of matches at the production stage because of exogenous separations, productivity
shocks, and endogenous separations following productivity shocks:
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The third endogenous distribution is the distribution of vacant jobs. It is computed from newly
created jobs, unfilled matches, and filled matches that become vacant because of either endogenous
















































































Line 1 of Equation (1.14) accounts for newly created jobs. Newly created jobs are denoted with vN (y).
A firm with productivity y creates new vacant jobs until the marginal cost of doing so equals the value
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⇒ vN (y) = c′−1 (V (y)) .
(1.15)
New jobs are created at the beginning of the period, so they can be exogenously destroyed. New job
creation is weighted with the total mass of firms M and the exogenous distribution of firms across
productivities φy (y). Also, between the production stage and the search and matching stage productivity
shocks take place.
The second and third lines of Equation (1.14) deal with unfilled vacant jobs surviving from the
period before. To still be part of the distribution of vacant jobs, a job may not be exogenously destroyed.
Given this is the case, there are three scenarios in which a job remains vacant. First, it may not meet any
worker. Second, it may meet an unemployed worker, but productivities are such that no match is created.
Third, it may meet an employed worker, but productivities are such that there is no job-to-job transition.
Lines 4 and 5 take care of separations that cause a previously filled job to become vacant. This can
happen either because of a job-to-job transition or an endogenous separation. Consider first job-to-job
transitions (line 4). Starting from the distribution of matches at the search stage, a worker may meet a
vacant job and do a job-to-job transition. Then, the firm will have a vacant job. Until the search stage of
the next period, however, this job can be exogenously destroyed and is subject to the firm productivity
shock.
Consider next endogenous separations (line 5). Starting from the distribution of matches at the
production stage, jobs can be exogenously destroyed. In that case they do not enter the distribution
of vacant jobs. Those matches that survive exogenous destruction shocks are subject to productivity
shocks. After these realize, there may be endogenous separations. However, the vacant jobs can only
be refilled at the search stage of the next period, so that they are subject to exogenous destruction and
productivity shocks again before entering the distribution of vacant jobs.
Finally, the distribution of unemployed follows as the difference between the exogenous distribution



















This is due to the assumption that those who are separated cannot search within the same period.
Therefore, they will show up in the distribution of unemployed only in the next period. However,
productivity shocks apply between the production stage and the search stage.
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1.3.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the Danish labor market. A model period is a month.
Functional Forms. For solving the model, we have to specify a number of functional forms. We start






with coefficient of relative risk aversion γ .
Match output has the following functional form:









where ν governs the level of production and ρ the complementary between worker and firm productivity
in production, which is important for sorting.
The matching function takes the standard Cobb-Douglas functional form:
M (L,v) = ξ Lωv1−ω . (1.19)
This functional form is widely used in the labor literature and is consistent with the data (Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2001).







as in Merz and Yashiv (2007), Bagger and Lentz (2019), and Gulyas (2020), among many others.
To model the progressive income tax scheme, we rely on the widely used loglinear income tax
function:
T (w) = w−λw1−τ , (1.21)
which has been popularized by Feldstein (1969), Benabou (2002), and Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2017). With this tax function, λ governs the level of tax rates, whereas τ determines the
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progressivity. With positive τ , average and marginal tax rates are increasing in income. τ = 0 implies a
flat tax rate, whereas a negative τ means that the tax system is regressive.
Finally, we have to specify the stochastic processes for worker and firm productivity. We assume
that worker productivity follows an AR(1) in logs:





Firm productivity remains the same with probability 1−πy. With probability πy, a firm draws a new
productivity. This new productivity level can be drawn from a range around the old productivity level.
The size of this range is governed by the parameter ȳ. This is a common way of modeling productivity
shocks in the firm dynamics literature (Kaas and Kircher, 2015).
Targeted Moments and Parameters. We parameterize the model in two steps. First, we set a number
of parameters externally. Second, we choose the remaining parameters to match key properties of the
Danish labor market.
In the first step, we exogenously fix preference parameters. We set the discount factor β to 0.995,
corresponding to an annualized discount factor of 0.94. We set the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ
to two.
In the Danish registry data we observe taxes paid by an individual, so we can compute pre- and
after-tax income. We use this to estimate the parameters of the loglinear income tax function. To do
so, we regress after-tax income on pre-tax income as in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017).
We estimate the coefficients by year, as taxes are based on annual income. The coefficients are fairly
stable over time. Our estimate for λ is 0.92 and the estimated progressivity τ is 0.22. The estimated
τ is much higher than in many other countries, reflecting the high progressivity of the Danish tax
system. This is in line with previous estimates such as Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2019), who
estimate a progressivity parameter of 0.258 for Denmark using OECD data. For simplicity we apply
the tax function to monthly income. Applying it to annual income would require introducing another
state variable keeping track of previous income during the year. We fix the unemployment benefit at a
constant level. It does not expire, which is a reasonable approximation since the Danish unemployment
insurance system is very generous and benefits are available for up to three years. There are no layoff
taxes or vacancy subsidies, so we set them to zero in the calibration.
For the labor market parameters, we exogenously fix the worker bargaining power α when being
unemployed to 0.2. We set the curvature of the matching function ω to 0.5, as in Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001). The remaining parameters are calibrated internally. The matching function level
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Figure 1.10 Hiring and Separation Rates
Notes: This figure shows firm hiring and separation rates by firm growth rate.
parameter ξ is closely associated with the transition rate from unemployment to employment and
thereby the unemployment rate, which averaged around 6% in the time period we are interested in.
Search intensity on the job s is set to match a monthly job-to-job transition rate of 1.7%. To calibrate the
exogenous job destruction rate we compute hiring and separation rates as a function of firm employment
growth rates. These are shown in Figure 1.10. Hiring and separation rates follow the hockey stick
shape that is also present in U.S. data (Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger, 2013; Mongey and Violante,
2019). For negative growth rates, the hiring rate is flat at around 1.5-2%. For positive growth rates,
the hiring rate is monotonically increasing. The separation rate is decreasing for negative firm growth
rates and flat at around 2% for positive growth rates. The stable positive separation rate for growing
firms in particular is informative for the exogenous job destruction parameter δ . On the worker side, the
monthly employment to unemployment transition rate is 2.6%.
The model does a very good job at matching the unemployment rate and the average job-to-job
transition rate. The unemployment rate by worker productivity level is shown in Figure 1.11. The
unemployment rate is constant for high productivity levels. This is the case because the model is a
random search model, so that meeting probabilities do not differ by productivity. Matches with high
productivity workers will always be created and never be dissolved voluntarily, so that the unemployment
rate for these groups is the same. At low productivity levels, however, the unemployment rate is higher.
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Figure 1.11 Unemployment Rate
Notes: This figure shows the unemployment rate by worker productivity level.
While these workers when searching as unemployed have as many meetings as more productive workers
because of random search, not all these meetings will lead to matches. Also, when worker productivity
falls to these low levels, depending on firm productivity, an existing match could be split up. The model
does, however, understate in the current calibration the average EU rate. Even after negative productivity
shocks it is too often feasible to renegotiate and keep matches alive rather than endogenously separating,
which occurs only relatively rarely.
The worker productivity parameters are set to match the wage distribution. For that purpose we
compute moments of the monthly earnings distribution from the data. The model does fairly well in
capturing income inequality for most parts of the earnings distribution. For example, mean earnings
of the 90th to the 95th percentile of the earnings distribution relative to mean earnings of individuals
between the 5th and the 10th percentile of the earnings distribution is 3.39 in the data and 3.49 in the
model. However, while this value is even slightly too high, the model fails to match the levels of income
at the very top: The model does not have a mechanism to generate the very large incomes of the very
top earners.
Finally, the parameters for the firm productivity process and the job creation cost function are
closely related to the firm size distribution. Mean firm size in the data is 19. The firm size distribution
is extremely skewed with the 75th percentile being 8, the 90th percentile being 20, and the 95th
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Figure 1.12 Distribution of Matches
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of workers across firm productivity levels.
percentile being 167. The model matches average firm size almost perfectly, but does not yet produce
the extreme concentration of the workforce in the largest firms. This is a common problem in firm
dynamics models, which could be fixed for example with firms being heterogeneous in two dimensions,
one permanent productivity type and an additional stochastic productivity component. Permanent
productivity differences are very powerful in generating skewed firm size distributions; see for example
the model of Kaas and Kircher (2015), which features a permanent and a transitory firm productivity
component. To economize on state variables, we only incorporate a transitory component and therefore
miss to some extent the extreme concentration of the workforce in the very largest firms.
An important parameter that we do not take a stand on so far is the complementarity parameter ρ ,
which we set to one. This is to be disciplined carefully in the next version. All model parameters are
summarized in Table 1.1.
Figure 1.12 shows the model implied distribution of matches at the production stage. It is apparent
from the figure that a large share of matches is concentrated in the high productivity firms. Matches
are more valuable for more productive firms, who will therefore post a larger number of vacant jobs.
They also fill these jobs more quickly because very productive firms form matches with all worker types
and because they can poach employed searchers from less productive firms. There is no mass at the
combinations of low worker and low firm productivity as these matches are not feasible.
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Table 1.1 Parameter Values
Parameter Interpretation Value
Preferences
β Discount factor 0.9950
γ Risk aversion 2.0000
Labor market
α Bargaining power 0.2000
ξ Matching function level 0.2000
ω Matching function curvature 0.5000
s Search intensity on-the-job 0.1200
δ Job destruction probability 0.0200
Workers
ρx Worker productivity persistence 0.9900
σx Worker productivity std. dev. 0.0500
Firms
πy Prob. of new firm prod. draw 0.1000
ȳ Firm prod. adjustment range 5.0000
M Mass of firms 0.0420
Production
ν Production function scale 1.2000
ρ Production complementarity 1.0000
Job creation
c0 Job creation cost level 22.0000
c1 Job creation cost curvature 1.0500
Government
b Unemployment benefit 0.3000
λ Income tax level 0.9200
τ Income tax progressivity 0.2200
τL Layoff tax 0.0000
τV Vacancy subsidy 0.0000
Notes: Table 1.1 summarizes the parameter values.
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1.3.3 Model Results
We now turn to the model implications for the untargeted distributions of worker earnings growth, firm
revenue growth, and worker earnings growth conditional on firm revenue growth. As in the data, we
start with the distribution of worker earnings growth.
The model captures very well the key feature of the earnings growth distribution, which is excess
kurtosis, as shown in Figure 1.13. There is significant mass around zero earnings: The model produces
this because wages are only renegotiated or even matches dissolved if very bad productivity shocks
occur. For most small shocks noone has a credible threat to leave the match, so earnings are unchanged.
The model also captures through this mechanism that the earnings growth distribution has fat tails.
If productivity shocks are extreme, this will trigger a renegotiation potentially leading to very large
earnings changes. Large earnings drops are also generated through exogenous separations, while large
earnings gains are also generated through renegotiations after outside offers and job-to-job transitions.
Figure 1.14 shows the annual firm revenue growth distribution in the model. Also for this distribution
the model captures the excess kurtosis very well. It also captures that while there is a lot of mass around
zero revenue changes the distribution is less concentrated around zero than for worker earnings. The
reason why there is a lot of mass around zero is that firms are only likely to voluntarily separate from
workers if productivity falls very low. Also, the posting of new vacancies is very skewed towards firms
with very good productivity realizations.
Finally, in Figure 1.15 we show the earnings growth distribution conditional on firm revenue growth
being between -0.30 and -0.25 or between 0.25 and 0.30, which corresponds to the groups we already
looked at in the empirical part. This is constructed, as in the data, conditioning on a worker being
employed for the entire twelve months in the base year. The model does capture that the worker earnings
growth distribution has more mass in the left tail for workers employed at shrinking firms. This is
driven by endogenous separations in the firms experiencing shocks to the very worst productivity levels
and renegotiations of wages also in firms where productivities drop at higher levels. The model also
reproduces that there is a lot of mass at zero for workers in shrinking and in growing firms. Finally,
the model reproduces a longer right tail of the earnings growth distribution for workers in growing
firms. Firms that grow tend to have positive productivity shocks and therefore also higher levels of
productivity. In such firms, outside offers are more valuable because the firm can afford to pay for larger
earnings gains.
In Figure 1.16 we additionally condition on the worker being employed for twelve months in the
second year at the same firm. As in the data, the earnings growth distribution of this subsample has
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Figure 1.13 Model: Annual Earnings Growth Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the annual worker earnings growth distribution in the model.
Figure 1.14 Model: Annual Firm Revenue Growth Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the annual firm revenue growth distribution in the model.
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Figure 1.15 Model: Worker Earnings Growth by Firm Revenue Growth
Notes: This figure shows the worker earnings growth distribution conditional on firm revenue growth.
Figure 1.16 Model: Worker Earnings Growth by Firm Revenue Growth (Stayers)
Notes: This figure shows the worker earnings growth distribution of job stayers conditional on firm revenue
growth.
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much lower variance compared to the previous case because there is noone included whose earnings
vary strongly because of unemployment spells. Still, higher firm growth is associated with a shorter
left and a longer right tail of the worker earnings growth distribution because of renegotiations after
productivity shocks and outside offers.
Preliminary Policy Experiments. We use the model to conduct a couple of preliminary exploratory
policy experiments. In principle, the model naturally lends itself to a comparison of policies stabilizing
worker earnings directly at the worker side (progressive taxes, unemployment benefits) or targeting
firms (layoff taxes, vacancy subsidies). Here, we only discuss the trade-offs associated with two of
these policies, which are progressive taxes and vacancy subsidies.
Progressive taxes have a very immediate strong effect on the dispersion in after-tax earnings
and earnings changes. With more progressive taxes, after-tax inequality is significantly reduced and
large pre-tax earnings changes translate into smaller after-tax earnings changes. However, a standard
efficiency-redistribution trade-off emerges. Very progressive taxes lower the surplus especially for high
productivity matches. This discourages vacancy posting by the most productive firms, which leads to
more unemployment in equilibrium and a lower share of workers employed at the highest productivity
firms.
Vacancy subsidies, by contrast, make the creation of vacant jobs cheaper, which stimulates vacancy
posting. In equilibrium, there is a lower unemployment rate and a higher share of employed workers
working at the most productive firms. However, this is a costly policy which needs to be financed by the
government. In future versions, we will compare these and other policies more rigorously.
1.4 Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence from Denmark on worker earnings risk, firm dynamics, and their
relationship. Both the worker earnings growth distribution and the firm revenue distribution are charac-
terized by excess kurtosis: Most workers/firms experience very small changes to their earnings/revenues,
but a significant share of workers/firms sees their earnings/revenues change drastically. The majority of
workers in shrinking and growing firms alike experiences small earnings changes, but the likelihood
of very large earnings drops is significantly higher in shrinking firms. This is driven by separations to
unemployment and wage drops for continuously employed workers.
We then develop a model of multi-worker firms operating in frictional labor markets that features
risk averse workers searching on- and off-the-job and contracting with two-sided limited commitment.
The model, when calibrated to the Danish economy, is consistent with the key patterns found in the
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data. Preliminary policy experiments suggest that policies targeting workers or firms can be used to
stabilize earnings, which is valued by risk averse workers, while creating different efficiency costs.
In the next steps, we are going to estimate the model on Danish data and perform a more rigorous
policy analysis. Also, the worker earnings growth distribution, firm revenue growth distribution, and the
joint distribution exhibit important cyclical patterns. We plan to add aggregate risk in the form of an
MIT shock to the model in order to investigate whether the model is also consistent with the evidence
over the business cycle.
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Chapter 2
Joint Search over the Life Cycle
Abstract This paper studies how the added worker effect - intra-household insurance through in-
creased spousal labor market participation - varies over the life cycle. We show in U.S. data that the
added worker effect is much stronger for young than for old households. A stochastic life cycle model of
two-member households with job search in a frictional labor market is capable of replicating this finding.
The model suggests that a lower added worker effect for the old is driven primarily by better insurance
through asset holdings. Human capital differences between employed young and old contribute to the
difference but are quantitatively less important, while differences in job arrival rates play a limited role.
2.1 Introduction
Household earnings dynamics vary strongly over the life cycle. Recent literature documents that key
moments of the earnings growth distribution exhibit significant age-dependency (De Nardi, Fella, and
Paz-Pardo, 2019; Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song, 2021). Earnings variability is highest for young
individuals as they change jobs frequently before settling into a stable job. However, the earnings
growth distribution is more left-skewed for older individuals: Most of the time older individuals are
employed in stable employment relationships at relatively high wages. If they lose this job, however,
this fall off the job ladder implies very large earnings losses. In this paper we take a complementary
perspective: Instead of investigating how risks change over the life cycle, we study how insurance
against individual earnings risk varies over the life cycle. Specifically, we focus on an insurance margin
against individual earnings and unemployment risk available to couples, the added worker effect (AWE),
where a previously non-participating spouse enters the labor force upon job loss of the primary earner
to stabilize joint earnings.
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While the added worker effect has in general been widely documented, our focus on how it varies
over the life cycle is novel to the literature.1 Age differentials in the AWE are important for a variety of
reasons: Observed heterogeneity along this margin improves our understanding of how well households
at different ages are insured against income losses. Therefore, disparities in the availability of this self-
insurance margin can alter the optimal provision of public insurance over the life cycle. Moreover, in
light of demographic change any difference in the labor market behavior of old versus young households
can change aggregate labor market dynamics.
We begin by providing empirical evidence on the added worker effect over the life cycle: Using data
for the United States from the Current Population Survey (CPS), we show that the likelihood of a non
participating spouse entering the labor force increases significantly when the primary earner loses her
job compared to when she remains employed. We find, however, a strong age-dependency in this effect.
In particular, the added worker effect is largest for young households and continuously declines over
the life cycle. For the age group just before retirement, the added worker effect is almost non-existent.
For young households, job loss of the primary earner is associated with a significant increase in the
likelihood of an out of the labor force spouse entering the labor force both directly to employment
and to unemployment. This finding is robust across education levels, the presence of children in the
household, different reasons for being out of the labor force, different reasons for an employment to
unemployment transition of the primary earner, and looking at only one cohort.
Still, there remain several candidate explanations for the observed change in the AWE over the life
cycle. It might be that older households have accumulated sufficient asset holdings that allow them to
smooth consumption during a potentially temporary job loss of the primary earner. In this case, older
households do not need the added worker effect as an (additional) insurance margin. An out of the labor
force spouse could in principle join the labor force, find employment, and stabilize joint earnings, but
chooses not to do it. Alternatively, it could be that older spouses have been out of the labor force for a
long time such that their labor market qualifications have become less valuable than those of younger
individuals. In this case, spousal labor supply is unavailable as an insurance margin if the spouse can
provide little marketable skills. In order to distinguish between the need for and the availability of the
spousal insurance margin, we build a quantitative model of joint labor supply over the life cycle in a
frictional labor market.
In the model, a household consists of two members, each of whom can be either employed,
unemployed (and actively searching for a job), or out of the labor force. The labor market is frictional,
an individual can only take up employment if she has a job offer. While both out of the labor force and
1See the related literature below for a detailed discussion.
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unemployed individuals can receive job offers, unemployed members increase the chance of finding
a job through costly search. Employed individuals face the risk of (exogenous) separation and wage
changes due to match quality shocks. Human capital is accumulated while employed but depreciates
during non-employment and the couple can jointly save in a risk-free bond. Job arrival rates are
endogenous and determined by the solution to a vacancy posting problem of single-worker firms.
These model ingredients allow us to differentiate between the potential different explanations for
the age dependency in the added worker effect. Household savings are a key alternative insurance
mechanism against individual unemployment risk. With a realistic life cycle savings profile the model
can speak to whether differences in asset holdings between young and old are sufficient to explain
the difference in the observed AWE. On the other hand, human capital accumulation and endogenous
arrival rates allow for the possibility that older households might have fewer opportunities to provide
insurance against individual risk, as human capital depreciates over long spells out of the labor force.
Furthermore, firms might be less willing to hire older individuals as there is only little time remaining
to recover hiring costs. These two model elements capture that older individuals might have fewer
opportunities to provide insurance against a spouse’s job loss.
We calibrate the model to match key features of the U.S. labor market and of inequality over the life
cycle. For the labor market, we focus on matching average transition rates across labor market states as
well as the joint distribution of couples across labor market states. For inequality, we match life cycle
income profiles and asset holdings over the life cycle. Without targeting them, the model reproduces
reasonably well life cycle profiles of labor market transitions as well as very closely the age-dependency
in the added worker effect. The model captures very well that the effect is largest for the young and
smallest for the age group just before retirement.
With the calibrated model at hand, we perform counterfactuals to evaluate which mechanisms are
important in explaining the age-dependency in the added worker effect. Our results suggest a significant
influence of larger asset holdings of older households, which can serve as a cushion against temporary
job loss. Higher human capital levels of old employed spouses relative to their younger counterparts –
accumulated during a longer working life – make spousal labor supply less valuable as an insurance
margin but are quantitatively less important. Differences in job arrival rates for young and old out of the
labor force spouses play a limited role, as they turn out to be relatively low for both age groups.
In future work, we will evaluate the consequences of these mechanisms for the provision of optimal
life cycle unemployment insurance. For such an analysis it is key to match the risk exposure of
households over their life cycle as well as the private insurance mechanisms, which could be crowded
out through public transfer payments. As our model covers a wide range of insurance mechanisms
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available to households at different stages of their life cycle, the framework naturally lends itself to this
question. Michelacci and Ruffo (2015) study optimal life cycle unemployment insurance using a single
earner life cycle search model.2 They argue that unemployment insurance should be more generous
for the young than for the old, as the insurance value is very high for individuals with little assets and
the moral hazard problem is limited, as young individuals need to accumulate labor market experience.
Studying this question in a search model of couples is relevant because unemployment insurance could
crowd out the added worker effect, which is an important insurance margin for the young.
Related Literature. The added worker effect is widely studied in the empirical literature, going back
to the seminal contribution of Lundberg (1985). The early literature following this paper does not
find much evidence supporting the presence of the added worker effect in the data (Maloney, 1987,
1991). More recent literature, however, documents a positive added worker effect as a relevant insurance
mechanism against the primary earner’s job loss (Bredtmann, Otten, and Rulff, 2018; Guner, Kulikova,
and Valladares-Esteban, 2020; Halla, Schmieder, and Weber, 2020; Stephens, 2002), using data for a
wide variety of countries. Mankart and Oikonomou (2016b) and Mankart, Oikonomou, and Pascucci
(2021) show that the added worker effect has become more important in the U.S. over the last decades.
The literature also argues that the size of the added worker effect crucially depends on the institutional
environment and the state of the business cycle. For example, Cullen and Gruber (2000) show that
generous unemployment insurance crowds out a spousal labor supply response. Expanding upon
previous work, we argue that there is a sizeable age-dependency in the added worker effect.
While the added worker effect has been studied extensively in the empirical literature, the vast
majority of the large macro-labor literature focuses on the job search problem of a single earner
household. Guler, Guvenen, and Violante (2012) is among the first papers to study the joint search
problem of a couple by extending the classic single-agent search problems of McCall (1970), Mortensen
(1970), and Burdett (1978). A number of recent papers introduces asset accumulation into the joint
search framework, expanding on the single agent search problem with asset accumulation as in Lentz
(2009), Krusell, Mukoyama, and Şahin (2010), and Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson, and Şahin (2017).
The focus of these papers is mostly on business cycle dynamics. Mankart and Oikonomou (2016a)
build a search model with two member households to explain the cyclical properties of employment and
labor force participation. Wang (2019) builds a model showing that joint household search is crucial for
accounting for the countercyclicality of womens’ unemployment rate. Ellieroth (2019) argues that there
2Optimal age-dependent policies are also commonly studied in public finance. See for example Erosa and
Gervais (2002), Weinzierl (2011), and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2020a).
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is precautionary labor supply by spouses whose partners face an increased job loss risk in recessions.
Garcia-Perez and Rendon (2020) focus on the role of household wealth for the added worker effect.
Birinci (2019), Choi and Valladares-Esteban (2020), and Fernández-Blanco (2020) investigate the
implications of joint search for optimal unemployment insurance. Bardóczy (2020) focuses on the role
of spousal labor supply as an automatic stabilizer for aggregate consumption. Relative to these papers,
we focus on the life cycle dimension of the joint search problem to analyze whether the age-dependency
in the added worker effect is explained by changing opportunities or changing insurance margins.
Life cycle search problems have been studied in the literature, but mostly in single earner frameworks.
Chéron, Hairault, and Langot (2011, 2013) extend the random search framework of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) to a life cycle setting. Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers (2016) build a directed search
life cycle model in the tradition of Moen (1997) and Menzio and Shi (2011). Griffy (2021) extends
their model by incorporating risk averse workers and borrowing constraints. More closely related to
our paper, Haan and Prowse (2017) propose a structural life cycle model of labor supply, consumption,
and savings of married couples. They focus on the optimal mix of unemployment insurance and social
assistance but do not discuss any age-dependency in the added worker effect. Finally, the current paper
is related to a number of studies analyzing life cycle labor supply decisions of couples in incomplete
market frameworks (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten, 2016; Ortigueira and Siassi, 2013; Wu
and Krueger, 2021).
Roadmap. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 contains the empirical evidence. In Section 2.3
we introduce the model setup. Section 2.4 contains the calibration and section 2.5 the results. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 Evidence
We begin by providing evidence on the added worker effect from U.S. micro data. The following section
first explains the data and the sample selection criteria. In a next step, we provide empirical evidence of
the AWE in our sample and show that its magnitude is decreasing in age.
2.2.1 The Sample
To compute joint labor market transitions, we work with data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The CPS is a monthly rotating panel which is representative for the U.S. population. Households enter
the survey for four consecutive months, drop out for eight months, and are re-interviewed for another
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four months. In our setting, the unit of observation is a couple. Our final sample spans from 1994 until
2020 (pre-Covid) and is restricted to couples who are both between 25 and 65 years old. We mainly
focus on couples with one spouse working and the other spouse out of the labor force. We include both
legally married as well as cohabiting couples, irrespectively of their sex. In contrast, we drop couples
who report that one spouse lives permanently outside of the household or is institutionalized. Moreover,
we only keep couples for whom we observe the labor market status of both spouses in every month
that they are interviewed. Throughout the analysis, we weigh each observation by the provided survey
weights.
2.2.2 Uncovering the AWE from Joint Labor Market Transitions
We follow Guner, Kulikova, and Valladares-Esteban (2020) in our method to calculate the added worker
effect from the data. First, we classify all individuals either as employed (E), unemployed (U) or
non-participating (N) as outlined in the CPS. Hence, there exist nine possible combinations of labor
market states for each couple. A common issue when considering multiple non-employment states is
misclassification between unemployment and non-participation, resulting in implausibly high transition
rates across these two. We therefore adjust labor market flows as in Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015)
and re-classify individuals who report to be unemployed (non-participating) in one month but to be out
of the labor force (unemployed) in both the following and in the previous month as non-participating
(unemployed).
In a next step, we pool all observations and construct a 3×3 matrix of joint labor market transition
probabilities, conditional on the couple having one member previously employed and one out of the
labor force. Table 2.1 and Table 2.3 display our main results. In each table, the columns refer to
the monthly labor market transition of the household’s primary earner, that is either employment-to-
employment (EE), employment-to-unemployment (EU), or employment-to-non-participating (EN).
In contrast, each row indicates the probability of the spousal labor market transition, conditional on
the respective transition of the primary earner. Given that for this exercise we only include couples
with one member employed and the other one non-participating, spouses can either transition from
non-participating to employment (NE), from non-participating to unemployment (NU) or remain out of
the labor force (NN). We define the added worker effect as the change in the conditional probability
of the spouse transitioning from non-participating to employment (NE) or from non-participating to
unemployment (NU) if the primary earner becomes unemployed (EU) in contrast to when the primary
earner remains employed (EE). Referring to Table 2.1, we compute the added worker effect as the
difference between the second and first column, adding up the first and the second row.
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Table 2.1 Joint Labor Market Transitions (Full Sample)
Primary earner transition
EE EU EN
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.03% 8.01% 16.79%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.63% 5.55% 1.33%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 92.34% 86.44% 81.88%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from out of the labor force conditional on primary
earner transitions for the entire population.
Overall Effect
Table 2.1 shows the overall strength of the added worker effect in our sample. The likelihood that
a spouse enters the labor force increases by 5.9 percentage points, if the primary earner becomes
unemployed compared to when the primary earner remains employed, confirming the existence of the
added worker effect in our sample.3 This result is in line with Guner, Kulikova, and Valladares-Esteban
(2020), who find an overall AWE of 6.89 percentage points with CPS data spanning from 1976 to 2018
for couples between 25 and 54 years.
Zooming in on the precise margin of adjustment, we find that the conditional probability of the
spouse transitioning directly into employment increases by 1.98 percentage points, whereas the condi-
tional probability of the spouse transitioning into unemployment increases by 3.92 points. Thus, around
two thirds of the overall AWE arise from individuals transitioning into unemployment, highlighting the
importance of explicitly distinguishing between unemployed and non-participating individuals. Some
couples may wish to leverage spousal labor supply as an insurance margin against job loss but labor
market frictions (or the lack of appropriate job offers) may prevent them from doing so. If we only
considered transitions from non-employment into employment, we would hence largely understate
spousal labor supply adjustments in response to the job loss of the primary earner.
To further investigate the added worker effect, Table 2.2 splits primary earners by the reason for
why they became unemployed. In particular, we distinguish between laid-off workers (who face a
high chance of being recalled), job losers, workers whose temporary contracts ended, and voluntarily
job leavers. Table 2.2, which splits the EU transition of the primary earner by reason for entering
3In this paper we focus on the transitions of out of the labor force spouses conditional on the labor market
transitions of primary earners. In the appendix, Tables B.1 and B.2 we also report the conditional transition
probabilities of unemployed and employed spouses, respectively. There is a slightly higher likelihood that
unemployed spouses transition to employment or stay unemployed rather than leave the labor force if the primary
earner loses the job compared to the primary earner staying employed. However, evidence for insurance through
spousal labor supply is strongest when considering out of the labor force spouses, which we focus on.
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Table 2.2 AWE by reasons of Unemployment for Household Head
EE EU (by reasons for U)
Layoff Job Loser Temp. Job ended Job Leaver
NE 6.03% 6.13% 8.81% 7.56% 10.47%
NU 1.63% 3.51% 6.66% 6.59% 7.68%
NN 92.34% 90.35% 84.53% 85.85% 81.86 %
Notes: This table shows the added worker effect (as defined in the main text) by reason for the EU transition of
the primary earner.
unemployment, shows that our finding is not solely driven by household members voluntarily quitting
(column Job Leavers, especially with spouse NE) upon employment of their partner. The effect for
those exogenously separated (Job Losers) is of similar magnitude, with a slightly decreased AWE for
households in which the head’s job loss can be seen as expected (Temp. Job ended) or as temporary in
nature (Layoff ).
While in the main text we focus on couples where one spouse is employed and the other is out
of the labor force, in Appendix B.1 we include similar tables for couples that start as both employed
or with one employed and one unemployed member. We can also see in these transition matrices
that unemployed spouses are slightly more likely to enter employment or keep looking for jobs rather
than dropping out of the labor force if the primary earner moves from employment to unemployment
compared to when the primary earner stays employed. However, the main pattern that emerges from
these two transition matrices is that couples often make joint transitions: The likelihood of a spouse
dropping out of the labor force is drastically increased when the primary earner also transitions from
employment or unemployment to out of the labor force.
The Added Worker Effect by Age
To analyze the life cycle dimension of the added worker effect, we split our sample into four age
brackets and construct joint labor market transitions for each group in the same manner as above. Table
2.3 displays the results. We find a strong age-dependency in the strength of the AWE: For the youngest
group (25 to 35 years), the likelihood that the spouse enters the labor force upon the job loss of the
primary earner increases by 7.53 percentage points, for the young middle aged (36 to 45 years) it
increases by 7.10 points, for the older middle aged (46 to 55 years) by 5.00 points, and eventually it
only slightly increases by 1.29 points for the oldest group (56 to 65 years). Thus, spousal labor supply
adjustments of the youngest age group are more than five times larger than for the oldest age group.
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Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.66% 9.30% 26.93%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 2.00% 6.89% 2.02%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.34% 83.81% 71.05%
Age Spouse 36-45:
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.73% 9.32% 26.69%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.86% 6.37% 2.00%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.41% 84.31% 71.30%
Age Spouse 46-55:
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.13% 7.96% 16.62%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.62% 4.79% 1.72%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 92.25% 87.25% 81.66%
Age Spouse 56-65:
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.29% 3.73% 8.69%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 0.90% 2.75% 0.56%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 94.81% 93.52% 90.76%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from out of the labor force conditional on primary
earner transitions by age group.
More specifically, for the young, we find behavioral responses both from non-participating directly
into employment (2.64 percentage points) as well as into unemployment (4.89 percentage points). Thus,
the relative share of young individuals transitioning directly into employment is slightly larger than
for the entire sample. However, for the oldest age group, we only find small behavioral responses into
unemployment (1.85 percentage points) and no response directly into employment (-0.56 points).
2.2.3 Dynamic Response
So far, we have focused on the contemporaneous spousal labor supply response, that is, the probability
that a spouse enters the labor force in the same month as the head transitions into unemployment.
This most likely understates the overall strength of the added worker effect since spousal labor supply
responses may occur in prior months (anticipation effects) or some months delayed. In fact, Ellieroth
(2019) documents spousal insurance not only in response to actual job loss of the primary earner but
also in anticipation of such event, a phenomenon that she names “precautionary labor supply”. To
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β - coefficient with CI
Figure 2.1 ∆ Pr(Spouse enters LF) this month
Notes: Figure 2.1 shows the change in probability that a non-participating spouse enters the labor force (either as
unemployed or as employed) if the household head loses/lost the job in two months, next month, this month, last
month or two months ago, respectively, relative to the baseline in which the household head remains employed.
The sample includes couples in which one spouse is working and one spouse is out of the labor force between
age 25 and 65 from the Current Population Survey (CPS), waves 1994 until 2020. The regression producing the
coefficients is Equation 2.1.
specification:
∆LFSspit = α j +β j∆ES
h
it+ j + γ jXit + ε jit , (2.1)
where ∆LFSspit is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the non-participating spouse of couple i transitions
either into employment or into unemployment between month t −1 and t, and 0 if she or he remains
out of the labor force. Similarly, ∆EShit is defined as a dummy taking the value 1 if the primary earner
transitions from employment into unemployment whereas it is 0 if the head stays in employment. Xit
further controls for month fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, state fixed-effects, sex, race, education,
children as well as the quarterly unemployment rate in the couple’s state of residence.
Our coefficient of interest is β j, indicating the likelihood that the spouse enters the labor force
in month t if the household head transitions into unemployment in month t + j versus when he or
she remains employed (i.e. the strength of the AWE in month t + j). We conduct the analysis for
j = {−2,−1,0,1,2}. In the CPS, we observe the same couple for at most four consecutive months and
hence a maximum of three consecutive labor market transitions, preventing us from considering more
distant leads and lags. Figure 2.1 reports the results for the entire sample, whereas Figure 2.2 splits the
observations by age.
In line with section 2.2.2, Figure 2.1 confirms the overall strength of the AWE of around 6.1 percent-
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β - coefficient with CI
(b) Age 56 to 65
Figure 2.2 ∆ Pr(Spouse enters LF) this month
Notes: Figure 2.2 shows the change in probability that a non-participating spouse enters the labor force (either as
unemployed or as employed) if the household head loses/lost the job in two months, next month, this month, last
month or two months ago, respectively, relative to the baseline in which the household head remains employed.
The sample includes couples in which one spouse is working and one spouse is out of the labor force between age
25 and 35 (Figure 2.2a) and between age 56 and 65 (Figure 2.2b) from the Current Population Survey (CPS),
waves 1994 until 2020. Age refers to the non-participating spouse. The regression producing the coefficients is
Equation 2.1.
from zero. In addition to the contemporaneous effect, we find strong support of both anticipation
and lagged effects, albeit of lower magnitude. Overall, our results indicate that spousal labor supply
responses in the months preceding and in the months after the primary earner’s job loss are around
half as strong as the direct response. When splitting the sample by age (Figure 2.2), we find that the
contemporaneous effect is statistically significant for all age groups, however it is around five times
stronger for the young than for the old. Moreover, young households display both lagged responses as
well as anticipation effects, whereas we cannot confirm any clear pattern of those among households
between 56 and 65 years. We relegate the results for the two middle age groups to Figure B.1 in the
appendix.
Lastly, in Figure 2.3, we again split the sample by reasons for unemployment of the primary earner
(as in Table 2.2). Generally, the figure confirms that the probability that a non-participating spouse
enters the labor force increases most if the EU transition of the primary earner is due to a quit or job
loss, and less so in case of a layoff when there is a chance of being recalled. Interestingly, for spouses
of household heads who voluntarily leave their job the effect two months ahead and the two month
lagged effect are smaller, while the effect in the month before and after the primary earner transition
is larger. This finding can be taken as indication that these labor market transitions are coordinated
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β - coefficient with CI
(d) Job Leaver
Figure 2.3 ∆ Pr(Spouse enters LF) this month
Notes: Figure 2.3 shows the change in probability that a non-participating spouse enters the labor force (either as
unemployed or as employed) if the household head loses/lost the job in two months, next month, this month, last
month or two months ago, respectively, relative to the baseline in which the household head remains employed;
split by reasons for unemployment of the household head. Specifically, Figure 2.3a shows the results if the
household head is on layoff, Figure 2.3b if the household head lost his job, Figure 2.3c if a temporary job ended
and Figure 2.3d if the head voluntarily quit his or her job. The sample includes couples in which one spouse is
working and one spouse is out of the labor force between age 25 and 65 from the Current Population Survey
(CPS), waves 1994 until 2020. The regression producing the coefficients is Equation 2.1.
2.2.4 Robustness
In this section, we explore further channels that could result in the observed age-dependency in the
added worker effect without relating to life cycle heterogeneity in the insurance value of the AWE
itself and neither to other insurance margins that differ by age.4 All corresponding tables are listed in
Appendix B.1.
Education. If educational attainment differs by age and at the same time affects spousal labor
supply responses, the stronger AWE for younger couples may simply arise from differences in education
levels between old and young couples.5 Indeed, Table B.3 confirms that the AWE is larger for spouses
4Some of these variables are also included as controls in the regressions. We still address the economically
most important ones explicitly in this section.
5Generally, heterogeneity in education levels by age is low: around 45% of spouses among the youngest age
group have a college degree, whereas around 40% of spouses among the oldest age group do.
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with a college degree. However, when splitting the sample by age and education (Panel III to VI in
Table B.3), the decreasing magnitude of the AWE over the life cycle holds both among spouses with a
college degree and among those without a college degree.
Cohort Effects. If preferences for labor supply or within household insurance differ by cohorts,
any age-dependency in the added worker effect between old and young couples may be driven by these
underlying preference shifts. Female labor force participation increased substantially between the 1960s
and the 1990s. Hence, entering the labor force upon the head’s job loss may be easier for young couples
if deviations from the traditional family model are societally more accepted. We address this concern in
two ways. First, we split our sample by gender and age. Male labor force participation changed to a
much lesser extent than that of women. Hence, if we can replicate the age-dependency in the AWE for
couples in which the non-participating spouse is a man, possible cohort effects are less concerning. Table
B.4 (Panels I and II) shows the results of this exercise. Although we find that the overall probability of
the spouse joining the labor force is higher when the non-participating household member is a man,
we do not find significant changes in the strength of the AWE (i.e. in the increased likelihood that the
spouse enters the labor force when the household head becomes unemployed, compared to when the
head remains employed). Focusing only on male non-participating spouses, young households still
show a stronger AWE than older couples. We take this as suggestive evidence that our results are not
driven by changing patterns of female labor force participation.
Of course, couples for which a man is non-participating could be a particular selection whose
preferences differ from those of the remaining population. Therefore, we extract one cohort and repeat
the empirical exercise on this restricted sample. In particular, we focus on couples in which the non-
participating spouse was born between 1960 and 1970. We choose this timespan to ensure sufficiently
many observations both for the young and for the old age brackets. Table B.4 (Panel III and IV) reports
the results. Again, we can confirm the decreasing magnitude of the AWE over the life cycle for this
particular cohort, i.e. for the same cohort when young and when old.
Children. Young couples are more likely to have children living in their household, which arguably
affects labor supply behavior and could therefore result in the observed differences of spousal labor
supply insurance. On the one hand, couples with children might have stronger incentives to enter the
labor force in response to the job loss of the primary earner because they have larger consumption
commitments and stronger saving motives (e.g. saving for college). On the other hand, if household
members specialize in childcare and paid work, the willingness of the spouse who specializes in
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childcare to enter the labor force might be low. To address this issue, Table B.5 reports the AWE for
couples below age 40 (to avoid picking up age-effects) with and without children as well as for couples
below age 40 with and without children under age five (who require the most childcare). We do not
find any (significant) differences in the overall strength of the AWE between couples with and without
children across both specifications. As expected, out of the labor force spouses in couples without any
children have a higher baseline probability of entering the labor force, independently of the labor market
transition of the primary earner. However, we do not find any differential effect of the primary earner
transitioning to unemployment on the probability to join the labor force between spouses in couples
with and without children.
Reasons for Non-Participation. Individuals do not participate in the labor force for a variety of
reasons that are age-dependent. At the same time, the reason for being out of the labor force can
affect the strength of the added worker effect. For example, if the non-participating spouse is retired,
transitioning back into the labor force has a much smaller insurance value because of pension payments.
Similarly, if the non-participating spouse dropped out because of bad health, she or he might simply
not be able to start working if the primary earner becomes unemployed. Arguably, both retirement and
health related non-participation are more prevalent among the old. Therefore, Table B.6 repeats the
empirical analysis excluding retired spouses (Panels I and II), disabled or ill spouses (Panels III and
IV), as well as excluding both retired and disabled/ill spouses (Panels V and VI). Unsurprisingly, these
restrictions do not impact our baseline results for the young age group in any way. However, we also do
not find any significant impact on the strength of the AWE among the old. If anything, spouses are more
likely to join the labor force in general when excluding retirees, however, the increase in the likelihood
of entering (un)employment in response to the primary earner’s job loss is not larger (or smaller) when
repeating the analysis on the three subsamples.
Business Cycle. We investigate whether the results differ by the state of the business cycle, as
much of the literature on joint search focuses on the business cycle (e.g. Mankart and Oikonomou
(2016a) and Birinci (2019)). In Table B.7 we split the sample by NBER recessions and expansions.
The state of the business cycle might matter for the added worker effect in several ways. On the one
hand, if a primary earner loses a job in a recession, it might be harder to find a job again, so that
insurance through spousal labor supply could be more important. On the other hand, it could also
be harder for an out of the labor force spouse to find a job and provide this insurance. We do not,
52
however, find large differences in the AWE across young and old for different states of the business cycle.
Income. A deficiency of the CPS for our analysis is that we do not observe asset holdings of
households, which are another key insurance margin available to them. We have, however, some
information on total income of a couple over the past year. This may proxy for the ability of households
to build up savings, but is also correlated with other characteristics such as education. We split couples
into income terciles and compute transition matrices for these different income groups. They are
reported in Table B.8. Pooling all age groups we observe a sizeable AWE for low and high income
groups. For the old, the added worker effect is relatively weak for both low and high income groups.
When only considering the young, the AWE is smaller for the high income group than for the low
income group. This may reflect that within the high income group the primary earner may have a higher
chance of being reemployed or that the high income group has larger savings. Both these channels will
be present in the our quantitative theory, to which we turn next.6
2.3 Model
The empirical evidence presented so far suggests that there is a significant age-dependency in the
added worker effect: Spousal labour supply is a more important insurance margin for young than for
old couples. We now build a life cycle search model with two-member households in order to better
understand why the added worker effect is more prevalent among the young.
2.3.1 Environment
The economy is populated by two-member households. We assume that both members have the same
age. Households live for T periods, after which they die deterministically. Households retire jointly
after a working life of TW periods, so that retirement lasts T −TW periods.
During working life an individual can be in one of four labor market states. An individual can be
employed (E), in which case the agent receives a wage payment. If the individual does not have a job,
there are three other labor market states: First, an agent may be unemployed and receive benefits (U).
Second, the agent can be unemployed without receiving benefits (S). In both these states, the agent
exerts costly search effort in order to increase the probability of finding a job. Third, an agent may
choose to not exert this costly search effort. In that case, the agent is considered to be out of the labor
6In ongoing work, we extend our empirical analysis using data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). We started with the CPS as it is the main source for monthly labor market statistics in the
United States. The SIPP, however, has the advantage that we can observe households’ asset holdings.
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Figure 2.4 Human Capital Transitions
Notes: Figure 2.4 illustrates human capital transitions in the model.
force (N). Individuals who are not actively searching can never receive unemployment benefits. Given
these four individual labor market states, there are 16 combined labor market states for a two-member
household: jk ∈ J = {E,U,S,N}×{E,U,S,N}.
Each household member is endowed with a level of human capital, which evolves stochastically
depending on the agent’s employment status and current human capital level. If an individual member is
employed, the human capital will go up by one unit with probability φ up(h). For non-employed agents,
human capital drops by one unit with probability φ down(h). This process is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
While employed, an individual is also characterized by match quality z, which evolves according
to a first-order Markov process. The match quality and the human capital level jointly determine the
wage an individual receives. Non-employed individuals do not have a match quality, but draw one upon
finding a new job.
Individual labor market transitions are illustrated in Figure 2.5. An employed agent can receive an
exogenous separation shock with probability δ (h), which depends on the level of human capital. If such
a separation shocks occurs, the agent transitions to unemployment and receives unemployment benefits.
Note that in case of a separation shock an agent can choose to immediately leave the labor force instead
of becoming unemployed and receiving benefits. This can be beneficial because no costly search effort
is exerted while out of the labor force. If there is no separation shock, the individual can choose between
staying employed and quitting. If she chooses to quit, she can either become unemployed without
receiving benefits or leave the labor force entirely.
An unemployed agent who receives benefits can transition to all other labor market states. First, she
receives a job offer with probability λU(xi) and transitions to employment if she chooses to accept the
offer. The arrival rates with which non-employed agents receive job offers are endogenously determined
as the solution to an optimal vacancy posting problem of firms (see below) and for household member
i depend on state xi = {hi,h−i,z−i,a′, jk}. An agent can choose to reject an offer and might do so if







































Figure 2.5 Labor Market Transitions in the Model
Notes: Figure 2.5 illustrates possible labor market transitions in the model. xi = {hi,h−i,z−i,a′, jk} is the relevant
state for the arrival rate of household member i.
a potentially better match quality draw. Second, an unemployed worker who receives benefits can
stochastically lose benefit eligibility with probability φUS. This captures that unemployment benefits
run out after a certain time period. Third, she can choose to stop searching and leave the labor force.
Similarly, an unemployed worker without benefits receives job offers with probability λ S(xi) and can
quit the labor force.
Finally, out of the labor force agents receive job offers with probability λ N(xi), even though they do
not exert active search effort. This assumption is necessary to capture the empirical observation that
individuals directly transition from out of the labor force into employment. Moreover, non-participating
agents can rejoin the labor force as unemployed without benefits.
While each household member has an individual labor market state, human capital level, and match
quality shock when employed, households jointly have access to a risk-free bond. They can save in this
bond at the exogenous interest rate r. Borrowing is not allowed.
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Notes: This table shows the labor supply choice sets of households.
2.3.2 Household Search Problem
Timing in the model is as follows: In each period, households first receive their labor income (wages or
unemployment benefits) as well as their asset income from investing in the risk-free bond. Given their
budget constraint, households then make a consumption-savings choice. Afterwards, first separation
shocks, job offers as well as potential losses of benefit eligibility are realized for both household
members in parallel. Afterwards, match quality shocks and human capital transitions are revealed.
Finally, households choose their joint future labor market state from the feasible subset of J , which is
determined by their previous labor market state and job offers, separations, and benefit eligibility losses.
Table 2.4 summarizes all possible combinations of job opportunities and unemployment benefit
eligibility of the two household members along with the associated choice sets over joint labor market
states. The superscripts to J indicate whether the household members have the opportunity to be
employed. An employment opportunity arises either because an agent was employed in the previous
period and did not receive a separation shock or because an agent received a job offer while non-
employed. If both members have the opportunity to be employed, the superscript is EE. In contrast, X
indicates that a member cannot be employed. Hence, EX and XE are the cases where only one member
has a job opportunity, whereas XX indicates that neither household member can be employed in the
following period.
The logic for the subscripts is similar. However, they refer to unemployment benefit eligibility of
the individual household member. Again, U indicates eligibility, while X refers to non-eligibility.
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We are now in the position to formally state the household search problem. The value function of a
household of age t in joint labor market state jk is
V jkt (z,h,a) = max
a′




where the additional state variables are the match quality shocks of both household members (z =
(z1,z2)), their human capital levels (h = (h1,h2)), and joint asset holdings a. Households value
consumption c according to the utility function u(c). Consumption is pooled within the household.
Additionally, instantaneous utility is affected by ψ which is allowed to depend on the labor market state
and age. It captures disutility from search and the utility of staying at home. Households discount their
continuation value Θ, which is described in detail below, with discount factor β .
Households choose assets for the next period subject to their budget constraint
c jk(z,h,a,a′) = I j=Ew(z1,h1)+ Ik=Ew(z2,h2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor income
+ I j=U b̄+ Ik=U b̄︸ ︷︷ ︸
unemployment benefits
−(a′− (1+ r)a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net savings
. (2.3)
Depending on their employment status households receive wage and benefit income. In addition to this,
a household can use its assets and interest income to finance consumption and new purchases of the
risk-free bond.
To write the continuation utility for one labor market state explicitly, we consider a household with
two employed members today. Since both members are employed, the relevant state variables are two
match quality shocks and two human capital levels. In addition, the continuation utility depends on the
asset choice.
We express the continuation value in two steps. First, we take expectations over separation shocks





(1−δ (h1))(1−δ (h2)) Ṽt+1(z1,z2,h1,h2,a′,J EEXX )
+δ (h1)(1−δ (h2)) Ṽt+1(z1,z2,h1,h2,a′,J XEUX )
+(1−δ (h1))δ (h2) Ṽt+1(z1,z2,h1,h2,a′,J EXXU )
+δ (h1)δ (h2) Ṽt+1(z1,z2,h1,h2,a′,J XXUU ).
(2.4)
If neither member is exogenously separated (first line), both household members have the opportunity
to work, but neither of them is eligible for benefits if he or she chooses to voluntarily quit. Hence,
the feasible set of labor market states is denoted by J EEXX . Lines 2 and 3 deal with the cases in which
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one member is exogenously separated whereas the last line considers the case in which both members
receive the separation shock. In these instances, the exogenously separated member is eligible for
benefits but cannot be employed in the next period.
In a second step, we consider transitions for match quality z and human capital h as well as the
household’s discrete choice over feasible future labor market states:
Ṽt+1(z1,z2,h1,h2,a′,J OPQR ) =
φ









































For employed individuals human capital can either remain constant or increase. Each line of equation 2.5
corresponds to one of the resulting four combinations of possible human capital transitions. Moreover,
in each case, expectations are also taken with respect to match quality shocks.
The possible choices of future labor market states can be read off Table 2.4. ε ∈ R|J
OP
QR | is a vector
of iid, Type-I extreme value (Gumbel) shocks with mean zero. We introduce these taste shocks for
computational purposes, as they smooth out kinks and discontinuities in the policy functions that arise
from the discrete choices over labor market states. We choose the variance of these taste shocks to be
small enough such that they do not affect the solution to the problem in an economically meaningful
way.
While we outline here the continuation value for a household with two employed members today,
the problem for all other current joint labor market states evolves in a very similar manner: In equation
2.4, instead of separation shocks expectations are formed over job offer arrivals and potential losses of
benefit eligibility for non-employed members. Equation 2.5 remains mostly unaffected except for initial
draws of z out of non-employment, which stem from an initial distribution and are unaffected by past
realizations of z.
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2.3.3 Vacancy Posting and Endogenous Arrival Rates
To determine the job arrival rates of households endogenously we look at the optimal vacancy posting
problem of single-job firms. We assume free entry of firms and a cost κ of posting a vacancy. A vacancy
lasts for one period and if not filled can be renewed by paying κ again.
A match with quality z between a firm and a worker with human capital h produces per period
output y(z,h), of which the worker receives a constant share χ as a wage w(z,h) = χy(z,h), yielding
firms’ per period profit of such match as π(z,h) = (1−χ)y(z,h).
The expected future value to a firm of a match with a worker i from a household with current state
xi = (t,zi,z−i,hi,h−i,a, jk) and asset choice for next period a′ , given that the household can choose the
joint future labor market state from set J OPQR , is defined as
EJ jkt+1(z1,z2,h1,h2,a
′,J OPQR ) =












where E ĵk∈J OPQR I ĵ=E|x′ is firms’ expectation of the household’s joint labor market choice and an indicator
of whether for each joint state member i stays with the firm, i.e. is firms’ expectation over endogenous
acceptances and quits. The contemporaneous value to the firm is then given by




′,J EPXR ), (2.7)
where EP,R is a firm’s expectation over job loss, job finding, and eligibility transitions of the spouse
and a′ = a(t,z1,z2,h1,h2,a, jk) is the household’s asset choice.
We discuss the determination of endogenous arrival rates using the example of a household with
both members unemployed but not eligible for benefits, i.e. a household with initial labor market state
SS. Define member i’s arrival rate as
λt(hi,h−i,a, jk) = λS p(θt(hi,h−i,a, jk)) (2.8)
with arrival rate p(θ) = m(1,θ) and corresponding vacancy filling rate q(θ) = m( 1
θ
,1), where m(U,V )
is the standard Cobb-Douglas matching function, with market tightness θ denoting the ratio of vacancies
over searchers in any given submarket. Hence p(θ) = θ 1−α , q(θ) = θ−α , and p(θ) = θq(θ). The λS is
an exogenous shifter that only depends on the previous labor market state and reflects the consequences
of differences in search effort between unemployed (U or S) and out of the labor force (N). This
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is necessary to impose as – conditional on the remaining states of the household – firms will not
differentiate whether they hire a worker out of unemployment or out of the labor force.
Free entry imposes that the expected value of a vacancy (probability of filling times the value if filled)
has to equal the cost of posting κ . This condition determines relevant market tightness θt(hi,h−i,a, jk).
The free entry condition needs to satisfy
κ =q(θt(hi,h−i,a, jk))EPEJ jkt+1(z1,z2,h1,h2,a
′,J EPXX ). (2.9)
Here EP captures expectations over the spouse’s job finding and is an equation in the spouse’s
θt(h−i,hi,a, jk) as the spouse is also currently not employed. Hence, in all cases with currently
two non-employed household members we have to solve a system of two non-linear equations in two
unknowns.
With slight abuse of notation the two equations solving for two θs can be written as
κ = q(θ1)[λ (θ2)EJSSt+1(h1,h2,a
′,J EEXX )︸ ︷︷ ︸
EJEE1
+(1−λ (θ2))EJSSt+1(h1,h2,a′,J EXXX )︸ ︷︷ ︸
EJEX1
], (2.10)
κ = q(θ2)[λ (θ1)EJSSt+1(h2,h1,a
′,J EEXX )︸ ︷︷ ︸
EJEE2

































which is a non linear equation in one unknown and can be solved numerically.
The endogenous arrival rates can be derived in a similar fashion for other cases of original labor
market states. The exogenous component of λ needs to be adjusted to reflect whether an agent is
unemployed or out of the labor force. Solving for endogenous arrival rates gets substantially easier if
one spouse has been previously employed since in this case we only have one θ and hence we only
need to solve one equation with one unknown.
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Given this setup, the job finding probabilities of an individual depend on all the state variables,
including assets, age, and own human capital, but also the spouse’s human capital, employment status,
and potentially match quality. For age, this is exactly what we want to get out of this problem. As
agents get older it may be harder for them to find new jobs, as firms are reluctant to hire them. This
is captured in this setup because older agents have to retire at a certain age and therefore there is less
time for for firms to recover the vacancy posting cost. In our calibration, this effect is strong close to
retirement but relatively weak at young ages because for young individuals it is quite likely that the
match is dissolved before retirement in any case.
It is also intuitive that arrival rates depend on an individual’s human capital. It is potentially less
appealing that we also condition on the spouse’s state variables. It is necessary, however, because
it influences the probabilities of an individual accepting a certain job and quitting later on. Having
different submarkets and free entry in each active submarket simplifies computation drastically, as we
do not need to know the distribution of individuals across states to solve for arrival rates.
This setup for determining age-dependent arrival rates in the labor market generally implies arrival
rates decreasing in age, decreasing in assets because richer individuals are more likely to quit, increasing
in human capital because the value of the match is higher and individuals are less likely to quit,
increasing in match quality for the same reasons, and decreasing in a spouse’s employment, human
capital, and match quality because having a spouse earning high wages increases the quit probability
and lowers the value of a match to the firm.
2.3.4 Numerical Implementation
In our setup, agents do not face risk during retirement. This assumption renders the household problem
during retirement very simple. We solve the retirement problem using the endogenous grid method of
Carroll (2006) to obtain a terminal condition for the household problem during working life.
The household problem during working life is high-dimensional because of the many combinations
of labor market states and the fact that we have to keep track of match quality shocks and human capital
for both members. Furthermore, given our focus on labor market transitions, the model has a monthly
frequency. For computational efficiency, we therefore solve the household problem following Iskhakov,
Jørgensen, Rust, and Schjerning (2017), who extend the endogenous grid-point method of Carroll
(2006) to problems with discrete and continuous choices. Thus, their approach is well suited for our
problem with a discrete choice over labor market states and a continuous asset choice.
The algorithm proceeds as follows: Within each period, given future value functions of both the
household and firm, we begin by determining households’ choices over future labor market states for
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each potential choice set. With this, we are able to solve firms’ vacancy posting problem and determine
endogenous arrival rates. Endogenous arrival rates given, we can solve households’ consumption-
savings problem as described above. In a final step, we update households’ and firms’ value functions
making use of households’ policy functions and again the endogenous arrival rates.
2.4 Calibration
We solve the model at a monthly frequency. This assumption is in line with the frequency at which we
observe labor market transitions in the data and necessary because the U.S. labor market exhibits high
rates of turnover. We assume that the period of working life is 40 years, corresponding to 480 months.
The retirement period is another 120 months, i.e. 10 years.
2.4.1 Functional Form Assumptions





where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The second part of instantaneous utility that has to
be parameterized is the parameter ψ jkt , which captures the disutility of search and utility of staying at
home. Naturally, this parameter can differ depending on the joint labor market state reflecting disutility
of work and search. Furthermore, we allow it to vary by age.7
Output is assumed to be the product of human capital and the match quality shock:
y(h,z) = hz. (2.15)
Human capital is defined on an equidistant grid. The probabilities of moving to a higher (lower) human
capital level when employed (non-employed) are given by the following processes:
φ
up (i) = φ̄ upi¯
φ up (2.16)
φ
down (i) = φ̄ downi¯
φ down , (2.17)
7In the current calibration, the disutility of search parameter is mostly constant across age. In fact, we make
an exception only for one labor market state, as discussed below.
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where i indicates the grid point rather than the level of human capital. This process is flexible enough
to capture falling or rising probabilities of moving up or down the human capital ladder. The match
quality shock while employed is assumed to follow an autoregressive process of order 1 in logs. We
discretize the process using the method of Tauchen (1986).
Finally, we have to make an assumption on the arrival rates of job offers and separation rates in the
labor market. We restrict λS,λU ,λN to be constant across age.8 We allow the separation rate to vary
with human capital according to a similar process as the probabilities of moving up or down the human
capital ladder:
δ (i) = δ̄ i¯δ . (2.18)
2.4.2 Parameters and Moments
To compare the model to the data, we simulate the full life cycle of 160,000 households and compute
model-implied moments of this simulation. We initialize the distribution of households across labor
market states such that it is consistent with the data. We assume that all agents start with one of the
lowest asset levels. For employed individuals, we draw the match quality shock from the stationary
distribution of the match quality process. For human capital, even though this is mostly supposed to
capture work experience in our model, we assume some heterogeneity in the initial distribution to obtain
sufficient dispersion in incomes. Human capital levels are, however, concentrated on the lower rungs of
the human capital ladder.
While in the model all parameters jointly determine all moments, we now discuss which parameters
are most closely related to which moments. Table 2.5 summarizes the parameter values. We start by
setting a number of parameters without solving the model. We exogenously fix the coefficient of relative
risk aversion to two, a standard value in the literature. We also exogenously fix a monthly net interest
rate of 0.17%, corresponding to an annual interest rate of roughly 2%. We also fix the probability of
losing unemployment benefits φUS = 1/6, consistent with an average duration of benefit receipt of six
months. Finally, we set the elasticity of the matching function α to 0.5, as in Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001), and the share of match output going to the worker χ to 0.7.
We target key moments of the U.S. labor market that are related to a large number of parameters.
First, we target individual transition rates between labor market states. These are closely related to the
parameters λN ,λS,λU , the exogenous upper bounds on arrival rates depending on labor market states. We
8Even though the exogenous component of arrival rates is constant in age, the solution to firms’ vacancy
posting problem endogenously yields arrival rates falling in age t conditional on households’ remaining states.
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Table 2.5 Parameter Values
Parameter Interpretation Value
Demographics
T Length of life in months 600
TW Length of working life in months 480
Preferences
β Discount factor 0.9955
γ Risk aversion 2.0000
ψEE ,ψEU ,ψUE ,ψES,ψSE Disutility of work/search 0.0000
ψUU ,ψSS,ψSU ,ψUS Disutility of work/search 0.5000
ψUN ,ψNU ,ψSN ,ψNS Disutility of work/search 1.2000
ψNN Disutility of work/search 2.6000
ψEN ,ψNE Disutility of work/search 1.3+ 0.9−1.3
1+e−0.05(t−100)
Financial Assets
r Interest rate 0.0017
Labor Market
δ̄ Level parameter separation rate 0.0200
¯
δ Curvature parameter separation rate -0.5000
λU ,λS Probability of job offer for unemployed 0.4500
λN Probability of job offer out of labor force 0.3000
Human Capital
¯
h Lower bound h 0.2000
h̄ Upper bound h 0.8000
φ̄ up Level parameter prob. h rise 0.0500
¯
φ up Curvature parameter prob. h rise -1.2000
φ̄ down Level parameter prob. h fall 0.3316
¯
φ down Curvature parameter prob. h fall 0.0000
Match Quality Shocks
ρz Persistence 0.9000
σz Standard deviation 0.1000
Firms
χ Labor share of output 0.7000
κ Cost of vacancy posting 8.0000
α Matching elasticity 0.5000
Government
b Unemployment benefit 0.2500
φUS Probability of losing benefits 0.1667
p Pension 0.2000
Gumbel shock
σε Standard deviation of taste shock 0.1000
Notes: Table 2.5 summarizes the parameter values.
64
impose the restriction λS = λU , as these two states are supposed to only differ in whether an individual
receives unemployment benefits or not. Individual transition rates are also closely related to the vacancy
posting cost κ . The EU rate in particular pins down parameters of the job loss process. The model
captures well the magnitude of the transitions between employment and unemployment. The model
undershoots the magnitude of transitions between non-employment and employment/unemployment, as
we will discuss in more detail in the next section when looking at the added worker effect in the model.
Another important set of labor market moments that we target is the distribution of households
over joint labor market states for four ten-year age groups. Because the arrival rates are endogenously
determined from the firm problem we treat the preference parameters ψ governing the disutility of work
and search as free parameters to match joint labor market states by age. We keep all these parameters
constant by age, except for ψEN = ψNE , which we assume to be decreasing with age. Specifically, these
parameters start at a level of 1.30 at age 25 and decay logistically to a level of 90 with a half-life of 100
months. We need this because otherwise too many young households have both members employed.
Economically, it makes sense that there is a higher utility of having one household member at home for
the young age group because this is the age group that may have young children to take care of. As we
do not model children explicitly, introducing age-dependency in ψ is a simple way of capturing this
motive and helps us to match a high enough share of young households with one member employed
and one member out of the labor force.
In addition to these labor market moments, we target life cycle profiles of income and assets. The
level of the pension p and the discount factor β are mostly determined by the shape of the life cycle
asset profile. Specifically, we target mean asset holdings for four age groups. An important question
is which assets to consider in the data when constructing the moments to be matched. For insurance
reasons, the relevant concept is liquid assets. In particular, because a model period is one month, it
would be desirable to consider only assets that can be liquidated at a monthly frequency. However, given
the life cycle dimension of our setup, retirement is an important driver of savings. Imposing too strict
a requirement on asset liquidity would exclude much of households’ retirement savings. Therefore,
considering the trade-off between asset liquidity and retirement savings, we choose to target financial
assets including retirement accounts net of debt. In addition, we include vehicle equity because it can be
accessed very quickly. However, we exclude houses and mortgages because tapping into home equity
is difficult for unemployed and might take longer, so it is not as useful for insurance purposes on a
monthly frequency. Business equity is excluded for the same reason. We construct asset-related data
moments from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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The parameters of the human capital process are chosen to match the income profile over the life
cycle. In the data, these moments are also constructed from the PSID. The probability of moving
up the human capital ladder is decreasing in the human capital level which is a way of achieving a
concave income profile: When young, an agent moves up the human capital ladder quickly such that
the wage increase is steeper. After a few steps on the human capital ladder, the likelihood of a further
increase in human capital goes down quite significantly such that the income profile becomes flatter.
The probability of losing human capital, by contrast, is constant across human capital levels. Human
capital decay of non-employed allows us to capture the empirical observation that newly employed
individuals have lower wages than long-time employed and that job losses lead to persistent wage losses
(Davis and von Wachter, 2011; Jarosch, 2015; Kospentaris, 2021).
The parameters of the match quality shock process are chosen to match the variance in income
levels by age group. Additionally, we have to pin down the distribution from which newly employed
draw their match quality, which we set to the stationary distribution of the discretized Markov chain.
The only remaining parameters to be set are the level of the unemployment benefit and the variance
of the taste shock. We assume the unemployment benefit to be constant and set its level to be roughly
50% of median income. For the taste shock, we set σε = 0.1. Using 0.05 instead does not meaningfully
impact the results.
2.4.3 Fit of Targeted Moments
In this section, we present the model fit for key targeted moments. First, Figure 2.6 shows the share of
households in joint labor market states by age group in the model and in the data. To compare the model
to the data, we pool all agents who are unemployed with and without benefits into one group, labeled
U . In all age groups, the most common joint labor market state is that both members are employed.
This share is, however, strongly decreasing in age, with around 65% of households being in that group
among the two young groups and just 45% in the oldest age group. By contrast, the share of households
where at least one member is out of the labor force is increasing over the life cycle. Among the youngest
there are very few households with both members out of the labor force. Among the oldest, this share
is almost 20%. Also, the share of households where one member is employed and one member is
out of the labor force is slightly increasing in age. Overall, the model captures well the distribution
of households over joint labor market states. It also captures that the share of two earner households
is decreasing in age and the share of households with at least one member out of the labor force is
increasing with age, though it somewhat understates the magnitude of these changes over the life cycle.
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Figure 2.6 Joint Labor Market States of Couples (Model vs. Data)
Notes: Figure 2.6 shows the joint labor market states of couples in the model and in the data. For the model, U
includes both unemployed receiving benefits and searchers who do not receive benefits. The data is from the CPS.
Table 2.6 Asset Levels
Model Data
All 10.4 11.8
Age 25-35 2.8 3.0
Age 36-45 4.9 7.0
Age 46-55 10.6 14.6
Age 55-65 23.3 24.1
Notes: Table 2.6 compares mean asset holdings by age group in the model and in the data. The data is from the
PSID. In the data, assets include financial assets net of debt and vehicle equity. 1 unit corresponds to $10,000.
Additionally, the model matches the average asset holdings over the life cycle well, as shown
in Table 2.6. Averaging over all age groups, we match the mean asset level of the population well.
However, the model slightly underpredicts the mean asset holdings of the medium age groups. Still, the
model is able to capture that average asset holdings are strongly increasing in age.
Finally, we consider the model fit for the mean income levels and the dispersion in income across
age groups. Table 2.7 shows the comparison between data and model. Again, when averaging over all
age groups, the model is close to the income level in the data but as of now undershoots the dispersion.
Moreover, the model is able to replicate the increase in mean income for the age groups 25-35, 35-45,
and 45-55. It fails, however, in generating a fall in income for the oldest group. This mismatch for the
oldest age group arises from a very strong selection effect in the model who stays in the labor force.
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Table 2.7 Income Levels and Dispersion
Level Standard deviation
Model Data Model Data
All 0.3594 0.3424 0.1363 0.2374
Age 25-35 0.3296 0.3020 0.1172 0.2009
Age 36-45 0.3538 0.3572 0.1341 0.2456
Age 46-55 0.3752 0.3629 0.1429 0.2486
Age 56-65 0.3826 0.3400 0.1511 0.2466
Notes: Table 2.7 compares mean and standard deviation of labor income by age group in the model and in the
data. The data is from the PSID. 1 unit corresponds to $10,000.
Many agents with relatively low human capital and/or match quality prefer to drop out of the labor
force, which drives up the average income among the employed. In contrast, the model does replicate
that income dispersion within age group is higher among the old than the young.
2.5 Results
In this section we first present the model implications for untargeted moments. Second, we show
that our model can replicate the decreasing magnitude of the added worker effect over the life cycle.
Third, we use the model to construct counterfactuals and analyze which channels are responsible for the
age-dependency in the added worker effect.
2.5.1 Untargeted Moments
We begin this section by presenting untargeted life cycle profiles of individual labor market transitions
in Figure 2.7. Again, in the model U comprises both the group of unemployed who receive benefits and
those who exert costly search effort without receiving benefits.
First, consider transitions from employment over the life cycle (Figure 2.7a to 2.7c). The model
captures that the likelihood of remaining in employment falls quite rapidly towards the end of working
life, though the monthly transition probability out of employment never falls below 95%. The counterpart
to this in model and data is a corresponding increase in the likelihood of moving from employment to
out of the labor force. As agents get closer to the retirement age, it is not worthwhile for them to stay
employed when they receive a bad match quality shock or have low human capital. By contrast, young
agents continue to work even in these cases. Several model mechanisms account for this. First, young
agents have a longer time horizon until retirement, so that they need labor income to cover consumption
needs during working life. In contrast, old agents hold much higher levels of assets which they can use
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(a) E to E (b) E to U (c) E to N
(d) U to E (e) U to U (f) U to N
(g) N to E (h) N to U (i) N to N
Figure 2.7 Labor Market Transitions over the Life Cycle
Notes: Figure 2.7 shows individual labor market transitions in the data and in the model. For the model, U
includes both unemployed receiving benefits and searchers who do not receive benefits. The data is from the CPS.
to finance consumption. Second, human capital is only accumulated while employed. Thus, higher
human capital is more valuable for the young as they can benefit from it for a longer time period. The
model performs very well in matching the slightly decreasing path of E to U transitions over the life
cycle.
Next, consider the transitions out of unemployment (Figure 2.7d to 2.7f). The model replicates
that across the entire life cycle the most likely transition is to stay in unemployment. It also matches
well that the probability of transitioning to employment decreases with age, whereas the probability of
giving up on searching and leaving the labor force goes up with age. Finally, the model generates a fall
in transitions from out of the labor force into employment (Figure 2.7g) but understates the likelihood to
transition into unemployment (Figure 2.7h) over the life cycle, while it matches well the high persistence
of non-participation (Figure 2.7i).
Again, it is apparent from these figures that the model generates too few transitions between out
of the labor force and employment/unemployment. This is most likely due to the fact that we leave
many important life events such as child birth, marital transitions, and health shocks unmodeled. We
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Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 2.26% 3.12%
6.66% 9.30%
Cond. prob. of spousal NS transition 0.40% 5.28%
2.00% 6.89%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 97.34% 91.60%
91.34% 83.81%
Old (55-65):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 1.95% 2.24%
4.29% 3.73%
Cond. prob. of spousal NS transition 0.11% 1.16%
0.90% 2.75%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 97.95% 96.60%
94.81% 93.52%
Notes: This table compares joint labor market transitions by age in the model and in the data.
will show next, however, that the model captures well the impact of one key life event, job loss of the
primary earner, on the labor force participation of out of the labor force spouses, the added worker
effect.
2.5.2 The Added Worker Effect over the Life Cycle in the Model
We now evaluate whether the model can replicate our main empirical finding: the age dependency in the
added worker effect. To compare model to data, we replicate Table 2.3 from Section 2.2 with simulated
model data in Table 2.8. For ease of comparison, we also report empirical transition probabilities.
For the young, the model is capable of producing a strong increase in the probability of moving
from out of the labor force directly into employment and into unemployment upon job loss of the
primary earner. The model generally underestimates the probability of spousal transitions directly
into employment independently of the primary earner’s transition. However, it captures very well the
difference in probabilities depending on the primary earner transition, which is the added worker effect.
In the model, as in the data, there is a much smaller added worker effect for the old. The model
reproduces that there is no substantially increased likelihood of transitioning from out of the labor force
directly into employment when the primary earner loses a job for the old. Furthermore, the increased
probability of searching for a job by exerting costly effort is much lower than for the young, in line with
the data.
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(a) Young: 25-35 years (b) Old: 55-65 years
Figure 2.8 Dynamic Response: AWE by Age in the Model
Notes: Figure 2.8 shows the change in the probability that a non-participating spouse enters the labor force (either
as unemployed or as employed) this month if household head loses/lost the job in two months, next month, this
month, last month, two months ago, respectively, relative to the baseline in which the household head remains
employed. Figure 2.8a shows the model results for young households; Figure 2.8b shows the model results for
old households. The regression producing the coefficients is Equation (2.1).
Hence, the model performs well in generating the instantaneous added worker effect over the life
cycle. To analyze anticipation effects and lagged responses, Figure 2.8 shows the results of replicating
Equation (2.1) on model simulated output, separately by age. In line with the data, the model produces
larger contemporaneous and lagged effects for the young than for the old. The lead effects are, however,
of similar size across both age groups.
The model mechanisms that produce lagged responses are threefold. First, after becoming unem-
ployed the primary earner may lose human capital which decreases potential human capital differences
across spouses. Consequently, it may be optimal that both spouses search or to re-optimize on the
actively searching household member. Second, unemployment benefits can expire, making employment
a more desirable state. Third, households without any employed member may run down their assets to
finance consumption, which increases the need to search for a new job to to re-accumulate assets for
precautionary reasons and for retirement.
While the model produces some anticipation effect in the two months prior to a primary earner’s
job loss, these lead effects are smaller than in the data. Job loss is predictable because the exogenous
separation probability depends on human capital. Spouses of low human capital employed individuals
may enter the labor force because a future separation is relatively likely, whereas spouses of high human
capital individuals choose not to do so because the chance of an exogenous separation is low. By the
law of large numbers, these separations do in fact realize at higher rates for low human capital primary
earners, producing the effect that spouses are more likely to enter the labor force in anticipation of a
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Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 2.26% 3.12%
Cond. prob. of spousal NS transition 0.40% 5.28%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 97.34% 91.60%
Counterfactual meeting probabilities
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 2.14% 2.93%
Cond. prob. of spousal NS transition 0.41% 5.36%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 97.46% 91.71%
Counterfactual human capital
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 1.70% 3.02%
Cond. prob. of spousal NS transition 0.24% 3.09%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 98.06% 93.89%
Counterfactual assets
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 0.11% 0.33%
Cond. prob. of spousal NS transition 0.11% 0.43%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 99.78% 99.23%
Notes: This table shows the counterfactual joint labor market transition probabilities.
job loss. In addition, persistence in match quality might induce non-participating spouses to enter the
labor force upon a decline in match quality for the employed spouse, preparing a potential future quit if
match quality remains low.
2.5.3 Counterfactuals
Finally, we use the model to construct counterfactuals and analyze which channels are important in
driving the age-dependency in the added worker effect. For that purpose, we start with the added
worker effect of the young and then change individual model elements towards the counterparts of old
households. Table 2.9 reports the results for three such counterfactuals together with the baseline results
for young households.
The first counterfactual adjusts job arrival rates for young households. More specifically, we first
compute the average job arrival rate for old and for young households in the model, restricting the
sample to households with one member employed and one member out of the labor force. Afterwards,
we adjust the individual arrival rates of each young household in our simulation by the difference
72
between these previously computed means. This approach moves the average arrival rate of young
households to that of their old counterparts, but preserves the relative distribution of arrival rates among
the young. The second block of Table 2.9 shows that adjusting arrival rates has a limited impact on
the added worker effect. This result arises because the average arrival rates for young and old are very
similar: As most non-participating spouses are unlikely to accept a job offer, firms are only offering
low arrival rates in order to satisfy their free entry condition. Nevertheless, the average arrival rate is
slightly lower for older households resulting in fewer employment transitions both in the EE and in the
EU case.9
In the second counterfactual, we adjust the human capital level of young households. Similar
to above, we compute the difference in mean human capital levels across age groups separately for
employed and non-participating spouses and adjust the human capital level of each young household by
the difference. In our simulation, the employed spouse among older households has a higher human
capital due to on average longer cumulative employment spells. In contrast, the human capital levels
for non-participating spouses are very similar across age groups. This is partially driven by selection
(low human capital individuals are more likely to be non-participating when they have an employed
spouse) and partially by fast depreciation of human capital during non-employment in order to generate
immediate wage losses from non-employment spells. Thus, the results of the second counterfactual can
be attributed to a higher human capital level of the employed spouse during old age.
The third block of Table 2.9 shows that the increase in human capital of the employed spouse
reduces transition probabilities into participation for both the EE and the EU case, but also dampens the
added worker effect. When the human capital of a separated spouse is higher, this spouse is more likely
to find a new job (arrival rates are increasing in human capital) and the difference in human capital
levels across spouses is potentially larger, making a switch in the prime earner position less likely.
In a third counterfactual, we adjust the asset levels of young households in the same manner as
arrival rates and human capital. Since old households have on average substantially higher asset levels
we make all young households richer. The fourth block of Table 2.9 shows that this eliminates the
incentive for a non-participating spouse to transition into participation. Hence, the added worker effect
vanishes. Young households with asset holdings of the old are relatively rich for their age, reducing the
incentive to work also in the baseline EE case, and are well insured against any labor market shock such
that they do not have to rely on the added worker effect as a margin of insurance.
9This result may be partially due to the timing assumptions in the model. At the moment firms post vacancies
in all the submarkets before separation shocks occur. Hence, out of the labor force spouses do not consider that
their partner loses the job, translating into low acceptance probabilities and in turn low vacancy posting rates. In
future work, we will investigate the robustness of the finding to different timing assumptions.
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Taking all three counterfactuals together, we find that the substantially lower added worker effect
among the old predominantly arises through higher wealth levels. Hence, older households exhibit a
weaker AWE because they have better access to self-insurance through savings and are therefore less in
need of other insurance margins, as opposed to a lack of opportunity to make use of the AWE.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence that the added worker effect is an important insurance margin against
job loss of the primary earner for two-member households, but that the prevalence of this insurance
channel strongly differs over the life cycle. When the primary earner loses a job, an out of the labor
force spouse is much more likely to enter the labor force in order to offset the income loss compared to
when the primary earner remains employed. In particular, this spousal labor supply response is very
strong for young households and becomes continuously weaker as households age.
To analyze the mechanisms that drive this age-dependency, we build a stochastic life cycle model
of two-member households with a frictional labor market. We calibrate the model economy to match
salient features of the US labor market. The model endogenously generates the added worker effect
and its decreasing magnitude over the life cycle. Model counterfactuals reveal that the added worker
effect is weaker for old than for young households mainly because older households are better insured
through larger asset holdings, so that their need for spousal insurance is lower. In addition, human
capital of employed spouses is higher for the old, making the spousal labor supply less valuable,
though this channel is quantitatively smaller. Differences in arrival rates across age groups contribute




Larger Transfers Financed with More
Progressive Taxes? On the Optimal
Design of Taxes and Transfers1
Abstract The U.S. fiscal system redistributes through a rich set of taxes and transfers, the latter
accounting for a large part of the income of the poor. Motivated by this, we study the optimal joint
design of transfers and income taxes. Within a simple heterogeneous-household framework, we
derive analytical results on the optimal relationship between transfers and tax progressivity. Higher
transfers are associated with lower optimal income tax progressivity. Redistribution is achieved with
generous transfers while efficiency is preserved via a lower progressivity of income taxes. As such,
the optimal tax-and-transfer system features larger progressivity of average than of marginal tax rates.
We then quantify the optimal tax-and-transfer system in a rich incomplete-market model with realistic
distributions of income, wealth, and income risk. The model features a novel flexible functional form
for progressive income taxes and means-tested transfers. Relative to the current U.S. fiscal system,
the optimal policy consists of more generous means-tested transfers, which phase-out at a slower rate.
These larger transfers are financed with higher tax rates, but the taxes are not more progressive than the
current system.
1This work was supported by computational resources provided by the BigTex High Performance Computing
Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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3.1 Introduction
High economic inequality in the U.S. has put redistributive policies at the heart of the policy debate.
The U.S. fiscal system redistributes through two main instruments: a progressive income tax and a rich
set of means-tested transfers. Both components significantly alter the after-tax-and-transfer income
distribution, as shown in Figure 3.1. Means-tested transfers account for about a fifth of households’
income in the bottom income quintile. In contrast, income taxes paid by households in the top quintile
reduce their income by more than a quarter.
In this paper, we study the optimal joint design of taxes and transfers. Both progressive income
taxes and means-tested transfers are powerful tools to redistribute resources across households, but they
also create efficiency costs. Large income tax progressivity implies high marginal tax rates at the top,
which lower labor supply of the most productive households. Large transfers generate a heavy fiscal
burden, to be financed with distortionary income taxes. Overall, what should be the joint optimal tax
progressivity and generosity of transfers? Should transfers be more generous compared to the current
U.S. system? If so, who should face higher tax rates to finance these larger transfers?
To answer these questions, we first build intuition in a simple, analytically tractable model, and
then quantify the key trade-offs in a rich heterogeneous-agent model. A central insight throughout the
analysis is that optimal income tax progressivity is decreasing in the size of transfers. This negative
relationship between tax progressivity and transfers emerges for both redistribution and efficiency
reasons. First, large transfers provide redistribution, reducing the value of a further reduction in
inequality through more progressive taxes. Second, large transfers increase the fiscal burden; to increase
tax revenues, it is efficient to incentivize high labor supply of the most productive households with
lower marginal tax rates at the top. Quantitatively, given the large inequality in income and wealth in
the U.S. we find that optimal transfers are large and phase-out slowly. The income tax schedule used to
finance these large transfers is only moderately progressive, thereby preserving labor supply incentives
and easing the financing of a large welfare state.
We start our analysis with an analytically tractable model, following Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2017). A continuum of ex-ante homogeneous workers chooses consumption and labor supply
subject to idiosyncratic income shocks, and a government has a loglinear tax schedule as its only
policy instrument. In this case, a progressive tax schedule is desirable as the welfare gains of lower
consumption inequality outweigh the efficiency costs of progressive taxation in the form of lower labor
supply. We then extend this tractable framework by endowing the government with a lump-sum transfer
as an additional instrument. We derive a closed-form formula for welfare based on local approximations
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Figure 3.1 Redistribution in the United States
Notes: This figure shows average tax and transfer rates by income quintile for the working age population in the
United States in 2013. Data is from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Details on the components of taxes
and transfers are included in Appendix C.1.
around zero transfers. For realistic levels of income inequality, transfers should be positive. Higher
transfers reduce the optimal income tax progressivity. This optimal negative relationship between
income tax progressivity and transfers exists for both redistribution and efficiency reasons, as the
welfare formula transparently shows. Lump-sum transfers already provide redistribution to the poor,
reducing the redistributive gains of more progressive income taxes. Furthermore, larger transfers
increase the fiscal burden, which raises efficiency concerns. These efficiency concerns are amplified
by the fact that generous transfers are a force for lower labor supply themselves. Consequently, larger
levels of spending on transfers are optimally financed with lower income tax progressivity to incentivize
labor supply. While the analytical results are based on approximations, we quantitatively confirm them
by numerically solving for the optimal combination of lump-sum transfers and loglinear taxes in the
simple model. We find that redistribution should be achieved with generous transfers while efficiency
should be preserved via less progressive income taxes. As such, the optimal tax-and-transfer system
implies very progressive average tax rates while marginal tax rates actually turn out regressive.
Having established the intuition for the optimal relation between transfers and the progressivity of
the tax rates schedule, we turn to our second question: What should the optimal level of transfers and
the tax progressivity be relative to the current U.S. system? We answer this question using a quantitative
heterogeneous agent model. For the quantitative analysis we propose new functional forms to closely
approximate the two main components of the U.S. fiscal system: progressive income taxes and targeted
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transfers. In contrast to the loglinear specification, our proposed income tax function is bounded below
by zero, in line with the statutory income tax rates in the United States. For the transfer function,
we use a logistic functional form, which captures both the level and the phasing-out patterns of the
current U.S. transfer system when appropriately parameterized. While tractable, these parameterized
functional forms are flexible enough to explore a wide variety of shapes of the tax-and-transfer system.
In particular, having a transfer, even of the lump-sum variety, allows to disentangle progressivity in
marginal and average tax rates, which we showed to be important in the analytical model. Additionally
allowing for phasing out of the transfers allows marginal tax rates to potentially be U-shaped, which is
what is commonly optimal in the Mirrleesian optimal taxation literature.
For the quantitative analysis, we build an incomplete markets model à la Aiyagari (1994) with
endogenous labor supply. We incorporate rich income dynamics with a Pareto tail for the productivity
distribution to capture the concentration of income at the top and higher order moments of income
risk. The tax reforms we consider in the quantitative model are once-and-for-all changes to the tax-
and-transfer system. After a tax reform the economy slowly moves towards a new steady state and for
the computation of welfare we take into account the entire transition. The optimal tax-and-transfer
system in the quantitative model with realistic distributions of income, wealth, and income risk features
large transfers that phase-out slowly, combined with moderately progressive taxes. Relative to the
current U.S. system transfers are much larger. They are financed with higher taxes, which are not
more progressive though than the current U.S. system. In line with the prescriptions from the theory,
redistribution through very progressive average tax rates is achieved with less progressivity in marginal
tax rates. In fact, because the phasing-out transfer causes high marginal tax rates at the bottom of the
distribution marginal tax rates are falling over wide ranges of the income distribution. Welfare gains of
the reform are large and the reform is supported by a vast majority of households.
Endowing the government with an income tax function and the transfer as an additional tool is
essential to realize these welfare gains. Restricting the government to just the loglinear tax function
yields substantial welfare losses relative to the optimal system with progressive taxes and a targeted
transfer. With only the loglinear function achieving the substantial desired redistribution requires very
high tax progressivity, which then also implies very high marginal tax rates at the top. Restricting the
government to using a lump-sum transfer instead of a targeted transfer in combination with the income
tax function is much less restrictive. Most of the welfare gains can also be achieved with a system
of lump-sum transfers and relatively flat taxes. However, the amount of taxes that has to be raised is
substantial, with marginal rates of more than 60% along the entire income distribution.
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Related Literature. This paper builds on a large literature documenting rising inequality in the United
States since the 1980s. Seminal contributions to this literature are Piketty and Saez (2003) on the rise
of income inequality, Saez and Zucman (2016) on wealth inequality, and Piketty, Saez, and Zucman
(2017) introducing the concept of distributional national accounts. Also on the empirical side, this
paper is related to a number of contributions estimating parametric tax functions approximating the
U.S. income tax system. Gouveia and Strauss (1994) propose a tax function and estimate it using U.S.
data for the 1980s. Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014) estimate several parametric tax functions
using data for the year 2000. Feenberg, Ferriere, and Navarro (2020) provide estimates of the loglinear
tax function over time. Splinter (2020) empirically analyzes the redistributive impacts of a variety of
tax-and-transfer programs in the U.S.
On the theoretical side, we build on Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) and Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2017), who propose an analytical framework with partial insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks to study risk sharing and optimal taxation. We extend this framework to allow
for transfers. Our quantitative framework relates to several papers studying optimal tax progressivity
in incomplete markets models. An early contribution to this literature is Conesa and Krueger (2006).
More recently, several papers investigate optimal tax progressivity in frameworks with human capital
accumulation (Badel, Huggett, and Luo, 2020; Krueger and Ludwig, 2016; Peterman, 2016), superstar
earners (Kindermann and Krueger, 2021), transitional dynamics (Bakış, Kaymak, and Poschke, 2015),
and with the goal of maximizing revenue (Guner, Lopez-Daneri, and Ventura, 2016). Our paper also
relates to recent analyses of universal basic income policies and/or negative income taxes by Lopez-
Daneri (2016), Daruich and Fernández (2020), Conesa, Li, and Li (2021), Luduvice (2021), and Guner,
Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2021). While our model firmly falls in the Ramsey (1927) approach to optimal
taxation, it is also related to some literature in the Mirrleesian tradition (Diamond, 1998; Mirrlees,
1971; Saez, 2001). Most papers in the Mirrleesian tradition use static models; some recent papers,
however, extend the approach to dynamic models (Boerma and McGrattan, 2020; Farhi and Werning,
2013; Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski, 2016; Kapička, 2013). Our flexible functional forms allow for
many shapes of marginal and average tax rates schedules, thereby helping to bridge the gap between the
Mirrlees and the Ramsey approach. We share this aim with Findeisen and Sachs (2017).
Most closely related to us on the theoretical side is Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2021). They study
the optimal Mirrleesian tax schedule in a static partial insurance economy and compare the optimal
unrestricted tax schedule to simpler tax systems such as affine and loglinear tax schedules. Relative
to them, while not solving for the optimal fully nonlinear plan, we endow the government with more
flexible simple tools and incorporate them into a much richer quantitative model. Chang and Park (2020)
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compute the fully nonlinear optimal tax schedule in a Huggett economy, but restrict themselves to steady
states. Our quantitative model is related to Boar and Midrigan (2021), who also study optimal taxation
in a rich incomplete markets model. Their focus is, however, on the optimal progressivity of income and
wealth taxes, whereas we focus on targeted transfer programs in combination with progressive income
taxes.
Roadmap. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce the simple model and
characterize analytically the optimal interaction between lump-sum transfers and the progressivity of
the income tax schedule. In Section 3.3, we build a rich quantitative model calibrated to the U.S. to
quantitatively analyze the optimal joint design of the income tax schedule and means-tested transfers.
Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 An Analytical Model
As shown in Figure 3.1, transfers play an essential role in the redistribution of resources in the U.S.
Motivated by that, we analyze the optimal progressivity of the tax schedule in the presence of transfers.
We first present a simplified version of the partial-insurance framework of Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2014, 2017), where a government has a loglinear tax schedule as its only policy instrument.
We then extend this benchmark by endowing the government with a lump-sum transfer as an additional
instrument. We derive analytical results based on local approximations around zero transfers. We
confirm the analytical results by finding the global optimum using numerical methods.
3.2.1 Environment: A Static Bewley-Huggett Economy
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex-ante homogenous households, a representative firm,
and a utilitarian government. Households are hand-to-mouth, value consumption c and leisure 1−n,
and their labor productivity z follows a Markov process. The representative firm uses a linear technology
to transform labor into output. The government finances exogenous government spending G and a
lump-sum transfer T with loglinear labor taxes.
Taxes. A household with labor income y pays (total) taxes T (y) = y−λy1−τ , where τ captures the
progressivity and λ the level of taxes. For τ = 0, tax rates are flat and equal to 1−λ . When τ > 0
(τ < 0), marginal and average tax rates are increasing (decreasing) in income. Figure 3.2 shows the tax
function. This tax function is widely used since at least Feldstein (1969). As it has been popularized in
80
Figure 3.2 Loglinear Tax Function
Notes: This figure shows average tax rates given by the loglinear (HSV) tax function. In the left panel we vary
the progressivity parameter τ; in the right panel we vary the level parameter λ .
the quantitative macroeconomics literature by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017) we refer to
it equivalently as loglinear or HSV tax function.
Households. In period t, household i chooses consumption cit and labor nit to maximize utility




subject to a static budget constraint
cit = λ (zitnit)
1−τ +T. (3.2)
Consumption is equal to after-tax income, which is computed as the sum of income after applying the
HSV tax function and a lump-sum transfer.
We assume a log-AR(1) process for z, with vω controlling the degree of heterogeneity across
households







Two assumptions are key for tractability. First, households have a separable utility function and log
utility over consumption such that income and substitution effects cancel out. Second, we assume that
households are hand-to-mouth. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017) assume a more complicated
shock structure with a permanent uninsurable and iid insurable shocks. In their environment, a no trade
theorem arises such that no savings are not an assumption but a result. In principle, we could use this
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shock structure as well. However, having transfers breaks the no trade theorem in any case and our
analytical expressions for welfare below would become much more cumbersome, so we rely on this
simpler assumption. We will relax the assumption of no savings in the quantitative model.
Government. The government finances exogenous government spending G and the lump-sum transfer







3.2.2 Welfare without Transfers
As a benchmark, we first consider the case in which the government does not have access to the
lump-sum transfer. It can only use the loglinear tax function to raise revenues and redistribute. This is
also the assumption in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017), so that this is a special case of their
results.2
Under the assumption that there is no transfer we can solve for welfare in closed form. We relegate
the derivation to Appendix C.2.2. Here, we only outline the main steps. To obtain the expression for







Note that under these assumptions labor supply is only a function of preference parameters and tax
progressivity τ . We can compute total labor supply and output from the individual policy functions.
From the government budget constraint we can then compute the tax function level parameter λ . This
implies consumption from the individual budget constraint. Knowing the policy functions for labor and
consumption we can aggregate to total welfare as a function of tax progressivity:
W (τ) = log(n0(τ)−G)−
1− τ
1+ϕ
− (1− τ)2 vω
2(1−ρ2z )
. (3.6)
These three terms have straightforward economic interpretations. The first two terms capture efficiency
concerns. The first term is related to the size of the economy. With larger tax progressivity labor
supply goes down, which reduces the size of the economy. This decreases welfare. At the same time,
lower labor supply is beneficial, as households dislike working, which is captured by the second “labor
2Their environment is more general: In addition to the different shock structure, they consider skill investment
and preference heterogeneity. We abstract from these features to focus attention on the economic significance of
having transfers as an additional tool.
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(a) No spending, no heterogeneity (b) Spending, no heterogeneity
(c) Spending, uninsurable shocks
Figure 3.3 Welfare without Transfers
Notes: This figure shows welfare as a function of tax progressivity without a transfer.
disutility” term. The last term captures redistributive concerns. More progressivity compresses the
distribution of consumption, which increases welfare because a utilitarian planner prefers a more equal
distribution of consumption. This term gets more important the more dispersed incomes are.
We illustrate the forces determining optimal tax progressivity in Figure 3.3. For the numerical
illustration, we set the inverse of the Frisch elasticity ϕ to 2.5 and the labor disutility parameter B such
that labor supply n0(τ) = 0.3. We set τ = 0.18, based on the estimates of Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2017) for the U.S. We set government spending to match a spending to output ratio of 0.15.
We fix ρz = 0.935 and set vω to match the variance of log consumption, also as measured in Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2017).
In the first panel of Figure 3.3 we consider the special case in which government spending is zero
and there is no heterogeneity. In this case, optimal tax progressivity is zero. There is no need to raise
revenues and no need for redistribution, so it is best to not distort labor supply. In the second panel, we
maintain the assumption of a representative agent but introduce the exogenous spending requirement.
Then, optimal progressivity is negative. It is optimal to lower progressivity in order to increase labor
supply and thereby make it easier to finance the spending requirement.
In these two cases with vω = 0 setting progressivity optimally implements the first best allocations,
which can be derived from maximizing utility subject to the resource constraint. First best labor supply
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which we show in Appendix C.2.1. As shown in Figure 3.3, optimal progressivity is zero when
exogenous spending is zero and negative when there is a positive spending requirement.
Panel 3 of Figure 3.3 shows the optimal progressivity when we add heterogeneity. Now the planner
has a motive for increasing progressivity to redistribute. Then, optimal progressivity turns positive such
that average and marginal tax rates are increasing in income.
3.2.3 Welfare with Transfers
Having established the benchmark in which the government can only use the loglinear income tax
function, we now turn to the case in which it additionally has the lump-sum transfer at its disposal. In
that case, we can no longer express the labor policy function in closed form. Instead we approximate
the labor policy function by applying the implicit function theorem to the first order condition around








2 z−(1−τ)it , (3.8)




. Labor supply is falling in the size of the transfer due to the wealth
effect. With this approximation we can follow similar steps as in the case without transfers to obtain an
expression for welfare as a function of progressivity τ and transfer T :








+(1− τ)η +(ϕ + τ)(η −ητ)
)
. (3.9)
The welfare expression contains the expression for welfare from the case without transfers but is
extended by terms that depend on the presence of the transfer.
Consider first again the representative agent case, in which vω = 0 and η = 1. For any T , there is an







Figure 3.4 Optimal Progressivity with Transfers (Representative Agent): First Best
Notes: This figure shows optimal progressivity of the loglinear income tax as a function of the size of the
lump-sum transfer.
and is plotted in Figure 3.4. First note that in the figure we highlight two special cases. The first special
case is the one where transfers are zero, as discussed in the previous section. At zero transfers optimal
progressivity is negative for efficiency reasons because negative progressivity incentivizes labor supply
easing the financing of the exogenous spending.The second special case we highlight in the figure is at
T = −G. The negative transfer, i.e. a lump-sum tax, increases labor supply due to the wealth effect.
Hence, it is not necessary anymore to have negative progressivity to incentivize higher labor supply: At
this specific level of transfer, the optimal progressivity is zero even though there is a positive spending
requirement.
More generally, the figure shows a negative optimal relationship between the transfer and progres-
sivity τ to implement the first best allocation. At τ = τ⋆0 (G) the transfer is optimally zero. For all larger
values of τ , the transfer is negative; for all smaller values, the transfer is positive. The efficiency gains
from T are decreasing in τ .
Considering the general case with heterogeneity, this efficiency motive for a negative relationship
between T and τ remains at work. It is captured by the first two terms within the bracket. Additionally,
now there are redistributive concerns. These are captured by the final term in the bracket. Generally,
the lump-sum transfer is good for redistribution (the term is positive) because it reduces consumption
inequality. However, the redistribution gains from having the transfer are decreasing in τ . This is most
easily seen by considering the extreme case of τ = 1, in which after tax incomes are equalized. Then, the
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(a) Spending, no heterogeneity (b) Spending, no heterogeneity, transfer
(c) Spending, heterogeneity (d) Spending, heterogeneity, transfer
Figure 3.5 Welfare with Transfers
Notes: This figure shows welfare as a function of tax progressivity with a transfer.
redistributive gains from having a positive transfer are zero. Hence, redistribution concerns strengthen
the negative optimal relationship between transfers and progressivity of the income tax function that is
already given for efficiency reasons.
We illustrate how the introduction of a small transfer affects optimal progressivity of the tax function
in Figure 3.5. We start in the first panel from the scenario with spending but no heterogeneity. As
discussed above, optimal progressivity is negative there. When we introduce a small transfer in the
second panel, the optimal progressivity falls. Because this is the representative agent case with no
redistributive motive at play, this is solely for efficiency reasons. In the third panel we show again the
case with spending and heterogeneity in which positive progressivity is optimal. In the fourth panel we
again add a small transfer leading to a lower optimal τ , for efficiency and redistribution reasons.
3.2.4 Optimal Taxes and Transfers: Global Solution
So far we have used the expression for welfare to establish the optimal relationship between T and τ .
Since it is based on an approximation around the case of a zero transfer we cannot use the formula
to compute the optimal combination of transfer and loglinear tax function. Hence, we now compute
the global optimum numerically, which we can also use to judge the quality of the approximation.
Figure 3.6 shows the optimal τ as a function of T/Y . Welfare approximated with the formula provides
a very good fit for the optimal relationship between transfers and tax progressivity. At zero transfer the
formula and the global solution give the exact same solution by construction. However, the formula
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Figure 3.6 Optimal Progressivity: Quality of Approximation
Notes: This figure compares optimal progressivity as a function of the transfer given by the approximated formula
to the global solution.
provides a very good estimate for the optimal progressivity given T for a wide range of transfers. Only
for very large transfers does the quality of the approximation deteriorate.
Figure 3.7 shows again the optimal relationship between the transfer and progressivity from the
global solution and the optimal combination of the two. As we have established before, the optimal τ is
falling in T . The highest welfare is achieved with a very sizeable lump-sum transfer, in combination
with negative progressivity. The transfer amounts to roughly 30% of mean income. At the same time,
the progressivity of the income tax function is −0.07.
In Figure 3.8 we plot average and marginal tax rates implied by the tax-and-transfer system. The
large lump-sum transfer implies very negative average tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution,
which are then increasing towards zero as incomes rise. The average tax rate implied by the tax function
alone is highest at the bottom of the income distribution and lower at the top. Overall, however, the
tax-and-transfer system is very progressive in average tax rates. This is very different for marginal tax
rates. Since the transfer is lump-sum it implies a marginal tax rate of zero everywhere. Because the
income tax code is regressive, marginal tax rates are falling over the entire income distribution. Thus,
the optimal plan combines very progressive average tax rates, implying significant redistribution, with
regressive marginal tax rates, preserving labor supply incentives.
For comparison, the figure also includes the average and marginal rates of the optimal loglinear
plan when we force the transfer to be zero. Progressivity is positive and high (τ = 0.29) in this case
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Figure 3.7 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System
Notes: This figure shows optimal tax progressivity as a function of the lump-sum transfer. It also shows the
welfare achieved at a given lump-sum and the associated optimal income tax progressivity.
Figure 3.8 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System: Average and Marginal Rates
Notes: This figure shows average and marginal tax rates given by the optimal tax-and-transfer system. It also
compares the average and marginal rates of the optimal loglinear tax function when we force transfers to be zero.
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because the planner wants to redistribute resources. However, the functional form requires that to
achieve redistribution through increasing average tax rates marginal tax rates also have to be increasing.
Marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution are much higher in this scenario. Comparing
the average and marginal tax rates schedules illustrates a key insight from this analysis: It is generally
preferable to have lower progressivity in marginal tax rates than in average tax rates. While the optimal
level of the transfer and the optimal associated tax progressivity depends on fundamentals such as the
size of exogenous spending or the shape of the income distribution, it will always be true also in the
quantitative model that having more progressive average than marginal tax rates is optimal.
3.2.5 Taking Stock
In summary, there are two main takeaways from the analytical part. First, there is optimally a negative
relationship between the size of government transfers and the progressivity of the taxes which are used
to finance the transfers. This negative relationship is due to both efficiency and redistribution reasons.
Second, adding a transfer to the loglinear tax function is welfare improving because it allows to achieve
more progressivity in average than in marginal rates of the entire tax-and-transfer system. The analytical
model suggests that it is optimal to combine very progressive average tax rates with regressive marginal
rates. It is, however, too simple to make a truly quantitative statement about the optimal combination
of the instruments. To address that question, we move to a more quantitative macro model of the U.S.
economy next.
3.3 Quantitative Model
We now turn to the quantitative model in order to investigate how generous transfers and how progressive
the associated taxes should be in an economy calibrated to the U.S., with realistic distributions of income,
wealth, and income risk. For that purpose, we build an Aiyagari (1994) variant of the incomplete markets
model: In contrast to the simple model, production uses capital in addition to labor, the government
uses debt, and households can save to self-insure against idiosyncratic shocks.
3.3.1 Environment
The quantitative model is an incomplete-market model in the tradition of Bewley (1977), Huggett
(1993), and Aiyagari (1994) with endogenous labor supply as in Pijoan-Mas (2006). Time is discrete
and indexed by t = 0,1,2, . . .. The economy is populated by a continuum of households, a representative
firm, and a government. The firm has access to a constant returns to scale technology in labor and
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capital given by Y = K1−αLα , where K, L, and Y stand for capital, labor, and output, respectively. Both
factor inputs are supplied by households. We assume constant total factor productivity.

















where ct and nt stand for consumption and hours worked in period t. Households have access to a one
period risk-free bond, subject to a borrowing limit a. Their idiosyncratic labor productivity z follows a
Markov process with transition probabilities πz(z′,z).



















c+a′ ≤ wzn+(1+ r)a−T (wzn,ra)
a′ ≥ 0,
(3.12)
where w stands for wages and r for the interest rate. We impose an exogenous borrowing limit of
zero. Households face a distortionary tax T (wzn,ra), which depends on labor income wzn and capital
earnings ra separately. We will be more specific on the concrete functional forms for taxes and transfers
below. Every period, households face the problem in (3.12) and make optimal labor, consumption, and
saving decisions accordingly. Let n(a,z),c(a,z), and a′(a,z) denote the optimal policies.




K1−αLα −wL− (r+δ )K
}
, (3.13)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Optimality conditions for the firm are standard: Marginal
productivities are equalized to the cost of each factor.
Government. The government’s budget constraint is given by:




where D is government’s debt and µ(a,z) is the measure of households with state (a,z) in the economy.
Government spending G is kept constant.
Stationary Equilibrium Definition. Let A be the space for assets and X the space for productivities.
Define the state space S = A×X and B the Borel σ−algebra induced by S. A formal definition of the
competitive equilibrium for this economy is provided below.
A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is given by: value function V (a,z) and
policies {n(a,z),c(a,z),a′(a,z)} for the household; policies for the firm {L,K}; government decisions
{G,B,T }; a measure µ over B; and prices {r,w} such that, given prices and government decisions:
(i) Households’ policies solve the household problem and achieve value V (a,z), (ii) Firm’s policies
solve its static problem, (iii) Government’s budget constraint is satisfied, (iv) Capital market clears:
K + D =
∫
B a
′(a,z)dµ(a,z), (v) Labor market clears: L =
∫
B zn(a,z)dµ(a,z), (vi) Goods market
clears: Y =
∫
B c(a,z)dµ(a,z)+δK +G, (vii) The measure µ is consistent with households’ policies:
µ(B) =
∫
B Q((a,z),B)dµ(a,z) where Q is a transition function between any two periods defined by:
Q((a,z),B) = I{a′(a,z)∈B} ∑z′∈B πz(z′,z).
3.3.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy in 2013. We focus on matching well the tax-and-transfer
system and the distributions of income, wealth, and income risk, in order to appropriately capture
the redistribution and insurance needs in the U.S. Before we discuss the data moments and parameter
choices we introduce our new functional forms for taxes and transfers and discuss the income process.
Tax-and-Transfer System. We endow the government with two fiscal tools capturing the key elements
of the U.S. tax-and-transfer system. The first function is a new tax function, which is similar to the
loglinear tax function, but importantly implies positive rates for all income levels. We prefer this tax
function for our quantitative analysis, as we model transfers separately, while the loglinear tax function
is supposed to capture the entire tax-and-transfer system and therefore turns negative at low income
levels. The second tool the government can use is a targeted transfer function. In contrast to the simple
model in the previous part, we do not just allow for a lump-sum transfer, but for a transfer that phases
out with income, in line with transfer programs in the U.S.
The new income tax function is given by









Figure 3.9 New Income Tax Function
Notes: This figure shows average tax rates given by the new income tax function. In the left panel we vary the
progressivity parameter θ ; in the right panel we vary the level parameter λ .
Capital income is taxed linearly at rate τk. We keep this linear capital income tax rate for all our
optimizations. Labor income is taxed with the new tax function, which is illustrated in Figure 3.9. The
parameter λ captures the overall level of tax rates. At income level yℓ = ȳ the average tax rate is λ . The
parameter θ captures the progressivity of the tax code. The higher θ the more progressive is the income
tax system. A θ of zero corresponds to a flat tax, and a negative θ implies regressive tax rates. In
Figure 3.10 we compare the new income tax function to the loglinear tax function. The figure illustrates
the key difference: The HSV tax function turns negative at low income levels, whereas our new tax
function always implies positive taxes, in line with statutory tax rates in the U.S.
In addition to income taxes, we model targeted transfers. The functional form for transfers is















The parameter m governs the generosity of the transfer. Specifically, m is the level of the transfer at
zero income, expressed relative to median income. The effect of changing m is shown in the left panel
of Figure 3.11. The parameter ξ determines how quickly the transfer is phased-out with income. A
higher ξ implies a quicker phase-out. This is shown in the right panel of Figure 3.11. This functional
form is motivated by the fact that income security programs in the U.S. are means tested. Furthermore,
while the lump-sum allows for breaking the tight link between average and marginal tax rates implied
by just the tax rates schedule, the phasing out of the transfer allows for non-monotonic marginal rates
of the entire tax-and-transfer system, as will become clear when we look at the optimal fiscal system
below. Note that while the income tax function applies to labor and capital income separately, the
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Figure 3.10 New Income Tax Function: Comparison to Loglinear Function
Notes: This figure compares average and marginal tax rates implied by the loglinear tax function and the new tax
function.
transfer function conditions on total income. Empirically, this is motivated by the fact that most transfer
programs are also asset tested.
Income Process. We assume that household productivity follows a Gaussian Mixture Autoregressive
(GMAR) process:
















with probability 1− p1.
(3.17)
Traditionally, most macroeconomic heterogeneous agent models have assumed that shocks are drawn
from a normal distribution. This assumption implies that many households experience medium sized
productivity shocks very often and that very small changes and very large changes are relatively rare.
This is at odds with empirical evidence leveraging population wide data on earnings growth from Social
Security records, as shown in Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2021). They show that earnings
growth exhibits stark deviations from normality: The earnings growth distribution is negatively skewed
and exhibits excess kurtosis. Relative to a normal distribution there are more individuals with very small
and very large earnings changes, but much fewer with medium sized earnings changes. Often times,
the very large earnings changes tend to be negative. These features of the earnings growth distribution
can be captured in a simple way using the GMAR process. Households draw shocks from a mixture of
two normal distributions, one of which has a much higher variance than the other. It is more likely to
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Figure 3.11 New Targeted Transfer Function
Notes: This figure illustrates the shape of the transfer function for different parameter combinations. In the left
panel we vary the level parameter m; in the right panel we vary the phasing-out parameter ξ .
draw a shock from the low variance distribution such that households experience small shocks most
of the time. However, if they draw from the normal with the high variance there is a high probability
of a large shock. By having a positive mean for the low variance normal and a negative mean for the
high variance distribution we can capture the negative skewness of the earnings growth distribution. We
discretize the productivity process using the method of Farmer and Toda (2017).
We make one additional adjustment to the productivity process to better capture the concentration
of incomes at the top. As Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith (2020) we adjust the top income states such that
they follow a Pareto instead of a lognormal distribution. Specifically, we adjust the productivity states
of the top 15%. To do so, we assume that they follow a Pareto distribution with tail parameter κ .
Targets and Parameters. We now describe how we choose the parameters of the model. In a first step,
we fix a number of parameters exogenously. First, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ to
two. While we used log utility in the theory for tractability, a larger coefficient of risk aversion is more
standard in the literature. We also fix the inverse Frisch elasticity ϕ to 2.5. We set the production side
parameters to standard values, with the labor share α = 0.64 and the depreciation rate δ = 0.08. We fix
the capital tax rate τk = 0.35 (Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011) and keep it constant at this value in all our tax
optimizations. Finally, we set the Pareto tail parameter κ to 1.6 (Aoki and Nirei, 2017). These and all
other parameter values are summarized in Table 3.1.
The remainder of the parameters is calibrated internally. For the income process we have to choose
five parameters (ρ,µ1,σ1,σ2, p1). Given these choices µ2 is implied from the restriction that the mean
of the process is zero. We target five moments from the earnings growth distribution and the earnings
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Table 3.1 Parameter Values
Parameter Interpretation Value
Preferences
β Discount factor 0.962
σ Risk aversion 2.000
ϕ Labor supply elasticity 2.500
B Disutility of labor 85.000
Income Process
ρ Persistence 0.935
p1 Weight on first normal 0.850
p2 Weight on second normal 0.150
µ1 Mean of first normal 0.016
µ2 Mean of second normal -0.091
σ1 Std. dev. of first normal 0.150
σ2 Std. dev. of second normal 0.610
κ Pareto tail parameter 1.600
Production
α Labor share 0.640
δ Depreciation rate 0.080
Government
D Public debt 0.600
G Government spending 0.126
θ Tax progressivity 0.160
λ Tax level 0.118
τk Capital tax rate 0.350
m Transfer level 0.190
ξ Transfer phase-out 4.100
Notes: Table 3.1 summarizes the parameter values for the calibrated steady state economy.
distribution to discipline these parameters. An agent in our model is a household. Therefore, we cannot
directly target the data moments on the earnings growth distribution reported in Guvenen, Karahan,
Ozkan, and Song (2021), which are computed for individuals rather than households. Instead we
compute household labor earnings growth from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) using
data from 1978 to 1992.3 As is standard in the literature, we impose a minimum earnings threshold
of $1,500 to only consider households with some labor market attachment. The moments we target
are the standard deviation (0.35), the difference between the 90th and the 10th percentile (0.64), the
skewness (-0.45), and the kurtosis (12) of the household earnings growth distribution. The final moment
we target with the productivity process is the income share of the top 10% of the income distribution.
3We use these early years of the PSID because the PSID became biannual in the late 1990s and labor income
definitions changed after 1992.
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Table 3.2 Calibration: Income and Wealth Distributions
Data Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Top 10
Labor income 2% 9% 15% 23% 52% 38%
Net worth -1% 1% 3% 9% 88% 71%
Baseline Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Top 10
Labor income 4% 9% 14% 20% 52% 38%
Net worth 0% 2% 8% 18% 72% 52%
Notes: Labor income shares by labor income quintiles and wealth shares by wealth quintiles, households aged
25-60. Data: PSID 2013 for labor income; SCF 2013 for wealth and top-10 labor income.
We compute this from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) instead of the PSID because the SCF
oversamples the rich, thereby providing a better view of the incomes at the top of the distribution.
The fit for the income and wealth distributions is shown in Table 3.2. We match the top 10% income
share by construction, but the fit for all income quintiles is very good. The model performs a bit less
well for wealth inequality. While it is able to generate a significant amount of wealth concentration,
with more than half of all wealth in the economy held by the top 10% of the wealth distribution, it does
not account for the extreme concentration of wealth in the data. In the model the top quintile wealth
share is 72% compared to 88% in the data. Quintiles 3 and 4 specifically hold too much wealth relative
to the data in the model. To improve the model fit in this dimension we later consider a model extension
with heterogeneous stochastic discount factors.
To parameterize the tax-and-transfer system we have to choose four parameters, level and pro-
gressivity of the tax function and level and phase-out of the transfer function. We choose to match
the tax-and-transfer rates from the CBO that we have shown in the introduction in Figure 3.1. The
parameters of the tax-and-transfer function are summarized in Table 3.1, as are all other parameters.
In Table 3.3 we show average tax rates and average transfer rates by income quintile in the model and
compare it to the CBO data. Given that we have only two parameters for the tax function we cannot
match the tax rates for all income quintiles perfectly. We choose to match particularly closely the
average tax rates in the second and fifth income quintile, which implies that tax rates are too high at the
bottom and slightly too low in quintiles three and four. Transfer rates are matched well, accounting for
a significant share of income in the bottom quintile but then phasing-out quickly.
We also depict average and marginal tax rates implied by the tax-and-transfer system in Figure 3.12,
as a function of labor income. For this figure, we assume a capital income of zero. This does not
matter for the tax function, but does matter for the transfer function. For higher capital incomes, the
marginal tax rates implied by the transfer function are lower, as the marginal tax rates are falling in
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Table 3.3 Calibration: Average Tax and Transfer Rates
Data Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Tax rate 0% 10% 16% 20% 27%
Transfer rate 26% 3% 1% 0% 0%
Model Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Tax rate 8% 11% 14% 17% 28%
Transfer rate 24% 4% 1% 0% 0%
Notes: Average tax rates paid and transfer rates received per income quintile. Data: CBO 2013, working-age
households.
Figure 3.12 Calibration: Average and Marginal Tax Rates
Notes: This figure shows average and marginal tax rates along the income distribution in the calibrated steady
state. An income of 1 corresponds to median income in the calibration.
total income. The calibrated tax-and-transfer system is progressive in average rates because the income
tax function is progressive and the transfer introduces additional progressivity into average rates of the
overall system. Marginal tax rates are falling at the bottom of the income distribution, where transfers
imply high marginal rates. Once transfers are phased out, marginal tax rates are also increasing because
of the positive progressivity of the income tax function.
This leaves as the only remaining parameters the discount factor β , government debt D, labor
disutility B, and exogenous government spending G. We set the former three parameters to match
an interest rate of 2%, a government debt to output ratio of 60%, and an average labor supply of 0.3.
Spending is implied by government budget clearing. The resulting spending to output ratio of around
14% is roughly in line with the data.
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Figure 3.13 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System: Average and Marginal Tax Rates
Notes: This figure shows optimal average and marginal tax rates along the income distribution. An income of 1
corresponds to median income in the calibration.
3.3.3 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System
We use our calibrated model of the U.S. economy with realistic distributions of income, wealth, and
income risk to compute the optimal tax-and-transfer system. In order to find the optimal system, we
optimize on the fiscal system parameters λ , θ , and ξ . The level of the transfer m is residually determined
from the government budget. The government can change the tax-and-transfer system once and for all,
i.e. the three parameters of the fiscal system that we are choosing optimally are not allowed to vary over
time.4 However, we take into account the entire transition towards a new steady state when computing
welfare. Along the transition, m varies to clear the government budget period by period.
The optimal tax-and-transfer system is much more redistributive than the system currently in place
in the United States. Optimal transfers are large with an m of 0.46. They phase out slowly with ξ = 1.94.
The large transfers are financed with moderately progressive taxes (θ = 0.17). Average and marginal tax
rates along the income distribution are shown in Figure 3.13. Again, the graph is for a household with
zero capital income, with yℓ being normalized by median income. Average tax rates of the entire system
are very progressive because the income tax function is progressive and the transfer is large. Marginal
tax rates, however, are not monotonically increasing. Rather, they are high at low income levels because
the large transfer is phased out. At high incomes marginal tax rates are increasing because the transfer
has phased out completely and progressivity is solely determined by the tax function.
4Optimal time varying tax systems are investigated in Acikgöz, Hagedorn, Holter, and Wang (2018) and
Dyrda and Pedroni (2020).
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Table 3.4 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System
Data Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Tax rate 0% 10% 16% 20% 27%
Transfer rate 26% 3% 1% 0% 0%
Total avg rate -26% -7% 15% 20% 27%
Optimal Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Tax rate 15% 21% 27% 31% 44%
Transfer rate 170% 58% 21% 6% 0%
Total avg rate -155% -37% 6% 25% 44%
Marginal rate 62% 66% 62% 53% 51%
Notes: This table shows average tax and transfer rates in the data and under the optimal tax-and-transfer system
in the model for income quintiles. For the model, the table also shows marginal tax rates.
Table 3.4 shows the optimal average and marginal rates by income quintile. Overall, the tax-and-
transfer system is very progressive in average rates. The bottom quintile’s average tax rate is -155%,
whereas the top income quintile faces an average tax rate of 44%. However, marginal tax rates of the
entire system look very different. They are highest in the lowest income quintiles and lowest at the top.
Thus, we recover the result from the theoretical part that it is optimal to disentangle progressivity in
average and marginal tax rates. Because income and wealth are distributed very unequally a utilitarian
planner wants to redistribute a lot. The efficient way of achieving this is to give large transfers, but keep
marginal tax rates at the top at a relatively lower level.
We can also recover the second key insight from the theoretical model in the quantitative part: The
larger transfers, the lower the optimal progressivity of the tax system. We illustrate this finding in
Figure 3.14. In the figure we plot the optimal progressivity parameter θ as a function of the level of
the transfer m, keeping the phase-out constant at ξ = 2. The figure shows that optimal progressivity is
decreasing in the size of the transfer. Thus, this key insight survives in the more complicated model
with capital, savings, and taking into account transitions.5 Still, taxes are progressive, as opposed to
the simple model. One key difference between the simple model and the quantitative model is that the
productivity and income distribution has a Pareto tail. This is known to change the shape of the optimal
marginal tax schedule at the top (see e.g. Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009) and Heathcote and
Tsujiyama (2021)). With a lognormal income distribution, at a high income level there is only little
mass above that income level, so that raising marginal taxes there, while distortive, raises only very
5Note that for this figure we optimize over θ and m, adjusting λ along the transition, leading to marginally
different optimal combinations of parameters. This will be consistent in future versions.
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Figure 3.14 Quantitative Model: Relation between Transfers and Tax Progressivity
Notes: This table shows optimal progressivity of the income tax function θ as a function of the transfer level
m, keeping the phase-out constant at ξ = 2. Along the transition the tax function level λ adjusts to clear the
government budget.
little additional revenue to be redistributed to the poor. With a Pareto distribution, however, there is
more mass at higher income levels such that higher marginal tax rates at high income levels become
optimal because they can raise a lot of revenue. Given this and the large inequality in the U.S. the
optimal system combines very generous transfers with moderately progressive taxes.
The optimal tax-and-transfer system does not just increase utilitarian welfare, but is also favored
by a majority of households over the status quo. On aggregate, consumption equivalent welfare gains
are very large with 9.64%. 79% of households would benefit. The largest welfare gains accrue to the
poor, who benefit from the very generous transfers. Another group of households that gains is the
group of asset rich households. With the more generous system in place, the capital stock along the
transition towards the new steady state shrinks and asset rich households hold the assets that can be
consumed along the transition. They also benefit from rising interest rates. There is, however, also a
minority of households who prefer the status quo over moving to the new system: High productivity,
low asset households would suffer from the reform because they face higher tax rates. The distribution
of consumption equivalent welfare gains is shown in Figure 3.15.
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Figure 3.15 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System: Consumption Equivalent Welfare Gains
Notes: This figure shows consumption equivalent welfare gains from a tax reform to the optimal system for
different parts of the asset-productivity distribution.
3.3.4 Investigating the Results
How Important is Phasing-Out?
The optimal tax-and-transfer system features phasing-out transfers. We incorporate this feature into our
tax function because it is a feature of the U.S. tax code and because it allows us to have non-monotonic
marginal tax rates. In particular, it allows for a U-shaped marginal tax rates schedule that is often found
to be optimal in the Mirrleesian optimal tax literature.
We now investigate whether it is a crucial feature to achieve the large welfare gains to allow for
phasing-out transfers. For that purpose we compute the optimal system restricting ξ to zero. In that case,
all households receive a lump-sum transfer or universal basic income. It is taxed away only through the
income tax function but not phased out.
In Table 3.5 we compare the average and marginal tax rates of the whole system with phasing-out
transfers to the system with lump-sum transfers. Having phasing-out transfers allows to have slightly
larger transfers at the bottom, so that the average tax rate at the bottom is more negative with phasing-out
transfers. However, overall both systems are very redistributive with strongly increasing average tax
rates along the income distribution. The marginal tax rates schedules are, however, quite different. With
lump-sum transfers the functional form assumptions do not allow for higher marginal tax rates at the
bottom than at the top. Consequently, with the lump-sum the marginal tax rates schedule is rather flat.
This contrasts with the lower marginal tax rates at the top with phasing-out transfers.
However, in welfare terms the optimal system restricted to lump-sum transfers comes relatively
close to the optimal system with phasing-out transfers. The consumption equivalent gain is 9.43%,
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Table 3.5 Optimal Phasing-Out Transfers vs. Lump-Sum Transfers
With phase-out Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Total avg. rate -155% -37% 6% 25% 44%
Total marg. rate 62% 66% 62% 53% 51%
Lump-sum Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Total avg. rate -125% -29% 4% 20% 45%
Total marg. rate 60% 61% 62% 63% 64%
Notes: This table compares optimal average and marginal tax rates of the entire tax-and-transfer system for two
cases: phasing-out transfers and lump-sum transfers.
which is almost as large as with phasing-out transfers. The fraction of households preferring the system
over the status quo is even slightly larger than in the previous case. However, it requires very high rates
of the income tax function, which may still make it hard to implement.
How Important are Departures from Normality?
For the income process in our benchmark calibration we make two deviations from the standard
assumption of normality. First, we add a Pareto tail to the productivity distribution. Second, we draw
shocks from a mixture of normals, allowing us to match higher order moments of earnings risk. We
now investigate how important these deviations are for the optimal tax-and-transfer system.
First, we remove the Pareto tail. We recalibrate the model to match the targets as in our benchmark
calibration. Most importantly we need a different discount factor to match an interest rate of 2%
because we are now missing the richest agents who contribute significantly to aggregate savings. In
the optimal system, transfers at the bottom are lower with m = 0.43, but phase-out at a lower rate
ξ = 1.65. Progressivity of the tax schedule is lower with θ = 0.09. The lower progressivity is driven
by the fact that there is less mass in the very right tail of the income distribution, which reduces the
potential to “soak the rich” to finance generous transfers. Having high marginal tax rates at high income
levels remains distortive but raises less revenue. Therefore, progressivity is lower optimally. Given that
inequality is less pronounced transfers at the bottom of the income distribution are smaller. The average
tax rates of the entire system are compared to our benchmark model in Table 3.6: They are higher at the
bottom and lower at the top of the distribution.
Second, starting from the version of the model without the Pareto tail, instead of drawing shocks
from a mixture of normals we rely on a simple AR(1) process for productivity. We choose the standard
deviation of this process to be consistent with the standard deviation of the mixture. This implies that
we are missing higher order moments of earnings risk. Even though with endogenous labor the earnings
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Table 3.6 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System with Normal Shocks
Total avg rate Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Benchmark -155% -37% 6% 25% 44%
No Pareto tail -131% -26% 10% 28% 39%
AR(1) -151% -35% 5% 27% 41%
Notes: This table compares optimal average tax rates of the entire tax-and-transfer system for the benchmark
economy, an economy witout the Pareto tail for the productivity distribution, and an economy without Pareto tail
and with shocks drawn from a normal distribution instead of a mixture of normals.
growth distribution does not inherit the exact moments from the productivity process, the earnings
growth distribution with this shock process is essentially symmetric and not leptokurtic. There are now
many more households who experience medium sized productivity changes and many less with very
small and very large changes.
The average tax rates of the optimal system with this shock structure are also shown in Table 3.6.
Maybe surprisingly, the optimal system is more generous compared to the GMAR productivity process
(m = 0.45, ξ = 1.40, θ = 0.08). As there is no Pareto tail, progressivity of the income tax is mild. The
transfer, however, is larger. This indicates that increasing the likelihood of medium sized earnings
changes all the time outweighs the reduction in the probability of very large earnings changes.
How Important is Wealth Inequality?
In our benchmark calibration we match well the distributions of income and income risk. There is
also significant wealth inequality; we miss, however, the extreme concentration of wealth at the very
top of the distribution. To improve the fit of the model in this dimension we consider an extension
with heterogeneous stochastic discount factors as in Krusell and Smith (1998). We allow for two
different discount factors with transition probabilities chosen such that 10% of the population have
the high discount factor. The process is very persistent. We compare the wealth distributions in the
data, our benchmark calibration, and the extension with heterogeneous discount factors in Table 3.7.
The extended model captures the extreme concentration of wealth well, with 69% of the wealth in the
economy held by the top 10% of the distribution compared to 71% in the data.
We show the average tax rates under the optimal system in Table 3.8. With an m of 0.47 and a
phase-out ξ of 0.5 the transfer is more generous than in our benchmark. Tax progressivity θ is lower,
but tax levels are higher to finance the larger transfer. While the combination of instruments is slightly
different than in the benchmark, overall average tax rates of the entire system are not too different.
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Table 3.7 Wealth Distributions with Heterogeneous β
Net worth dist. Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Top 10
Data -1% 1% 3% 9% 88% 71%
Benchmark 0% 2% 8% 18% 72% 52%
Het. β 0% 1% 3% 11% 85% 69%
Notes: This table shows the distributions of net worth in the data, in the benchmark model, and in the extended
model with heterogeneous stochastic discount factors.
Table 3.8 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System with Heterogeneous β
Total avg. rate Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Benchmark -155% -37% 6% 25% 44%
Het. β -153% -35% 1% 22% 47%
Notes: This table compares the optimal average tax rates of the entire tax-and-transfer system of the benchmark
model and the extended model with heterogeneous stochastic discount factors.
How Large are Gains compared to Loglinear Function?
We have shown that while using phasing-out transfers is optimal, the largest share of the welfare gains
can already be achieved by only using lump-sum transfers. We now investigate whether restricting the
government to the loglinear tax function without even the lump-sum transfer also comes close to the
optimal system. The optimal progressivity parameter with the loglinear tax function is 0.49, which
also achieves more redistribution than the system currently in place. However, it enforces a tight link
between marginal and average tax rates, so that to achieve this large degree of redistribution marginal
tax rates at the top become very high. The consumption equivalent welfare gains from moving to this
system are 5.08%. While this is large, it clearly falls short of the gains achieved with the more flexible
tax functions.
How Important are Transitions?
As our baseline, we compute welfare after a change to the tax system taking into account the entire
transition to the new steady state. This is conceptually the right measure because the distributions over
assets differ potentially significantly between the calibrated initial steady state and the final steady state
after a policy change. Transitions to new steady states are generally quite slow, so just comparing steady
states can be severely misleading. This is the case in particular because the capital stock in a new steady
state might be higher. It might be good in welfare terms to be in a steady state with a higher capital stock
when not taking into account the transition during which this larger capital stock has to be accumulated.
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With this caveat in mind we still compute the optimal steady state tax-and-transfer system. The
optimal transfer is large with m = 0.36. It does not phase-out optimally and progressivity of the income
tax is mild (θ = 0.03). This reflects that having a larger capital stock is attractive when only comparing
steady states: The system provides less redistribution than the optimal system with transitions, which
encourages more precautionary savings. There is no phase-out because the phase-out also depends on
capital income and imposing a higher marginal tax on capital is undesirable in this case. Progressivity is
low to not discourage capital accumulation by the most productive too much. Then, under the optimal
system the capital stock will be higher than in our benchmark, which makes it preferable to be in this
steady state.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the optimal design of the tax-and-transfer system. First, we establish in a simple
analytical framework that there is a negative optimal relationship between the size of transfers and
the progressivity embedded in the income tax code. This is the case for efficiency and redistribution
reasons: When the government has to finance a large transfer it is optimal to incentivize individuals to
work more through lower progressivity in marginal rates. Also, transfers compress the consumption
distribution, lowering the desire to reduce inequality more through the income tax code.
In a quantitative model of the U.S. economy with realistic distributions of income, wealth, and
income risk, we find that transfers should be more generous and taxes should be higher. However,
taxes should not be more progressive. This combination of instruments allows to achieve a large
reduction in post-tax-and-transfer inequality, while preserving efficiency with marginal progressivity
lower than average progressivity. It is key for achieving large welfare gains to separate marginal
and average progressivity in this way. Adding additional flexibility to the tax-and-transfer schedule
by allowing transfers to phase-out, which allows for non-monotonic (U-shaped) marginal tax rates
schedules, increases welfare further, but is quantitatively less important.
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Chapter 4
Redistribution in Growing Economies1
Abstract We analyze the dynamics of the equity-efficiency trade-off along the growth path. To do
so, we incorporate the optimal income taxation problem into a state-of-the-art multi-sector structural
change general equilibrium model with non-homothetic preferences. We identify two key opposing
forces. First, long-run productivity growth allows households to shift their consumption expenditures
away from necessities. This implies a reduction in the dispersion of marginal utilities, and therefore
calls for a welfare state that declines along the growth path. Yet, economic growth is also systematically
associated with an increase in the skill premium, which raises inequality and the desire to redistribute.
We quantitatively analyze these opposing forces for two countries: the U.S. from 1950 to 2010, and
China from 1989 to 2009. Optimal redistribution decreases at early stages of development, as the role
of non-homotheticities prevails. At later stages of development the rising income inequality dominates
and the welfare state should become more generous.
4.1 Introduction
Fiscal redistribution is a central tool for governments to reduce poverty and inequality. A large literature
has analyzed the optimal design of the welfare state, which is shaped by the classic trade-off between
efficiency and redistribution: higher taxes allow for a more generous redistribution, but disincentivize
labor supply. This literature has primarily focused on steady-states and business-cycle fluctuations
in one-sector economies, trying to understand how the welfare state should look like in stationary
economies and how it should adjust during expansions or recessions.
1This paper uses data from the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey provided by IPUMS USA
(Ruggles, Flood, Goeken, Grover, Meyer, Pacas, and Sobek, 2020).
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We adopt a different perspective and consider long-run productivity growth. Growth has potentially
large and conflicting effects on poverty and inequality. On the one hand, as an economy becomes richer,
absolute poverty tends to decrease;2 necessities account for a decreasing share of aggregate consumption,
as emphasized in the structural change literature. On the other hand, a growing economy typically
reallocates towards high-skill intensive industries, which increases the demand for high-skilled workers.
The skill premium rises, and thus inequality tends to increase.3 Finally, growth may also change labor
elasticities over time, altering the efficiency costs of taxation. Overall, long-run productivity growth
generates non-trivial dynamics for the costs and needs for redistribution over time.
This paper analyzes how the welfare state should adjust over time in growing economies. To
that end, we combine the workhorse models of public finance and macro development. We build a
heterogeneous-agent variant of a state-of-the-art structural change general equilibrium model with
non-homothetic CES preferences (Buera, Kaboski, Rogerson, and Vizcaino, 2021; Comin, Lashkari,
and Mestieri, 2021). We incorporate the optimal income taxation problem into this framework to
analyze the dynamics of the equity-efficiency trade-off due to aggregate growth and changes in the
composition of consumption.
First, we study how the optimal fiscal plan changes with growth in a simplified partial equilibrium
set-up. We characterize the fully optimal nonlinear tax schedule in the spirit of Mirrlees (1971) and show
that, absent changes in prices and wages, the main channel at play with non-homothetic preferences
is a reduction in the dispersion of marginal utilities. As a result, optimal redistribution decreases over
time. We also document that the optimal tax schedule is well approximated by the parametric function
developed in Ferriere, Grübener, Navarro, and Vardishvili (2021), which motivates us to analyze optimal
nonlinear taxes using this parametric tax function in the general equilibrium environment.
We then turn to the general equilibrium model, to account for the fact that sectoral reallocation
along the growth path and skill-biased technological change endogenously increase the skill premium.
We calibrate our model to two countries: the U.S. from 1950 to 2010, and China from 1989 to 2009.
We find that optimal redistribution decreases at early stages of development even when inequality rises,
as the role of non-homotheticities prevails. On the other hand, at later stages of development the rising
skill premium and income inequality dominate, so that the optimal tax-and-transfer system becomes
more redistributive.
We build a rich structural change model with three sectors, agriculture, manufacturing goods, and
services, and households heterogeneous in their skill and productivity. The key ingredients of the
2See Ferreira and Ravallion (2011).
3This mechanism, which is referred to as “skill-biased structural change” by Buera, Kaboski, Rogerson, and
Vizcaino (2021), is further amplified by skill-biased technical change.
107
model are (i) non-homothetic constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences à la Comin, Lashkari, and
Mestieri (2021) with sector-specific income elasticities; and (ii) differential skill intensities across
sectors: Agriculture uses high-skilled labor relatively little, whereas services represent the most high-
skill intensive sector. In poor countries, households spend a large share of their income on agricultural
necessity goods. With aggregate growth and non-homothetic preferences, households endogenously
shift their consumption away from agricultural goods, toward goods and eventually services. This pattern
creates the typical hump-shaped profile for the manufacturing share in GDP and an ever increasing
share of services in aggregate output. In addition to this demand-driven structural change, the model
allows for heterogeneous growth rates of productivity across sectors and skill-biased technical change.
In general equilibrium, the increasing demand for high-skilled workers will generate an endogenous
increase in the skill premium.
We start with a simplified partial equilibrium setup to analyze the effect of growth on optimal
redistribution in the presence of non-homothetic preferences. In the canonical optimal taxation problem
with homothetic preferences aggregate growth is irrelevant for optimal redistribution; the only relevant
statistic is relative inequality. With non-homothetic preferences, growth reduces dispersion in marginal
utilities, and thus reduces the need for redistribution over time. In a low-productivity economy, poor
households spend most of their income on agricultural necessity goods. As the economy grows,
all households eventually decrease their share of spending on agricultural goods, reflecting the fact
that primary needs are satisfied. Marginal utilities decrease, especially for the poorer. With non-
homothetic preferences, growth also affects labor supply elasticities. However, we show that this
effect is quantitatively smaller. We calibrate the partial equilibrium model to the United States in 1950.
We pursue an inverse optimum approach and choose welfare weights such that the observed 1950
tax-and-transfer system is optimal given the chosen welfare weights. Then, we increase all incomes by
a factor corresponding to GDP per capita growth until 2010, keeping relative inequality and relative
prices constant. We show that because of the economy getting richer and absolute poverty concerns
becoming less severe marginal tax rates fall across the entire income distribution. This translates into
smaller transfers paid out to households, so that the welfare state is much less generous.
We then return to the general equilibrium model to analyze the dynamics of the welfare state
when also accounting for price and wage changes. We calibrate the model to match salient features of
structural change in the U.S. from 1950 to 2010 and in China from 1989 to 2009. In both countries
over the respective time period the skill premium rose significantly. The model accounts for that with a
combination of skill-biased structural change and skill-biased technical change.
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In our calibrated model optimal redistribution should become more generous over time in the United
States. However, this optimal evolution of the welfare state is non-monotonic. From 1950 to 1980, the
welfare state should become less generous, as the rise in inequality through an increasing skill premium
is relatively small and the effect of non-homotheticities is relatively large. From 1980 to 2010 there is a
much larger increase in inequality and non-homotheticities play a smaller role because the economy
is already larger to start with. Therefore, the rising inequality effect dominates and the government
should redistribute more. We decompose the changes further and show that the welfare state should
become less generous over time because of aggregate growth and because relative prices shift such that
the consumption baskets of the poor become relatively cheaper. On the other hand, the welfare state
should become more generous because the skill premium and the share of high-skilled individuals rises.
The effects of non-homotheticities are even more important for China. From 1989 to 2009 there is a
large rise in the skill premium in China. On the other hand, there is also very strong growth in GDP per
capita. The agriculture share was initially quite high and decreased substantially over that time period.
Even with the large rise in inequality the welfare state should not become much more redistributive;
over the first half of that period it should have even become much less generous because of the strong
effect of non-homotheticities.
Related Literature. This paper relates to two large but separate literatures. A large literature studies
optimal taxation in stationary environments. One strand of this literature following Mirrlees (1971)
analyzes the unrestricted fully non-linear optimal tax schedule in usually relatively simple models
(Diamond, 1998; Saez, 2001). Much of this strand of the literature focuses on static environments, while
Farhi and Werning (2013) and Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski (2016) extend the approach to dynamic
settings. Another strand of the optimal taxation literature following Ramsey (1927) exogenously restricts
the tax instruments available to the government, but usually analyzes richer models (Bhandari, Evans,
Golosov, and Sargent, 2017; Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante, 2017; Werning, 2007). Relative
to the optimal taxation literature, we embed the optimal tax problem into a state-of-the-art model of
structural transformation and aggregate growth instead of considering a stationary environment.
The second large literature this paper relates to is the literature on structural transformation. This
shift of the economy out of agriculture to manufacturing and increasingly services has long been
considered to be one of the key features of growing economies (Kuznets, 1973). The literature usually
considers two main drivers of the structural transformation. The first driver are income effects through
non-homothetic preferences, as emphasized by Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001). As households
become richer, they demand more and more manufactured goods and services such that the economy
109
shifts out of agriculture towards these sectors. The second key driver is differential productivity growth
across sectors (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007). Both of these forces are considered to be important drivers
of the structural transformation and are therefore both incorporated into state-of-the-art models of
structural change (Duarte and Restuccia, 2010; Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi, 2014), so we
also allow for both of them in our framework. While much of this literature focuses on representative
agent models, we build on Buera, Kaboski, Rogerson, and Vizcaino (2021) and Fang and Herrendorf
(2021), who incorporate some limited household heterogeneity. Most of the literature uses Stone-Geary
preferences to capture non-homotheticities (Geary, 1950). However, a number of recent papers have
shown that other non-homothetic preferences fit some important features of the data better (Boppart,
2014; Święcki, 2017). In that respect, we use the non-homothetic CES preferences proposed for a
model of structural change by Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021).
Besides these two large literatures, this paper shares the interest in designing the welfare state in
growing economies with Song, Storesletten, Wang, and Zilibotti (2015). Their focus is on the design of
the Chinese pension systems.
Roadmap. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 summarizes some empirical regularities through
which growth might matter for optimal redistribution. In Section 4.3 we introduce the partial equilibrium
setup, in which we incorporate aggregate growth and non-homothetic preferences into the optimal
income taxation problem. In Section 4.4 we extend the framework to general equilibrium to also capture
the dynamics of inequality. We calibrate the model to the United States and China and perform the
optimal tax analysis in general equilibrium. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Motivating Facts
Before going to the model, we describe a number of key observations about economic growth. We
focus on observations that might matter for how much a government might want to redistribute.
Observation 1: Absolute poverty. Economic growth can be a powerful mechanism to alleviate
absolute poverty. Ferreira and Ravallion (2011) show that it is a robust feature of long-run growth that
it lifts people out of absolute poverty. As a particularly impressive example, consider the case of China.
According to data provided by the World Bank, in 1990 around two thirds of the Chinese population had
less than $1.90 (at 2011 international prices) available per day. This share fell to almost zero in 2016.4
4The data is from the World Development Indicators.
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This may be important for a government’s taste for redistribution, as redistribution might provide the
largest benefits if it is directed to the very poor.
Observation 2: Structural change. One of the most prominent features associated with aggregate
growth is the structural transformation (Jones, 2016). The classic split of the economy is into three
sectors, which are agriculture, goods/manufacturing, and services. It is a very robust regularity across
countries that the nominal agriculture share is constantly declining, the manufacturing share is hump-
shaped, and the services share is rising. In combination with the next two observations this may have
important implications for redistribution.
Observation 3: Relative prices. A related empirical regularity is the evolution of relative prices. It
is a robust feature of development that the relative price of services is rising with growth (Buera and
Kaboski, 2012; Duarte and Restuccia, 2017). This may have important implications for redistribution,
as households at different positions in the income distribution consume very different consumption
baskets. Price changes of different consumption baskets associated with growth may affect the need for
redistribution.
Observation 4: Skill intensity. The next related observation is that the service sector tends to be the
most high-skill intensive in the sense that it uses a lot of high-skilled labor in production. The shift
towards this sector may therefore drive up the demand and price of high-skilled labor, with important
implications for inequality, as pointed out by Buera and Kaboski (2012) and Buera, Kaboski, Rogerson,
and Vizcaino (2021).
Observation 5: Inequality. A final robust feature observed for a variety of countries is the rise of
the skill premium. Wage inequality between college educated and non-college educated workers is
increasing. This is well known for the U.S. (Katz and Murphy, 1992), but also true for other countries
such as China (Fang and Herrendorf, 2021). Technical change is closely related to this phenomenon
through the shift towards high-skill intensive sectors described above or skill-biased technical change.
4.3 Mirrleesian Setup in Partial Equilibrium
In this part of the paper we want to isolate and quantify the effect of growth on optimal redistribution
when preferences are non-homothetic. For this purpose, we incorporate non-homothetic CES preferences
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à la Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021) into the workhorse model of optimal taxation following
Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1998), and Saez (2001).
4.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of heterogeneous households, who are characterized by their labor productivity
θ . They choose labor supply n, so that their pre-tax labor income is given by y = θn. They consume
goods from three sectors: agriculture, goods, and services. Households’ preferences are defined by the











where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ε is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and B is an
additional labor disutility parameter.
Households are assumed to be hand-to-mouth. Therefore, they choose consumption and labor
subject to their static budget constraint
pACA + pGCG + pSCS = y−T (y) , (4.2)
where p j denotes the price of commodity j and T (y) is the nonlinear income tax schedule faced by the
households.
For the consumption aggregator, we assume non-homothetic CES preferences following Comin,
Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021).5 It is standard in the literature on structural transformation to assume
non-homothetic preferences. Indeed, non-homothetic preferences are frequently identified as one
of the most important drivers of structural change (Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie, 2001). The most
common specification of non-homotheticities are preferences of the Stone-Geary type (Herrendorf,
Rogerson, and Valentinyi, 2014). Non-homothetic CES preferences share key properties with Stone-
Geary preferences. Appropriately parameterized, agricultural goods are necessities, whereas services
are luxuries. Stone-Geary preferences, however, have some disadvantages, which non-homothetic CES
preferences overcome. First, the non-homotheticities vanish asymptotically meaning that as countries
grow richer preferences behave as if they were homothetic. Second, they imply marginal propensities
to consume out of a change in permanent income that are constant across income levels. Third, they
5To be precise, we use the formulation from Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2017).
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imply a functional relationship between income and price elasticities of demand. All these features are
rejected by the data. None of the criticisms applies to non-homothetic CES preferences.









j = 1. (4.3)










and the Hicksian demand function can be written as




Cε j . (4.5)
With these preferences, σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods. ε j governs the income elasticity
of demand. C is a consumption index, whereas C j denotes the consumption of individual commodities.6
At first sight, when looking at the definition in equation 4.3, these preferences may seem hard
to work with. They yield, however, a quite tractable demand system. This can be seen from the
Hicksian demand function in equation 4.5. It can be easily seen from this equation that a good’s share
in expenditure will go up in income if ε j is large and that the expenditure share will go down if ε j
is small. Hence, for a good to be a luxury, it has to have a large ε j, whereas a low ε j characterizes a
necessity. Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021) estimate the preferences using micro data for countries
at different stages of development and find stable parameters with the ε j being largest for services and
lowest for agriculture, with goods having an income elasticity between the two other sectors.
4.3.2 Government
The government chooses a fully unrestricted nonlinear tax schedule as in Mirrlees (1971), Diamond
(1998), and Saez (2001). To define the government problem, we first write the household maximization
problem:
V (θ ;T (·))≡ max
C,n
U(C,n) s.t.
pACA + pGCG + pSCS = nθ −T (nθ) .
(4.6)
6We derive the expenditure function and the Hicksian demand function in Appendix D.1.
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Households choose consumption C, defined by the non-homothetic CES consumption aggregator,
and labor n to maximize their utility subject to their static budget constraint: Spending on the three
commodities has to equal after-tax income. We denote by V (θ ;T (·)) the household value obtained by
the optimal choice given the nonlinear tax schedule and by n(θ ;T (·)) the labor policy function.
Let {w(θ)} denote Pareto weights and G an exogenous spending requirement. In partial equilibrium
we do not have to specify which commodities the government consumes. Then, we can write the











T (n(θ ;T (·))θ) f (θ)dθ ≥ G.
(4.7)
The government chooses a nonlinear tax schedule to maximize the integral over household utilities,
weighted with the Pareto weights and the mass of households of a given productivity f (θ). The
government is constrained by its budget constraint, stating that the revenues from the income tax have
to cover the exogenous spending requirement. We denote by λ the multiplier on the government budget
constraint, which is the marginal value of public funds.
4.3.3 Optimal Tax Formula
The optimal tax formula can be derived using standard techniques. Specifically, we use a perturbation
approach following Saez (2001) to derive the optimal tax formula. We relegate the derivation to the
appendix. Optimal marginal tax rates for a certain skill level θ ∗ are given by
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.






efficiency concerns. This tax formula is an inverse elasticity rule: The larger labor supply elasticities,






accounts for redistributive concerns. If individuals with a higher skill than θ ∗ have
very high incomes, their marginal utilities will be low, making this term small. Given that the term is
subtracted, this means that this will be a force towards higher marginal tax rates. With high income
inequality, implying low marginal utilities at the top, it is optimal to have high marginal tax rates because
this raises large amounts of revenue from the top of the distribution to be redistributed at the bottom.
η (θ) captures income effects. When marginal taxes at θ go up, this lowers incomes of everybody
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earning more. With leisure being a normal good, this will increase their labor supply. Hence, income
effects are a force for higher marginal tax rates. Finally, the shape of the skill distribution matters. With
a lot of mass above a certain skill level, there are many people whose average taxes are raised by an
increase of marginal taxes at θ ∗. This is a reason for higher marginal tax rates. However, if there is a lot
of mass at this skill level, then distortions will be more important, so that lower taxes will be optimal.
Our description of the forces determining optimal taxes so far would apply equally to the case with





. With homothetic preferences, E ′(θ) is always equal to one for every skill level and therefore
also independent of economic growth. However, with non-homothetic CES preferences this term causes
redistributive concerns to become smaller as an economy becomes richer. Keeping relative inequality
constant, increasing the incomes of all agents reduces the benefits from distribution. This is how the
shift away from absolute poverty and the consumption of necessities enters the optimal tax formula.
Note that also the income effect term is affected by the presence of non-homotheticities. We derive
the formula for the income effect in the appendix. We show in the next part, however, that the key
change with non-homothetic preferences is to the taste for redistribution.
4.3.4 Calibration
We now evaluate the quantitative significance of growth in combination with non-homothetic preferences
by computing the optimal income tax schedules in an economy that is calibrated to the U.S. in 1950 and
for a counterfactual economy, in which every individual is richer by a factor corresponding to U.S. real
GDP per capita growth from 1950 to 2010. For this exercise, we keep relative inequality constant.
For the calibration, we assume that the income distribution follows a log-normal distribution with
a Pareto tail. To discipline the income distribution we use data from the 1950 U.S. Census (Ruggles,
Flood, Goeken, Grover, Meyer, Pacas, and Sobek, 2020). As income measure we use wage and salary
income. Because incomes are reported only in bins we refrain from estimating the parameters of the
distributions directly. Rather, we set them such that the implied income distribution is consistent with
the income distribution in the data. We assume that the income distribution for the majority of the
population follows a log-normal distribution and only adjust the incomes of the top 5% such that they
follow a Pareto distribution. We let the Pareto parameter decline linearly to ensure a smooth hazard
ratio 1−H(y)h(y) , as in Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2020). The income distributions in the data and in
the model are shown in Table 4.1.
We fix a number of preferences parameters exogenously. We set the coefficient of relative risk
aversion γ equal to two and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ε equal to 0.2. We set the non-
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Notes: This table compares the income distributions for the U.S. in 1950 in the data and in the model.
homothetic CES parameters σ = 0.3, εA = 0.1, εG = 1.0, and εS = 1.8, in line with the estimates of
Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021). We use these parameter values also in the general equilibrium
model, so these parameters are also summarized in Table 4.3. In partial equilibrium, we also have to set
the prices of the three commodities exogenously. Prices and the Ω j parameters of the non-homothetic
CES preferences cannot be distinguished from each other. They are jointly set such that we match the
nominal sector shares of the U.S. in 1950, with roughly 60% of the economy in the services sector,
34% in the goods sector, and 6% in the agricultural sector. Because we match these targets exactly
in our general equilibrium model, we incorporate the prices and preference parameters from the GE
calibration into the PE environment. This gives us a very close match for the sector shares in PE.
We calibrate taxes and spending to be consistent with taxes and spending of the U.S. federal
government in 1950. We assume that the government raises revenues using a parametric tax function.
The tax payment of an individual earning income y is given in equation 4.8.





Individuals pay taxes on their income, where tax progressivity is determined by the parameter τ and the
level of tax rates is determined by the parameter λ . Also, households receive a lump-sum transfer T .
The level of the lump sum transfer is set to match government spending on income security (roughly 1%
of GDP in 1950). Exogenous government spending G is set to account for all other federal government
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spending (roughly 14% of GDP). The parameters of the tax function are set to match average marginal
tax rates along the income distribution.7
Finally, we back out the underlying skill distribution from the income distribution given all other
parameters using the households’ first order conditions, as in Saez (2001). For the optimal taxation
problem, we follow an inverse optimum approach. That is, we compute Pareto weights such that
the calibrated 1950 tax schedule is optimal given these weights (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2012;
Christiansen, 1977; Hendren, 2020; Lockwood and Weinzierl, 2016).
For our counterfactual 2010 economy, we scale down all prices by the same magnitude, equivalent
to a proportional increase in income for everybody. We choose the magnitude to be the increase in GDP
per capita from 1950 to 2010. We recalibrate taxes and spending to be consistent with the distribution
of average marginal tax rates and government spending in the U.S. in 2010. Economic growth in
combination with non-homothetic preferences leads to a shift in the consumption allocation across the
different goods: Richer households spend less on agriculture and goods and more on services. The
agriculture share falls from 6% to 2.5%; the goods share declines from 34% to 25%; and the services
share rises from 60% to 73%. Note that this underestimates the structural change that we observe in the
United States in the data. The reason is that we are looking at nominal sector shares but keep relative
prices constant. However, it is well known that the relative price of services is rising with development
(“Baumol’s cost disease”, Baumol (1967)). In the general equilibrium model we capture this force and
thereby are able to match nominal sector shares. In this partial equilibrium framework we only capture
a real shift towards services consumption and away from necessities, so that we do not account for the
entire increase in the nominal service share.
Note that while relative inequality in incomes does not change by construction, the underlying
inequality in the skill distribution does change. We are going to revisit the importance of that change at
the end of the results section.
4.3.5 Optimal Taxes in Partial Equilibrium
Figure 4.1 depicts the optimal marginal tax rates in the two economies. The 1950 optimal marginal tax
rates schedule is the calibrated tax schedule by virtue of the inverse optimum approach. Marginal tax
rates are increasing along the income distribution. In addition to financing the exogenous government
spending, the government uses the tax revenues to give a lump sum transfer of around 1.1% of GDP.
7This calibration of taxes and spending is similar to the general equilibrium model. We discuss data and
targets in more detail there.
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Figure 4.1 Optimal Marginal Tax Rates
Notes: This figure compares optimal marginal tax rates in the calibrated 1950 economy and the counterfactual
2010 economy, which is characterized by higher income levels.
This lowers average tax rates of the entire tax-and-transfer system to zero at the bottom, which is shown
in Figure 4.2.
The two figures also show the optimal marginal and average tax schedules for the counterfactual
2010 economy. Optimal marginal rates are lower across the entire income distribution. Quantitatively,
the drop is roughly 5% at most income levels, with a slightly smaller difference at the bottom of
the distribution. These lower tax rates are not sufficient to finance the entire exogenous government
spending, so that instead of a lump sum transfer there is a lump sum tax of 2% of GDP. This optimal
system then implies very different average tax rates. The lump sum tax matters a lot for average tax
rates at the bottom of the distribution. The poorest individuals now face much higher average tax rates.
By contrast, average tax rates are much lower for high earners because the lump sum tax matters less
for them and the marginal tax rates schedule is shifted downwards.
Hence, with non-homothetic preferences aggregate growth is associated with less redistribution.
Absolute poverty is less of a concern and the consumption baskets also of the poorest contain more of
the relative luxury good services and less of the necessity agriculture. We now show that it is indeed
this declining taste for redistribution that accounts for most of the change to the optimal marginal tax
rates and not the changing skill distribution or income effects.
Figure 4.3 shows again the marginal tax rates schedule for 1950 and 2010. Additionally, we consider
two intermediate cases. First, we compute optimal rates for a scenario in which prices are at the 2010
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Figure 4.2 Optimal Average Tax Rates
Notes: This figure compares optimal average tax rates, implied by the entire tax-and-transfer system including
the lump sum grant, in the calibrated 1950 economy and the counterfactual 2010 economy, which is characterized
by higher income levels.
level, i.e. aggregate growth has happened. However, we keep labor supply and the skill distribution
fixed such that not just income inequality but also underlying skill inequality is the same as in 1950.
Note that because of the non-homotheticities labor supply is higher across the entire income distribution
in 1950 compared to 2010. This effect is strongest for the lowest incomes: Because they are very poor
in absolute terms in 1950, their labor supply is very high. The poorest in 2010 are much richer in
absolute terms, even if their relative income share is the same. Therefore, the reduction in labor supply
is largest at the bottom of the income distribution. To keep the income distribution the same, as imposed
by the calibration strategy, we need that the skill distribution also changes most at the bottom of the
distribution. All skill levels are lower in 1950, but the change is largest at the bottom. Therefore, if we
do a counterfactual where we impose inequality in skills to be as in 1950, with income inequality being
the same anyways, but with lower prices because of aggregate growth as in 2010, we have optimally
higher marginal tax rates compared to 2010, bringing the tax rates schedule closer to the 1950 schedule.
This is shown in Figure 4.3 in the case “2010 with 1950 inequality”.
We consider a second intermediate case in which we also fix the income effects at the 1950 level.
Income effects are larger in 1950 than in 2010, as on average poorer individuals respond more strongly
to receiving unearned income. As explained above, larger income effects are a force for higher marginal
tax rates. Increasing marginal tax rates at some point in the distribution is more beneficial as individuals
earning higher incomes will work more because of the loss through higher average taxes. Hence, the
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Figure 4.3 Optimal Marginal Tax Rates: Decomposition
Notes: This figure compares optimal marginal tax rates, implied by the entire tax-and-transfer system including
the lump sum grant, in the calibrated 1950 economy and the counterfactual 2010 economy, which is characterized
by higher income levels. It additionally compares two intermediate cases “2010 with 1950 inequality” and “2010
with 1950 inequality and income effects”.
“2010 with 1950 inequality and income effects” schedule brings us even closer to the 1950 optimum.
However, quantitatively these two changes account only for a small part of the change in the optimal
tax-and-transfer systems between 1950 and 2010. Therefore, we conclude that the most important
implication of non-homothetic preferences in combination with aggregate growth is the change to the
taste for redistribution.
4.4 General Equilibrium
We now turn to the general equilibrium model, in which in addition to aggregate growth we account for
changes to relative inequality and relative prices.
4.4.1 Households
In the general equilibrium model, household heterogeneity takes two dimensions. Households are
characterized by their skill level, which can be high or low. Firms pay wages by skill level per efficiency
unit of labor. Within skill, households differ in their productivity. Denote the wage a household receives
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C is the non-homothetic CES consumption aggregator and n is labor supply. The budget constraint
of the household equalizes consumption expenditure and after-tax-and-transfer income: λ is the level
parameter of the parametric tax function, τ governs progressivity, and T is a lump sum transfer.
The first order condition of the household with respect to consumption reads
C−γ = χE ′ (C) , (4.10)

































We can combine these two first order conditions to



















The production side of the economy closely follows Buera, Kaboski, Rogerson, and Vizcaino (2021).
The production function is given by












where the subscript j denotes the sector, with j ∈ {A,G,S} for agriculture, goods, and manufacturing
and t denotes the time period. Yj is sectoral output, which is produced using high-skilled and low-skilled
labor. H j and L j are efficiency units of high-skilled and low-skilled labor, respectively. The parameters
A jt denote skill-neutral technology parameters, and α jt denote skill intensities. These parameters are
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sector-specific and time-varying. The elasticity of substitution in production ρ is constant across time
and sectors.
Firms maximize profits under perfect competition. The firm problem is static, so we omit the time














−wHH j −L j. (4.14)
p j denotes the price of commodity j. wH is the wage paid per efficiency unit of high-skilled labor. The
wage paid to low-skilled labor wL is normalized to 1, so that wH can be interpreted as the skill premium.















The government raises income taxes to finance a lump sum transfer and exogenous government spending.
The tax payment is given by the parametric tax function





where exp [log(λ )y−τ ] is the average tax rate applied to income y = wθn.
In addition to the lump sum transfer the government finances exogenous government spending in










where i denotes worker skill and k refers to within-skill productivity. πik is the mass of workers with
skill i and within-skill productivity k.
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4.4.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium markets for high-skilled and low-skilled labor and markets for agriculture, goods, and









Define also total consumption in each sector, consisting of private and government consumption, as
D j = G j +∑
ik
C jikπik. (4.19)























This condition already imposes goods market clearing. Therefore, the only market left is the market for
low-skilled labor, which clears by Walras’ law if equation (4.20) holds.
The equilibrium definition is standard. The equilibrium consists of a set of prices and wages, given
a tax-and-transfer system, such that households solve their utility maximization problem, firms solve
their profit maximization problem, three goods and two labor markets clear, and the government budget
is balanced. Before turning to the optimal tax problem in this economy, we discuss the calibration in
the next section.
4.4.5 Calibration for the U.S.
Our first quantitative application of the model is to the United States. We calibrate the model to three
years: 1950, 1980, and 2010. We choose parameters to be consistent with the two key determinants
of optimal redistribution that we highlight: absolute poverty concerns and the level of the economy
(aggregate growth, structural change) and relative inequality (changing relative prices, changing skill
premium). We now describe our calibration strategy in detail, starting with a summary of the parameters
to be chosen.
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The first set of parameters we have to choose concerns demographics. In each period there is
a share fH of high-skilled individuals. Additionally, we have to parameterize the distribution of
efficiency units within skill. We opt to keep within type inequality constant over time. While especially
since the 1980s there also has been a rise of incomes of the very top earners relative to other highly
educated individuals, we abstract from this change in order to not introduce more exogenous changes
into the model. Another set of parameters that is kept constant over time is the set of all preference
parameters. We need to choose the non-homothetic CES parameters σ ,εA,εG,εS,ΩA,ΩG,ΩS and the
other preference parameters γ,ϕ,B. On the production side we need to set the elasticity of substitution
in production ρ , which is constant over time, and the time-varying skill neutral technology parameters
AA,AG,AS as well as the time-varying skill intensities αA,αG,αS. Finally, we have to choose three
parameters of the tax-and-transfer system λ ,τ,T in every period.
We first fix a number of parameters exogenously. We set the non-homothetic CES parameters in
line with the estimates of Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021) to εA = 0.1, εG = 1.0, εS = 1.8, and
σ = 0.3. These preference parameters imply that agricultural goods are necessities, while services are
luxuries. We set the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ to two and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
to 0.2, in line with micro estimates. We also exogenously fix the elasticity of substitution in production
ρ at 1.42, as in Buera, Kaboski, Rogerson, and Vizcaino (2018). For the within type heterogeneity
we distinguish between ten groups per skill level, accounting for 10% of the total mass per skill each.
We set the efficiency units for each of these deciles based on within skill wage differences from U.S.
Census data. Finally, we impose a few normalizations. We set ΩG to one. We also fix AS to one in 1980
and pick the productivity levels in agriculture and goods such that all relative prices are one in 1980.
We continue with calibrating the 1980 economy as our base year. Assuming that the skill premium
is matched, it is possible to express the three skill intensities as functions of the share of income going
to high-skilled individuals in each sector. We compute this data moment from the 1950 Census 1%
Sample, the 1980 Census 5% sample, and the 2010 American Community Survey (Ruggles, Flood,
Goeken, Grover, Meyer, Pacas, and Sobek, 2020). In the data, we consider an individual as high skilled
if the person has at least a four year college degree. Everybody with less than a four year degree is
considered low skilled. We restrict our sample to individuals who are between 25 and 60 years old.
We use Census Bureau industrial classifications to group individuals into the three broad sectors of
our model. As income measure we use total pre-tax wage and salary income. Income in the data is
top-coded. We apply a simple adjustment to account for top-coding by multiplying all incomes at the
top-coding threshold with 1.5. The high-skilled income shares by sector for the three years are reported
in Table 4.2, which includes all the data moments targeted in our U.S. calibration. Two important
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Table 4.2 Moments for the U.S. Calibration
Moment 1950 1980 2010
Skill premium 1.44 1.54 2.06
High-skill inc. share agriculture 5.22% 20.26% 23.62%
High-skill inc. share manufacturing 8.27% 19.96% 39.60%
High-skill inc. share services 16.46% 37.14% 57.67%
Service share - 69.59% -
Manufacturing share - 28.04% -
Real GDP per capita 0.50 1.00 1.70
Rel. price agriculture to manufacturing 1.88 1.00 0.55
Rel. price services to manufacturing 0.94 1.00 1.49
G/Y 14.00% 14.00% 14.00%
T/Y 1.12% 2.97% 3.61%
AMTR Top 10% 27.54% 46.03% 32.68%
AMTR Bottom 90% 14.94% 36.30% 27.95%
Notes: This table summarizes the moments for the U.S. calibration. Real GDP per capita and relative prices are
normalized to 1 in 1980.
patterns emerge from this data. First, services is generally the high-skill intensive sector, with a larger
share of income going to high-skilled individuals than in the other two sectors. Hence, as an economy
grows richer and households shift their consumption towards services, this will drive up the demand for
high-skilled labor and thereby put upward pressure on the skill premium. This is what Buera, Kaboski,
Rogerson, and Vizcaino (2021) refer to as skill-biased structural change. The second key pattern is
that the high-skilled income share goes up over time in each sector. This translates into rising skill
intensities, which is commonly referred to as skill-biased technical change.
The remaining parameters that are calibrated internally are the non-homothetic CES parameters ΩA
and ΩS, the high-skilled population share fH , the labor disutility parameter B, and all the government
parameters λ ,τ,T,GA,GG,GS. They are calibrated jointly; here we discuss which data moments are
most closely related to each of these targets. ΩA and ΩS are set to match the 1980 sector shares of
goods and services. We compute these data moments from National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA), based on value added by industry. To smooth fluctuations we take five year averages around the
respective years. The high-skilled population share is closely related to the skill premium, which we
also compute from the Census data. The skill premium is defined as the ratio of average weekly earnings
of high-skilled individuals divided by average weekly earnings of low-skilled individuals. We compute
weekly earnings as annual wage and salary income divided by the number of weeks in employment.
The labor disutility parameter B is set such that average labor supply of the high-skilled is equal to 0.33.
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This leaves the government parameters to be calibrated. We discipline government spending using
historical tables provided by the Office of Management and Budget. First, we discipline the size of the
lump-sum transfer by matching spending on income security programs. This has increased over time,
from 1.12% in 1950 to 3.61% in 2010. Again, these numbers are averaged over five year windows. We
consider every other government expenditure as part of the exogenous spending requirement. Total
expenditures have risen quite significantly over time. However, one aspect to be taken into account
that is not modeled is that a sizeable part of the additional spending has been debt financed. This is the
case for 1980 and even more so for 2010. When accounting for debt the financing requirement through
taxes was relatively stable across the three years. Therefore, we choose to keep a constant spending
to output ratio in the calibration. This has the advantage that our results are not affected by changing
spending requirements over time. This could have sizeable effects on desired tax progressivity (Ferriere,
Grübener, Navarro, and Vardishvili, 2021; Heathcote and Tsujiyama, 2021; Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante, 2017), which we can abstract from by making this choice. In our three sector model
we also have to take a stand on how government consumption is allocated across the three sectors.
As our baseline assumption, we choose to set government spending as a proportional share of private
consumption in each sector. Finally, to discipline the progressivity of the tax system we rely on average
marginal tax rates estimated by Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018). The tax progressivity parameter τ is
closely related to the difference between the average marginal tax rate (AMTR) faced by the top 10% of
the income distribution compared to the AMTR of the bottom 90%. The remaining condition for the
last government parameter λ is that the government budget has to clear.
Having calibrated the base year, we have to set the remaining parameters for the 1950 and 2010
economies. The skill intensities can be determined following the same approach as for the base year
1980 before calibrating the remaining parameters internally. Specifically, we need to determine skill-
neutral technology parameters AA,AG,AS, high-skilled population shares fH , and all the government
parameters. We discipline the skill-neutral technology parameters by matching growth rates in real GDP
per capita and changes in relative sectoral prices. The data for sectoral prices is from NIPA, as for the
sector shares. The skill-neutral technology parameters are rising over time, capturing aggregate growth.
The relative price of services is falling, whereas the relative price of agriculture is rising, implying that
productivity growth is lowest in services. Again, the high-skilled population share is closely related to
the skill premium, which is rising over time. However, given that skill-biased technical and structural
change cause a rise in the skill premium, the model requires the high-skilled population share to be
rising over time, in line with the data as we discuss below. Lastly, the calibration for the government
parameters is as in the base year 1980. Table 4.2 shows that the gap between the AMTR faced by the top
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Table 4.3 Parameters for the US Calibration
Parameter Interpretation Value
Preferences
σ Elasticity of substitution 0.300
εA Income elasticity agriculture 0.100
εG Income elasticity goods 1.000
εS Income elasticity services 1.800
ΩA Level parameter agriculture 0.008
ΩG Level parameter goods 1.000
ΩS Level parameter services 19.272
γ Coefficient of risk aversion 2.000
ϕ Labor supply elasticity 5.000
B Labor disutility 4291.443
Production
ρ Elasticity of substitution 1.420
AA Neutral technology agriculture 0.157, 0.839, 3.411
AG Neutral technology goods 0.325, 0.836, 2.251
AS Neutral technology services 0.412, 1.000, 1.669
αA Skill intensity agriculture 0.126, 0.302, 0.351
αG Skill intensity goods 0.170, 0.299, 0.479
αS Skill intensity services 0.262, 0.440, 0.606
fH Population share high skilled 0.097, 0.238, 0.371
Government
GA Government consumption agriculture 0.000, 0.001, 0.001
GG Government consumption goods 0.004, 0.006, 0.010
GS Government consumption services 0.007, 0.015, 0.026
T Transfer 0.004, 0.011, 0.016
λ Tax function level 0.210, 0.229, 0.203
τ Tax function progressivity 0.260, 0.262, 0.163
Notes: This table summarizes the calibrated parameters for the U.S. For the time-varying parameters the values
correspond to the calibration for the years 1950, 1980, and 2010.
10% compared to the bottom 90% is roughly constant between 1950 and 1980, while it is significantly
lower in 2010. This translates into similar progressivity parameters in 1950 and 1980, but a significantly
lower one in 2010. This is in line with the estimated time series for progressivity based on the loglinear
tax function in Ferriere and Navarro (2020) also based on the data by Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018).
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2020b), by contrast, estimate a relatively stable progressivity
parameter for the loglinear tax function between 1980 and 2010. However, a key difference is that
we model transfers separately. While progressivity of purely the income tax function decreases in our
calibration, redistribution through transfers increases over time.
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Table 4.4 Untargeted Moments in the US calibration
Moment Data Model
Service share 1950 59.79% 61.05%
Manufacturing share 1950 33.31% 33.11%
Service share 2010 81.04% 79.27%
Manufacturing share 2010 17.93% 19.84%
High-skilled population share 1950 8.56% 9.73%
High-skilled population share 1980 21.59% 23.88%
High-skilled population share 2010 34.98% 37.12%
Notes: This table compares untargeted moments with the model implied values for the U.S. calibration.
Table 4.4 shows the model fit for a number of untargeted moments. First, while we target the sector
shares in 1980 in our calibration, we do not target the sector shares in 1950 and 2010. The model still
matches these sector shares very well. It captures the 20 percentage point rise in the service share from
1950 to 2010 and the associated drops in the agriculture and goods shares. Capturing these structural
changes well is key for our analysis of optimal taxes and transfers over time. The very good model fit for
the sector shares gives us confidence that the non-homothetic CES preferences, parameterized according
to the estimates of Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021), capture the degree of non-homotheticities
very well.
Table 4.4 also shows the model implied high-skilled population shares over time. We need these as
free parameters in the model calibration to match the skill premium exactly. The implied values are
very close to the data. While there is a close relationship between the explicitly targeted high-skilled
income shares by sector and the skill premium on the one hand and the high-skilled population share on
the other hand, the fit does not have to be perfect because we impose the same skill premium across
sectors in the model, which is not exactly the case in the data. Therefore, it is reassuring that the model
implied population shares are very close to the data.
Finally, the model also captures the fact that labor supply is falling over time. Bick, Fuchs-
Schündeln, and Lagakos (2018) show for a cross-section of countries that hours worked tend to be
higher for countries at early stages of development compared to more developed countries. Boppart and
Krusell (2020) document falling hours in the time series for the U.S. and a variety of other developed
countries. We also see a fall in hours worked in the Census data.
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4.4.6 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System for the U.S.
The Ramsey problem in this economy is to choose the parameters of the tax-and-transfer system λ ,τ,T
to maximize welfare. As in the partial equilibrium setup, we follow an inverse optimum approach. To
implement this, we define Pareto weights as
f (θw) = µ +(θw)ν . (4.21)
Pareto weights are a function of the product of the skill specific wage and the within skill efficiency
units of labor. We set parameters µ and ν of the Pareto weight function such that the calibrated 1950
tax system is optimal at the observed skill premium. To make the 1950 tax-and-transfer system optimal
the planner has to put a lower weight on low income and a higher weight on high income households
than a utilitarian planner would do. For the years 1980 and 2010, we have to decide which Pareto
weights to use. One option would be to apply the Pareto weight function using the parameters µ and ν
required for 1950 to the new skill premium in 1980 and 2010. This has the disadvantage that given the
estimated Pareto weights for 1950 we would increase the weights the planner puts on richer households,
partially undoing the effect of the non-homotheticities on desired redistribution. Simply keeping the
Pareto weights constant across groups even though the skill premium changed has the disadvantage
that the planner may put different weights on individuals with different skill levels, who have the same
income. Hence, as our benchmark we choose to keep µ constant across years but to adjust ν such that
the ratio between the weight on the richest group and the weight on the poorest group remains the same.
In Figure 4.4 we show the optimal average tax rates implied by the entire tax-and-transfer system for
income deciles for the three years.8 The benchmark year is 1950, for which the optimum corresponds
to the calibrated system. The overall tax-and-transfer system is progressive in the sense that average tax
rates are increasing with income. In the lowest income decile the average tax rate is negative, implying
that households receive a net transfer.
The optimal tax-and-transfer system in 1980 is less redistributive. The net transfer for the bottom
income decile is essentially zero. Tax rates are slightly higher also for the other bottom income
deciles. The top income decile, by contrast, faces a lower optimal tax rate. Which changes drive
these results? The skill premium and the share of high-skilled individuals increase from 1950 to 1980.
Standard optimal tax theory abstracting from level effects thus would imply that more redistribution is
optimal. However, the non-homotheticity effect overcompensates the standard channel. Consumption of
8We replicate this figure in Appendix D.2.4 for the case in which we simply keep Pareto weights the same
across groups in later years. There is no meaningful difference in optimal tax rates across the two cases.
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Figure 4.4 Optimal Average Tax Rates
Notes: This figure shows optimal average rates given by the entire tax-and-transfer system by income decile for
the U.S. in 1950, 1980, and 2010.
necessities in form of agricultural goods drops between 1950 and 1980 and consumption of the relative
luxury good services rises. Therefore, the planner has a lower desire for redistribution, explaining why
the optimal tax-and-transfer system becomes less redistributive.
Until 2010, however, this change is more than reversed. The rise in inequality is much stronger over
this later time period, which strongly affects the desire to redistribute. Moving from 1980 to 2010, the
effect of non-homotheticities is also weaker relative to the change between 1950 and 1980 because the
economy is already starting from a higher level.
In Figure 4.5 we perform a decomposition of the change between 1950 and 2010. Over the entire
time period the tax-and-transfer system becomes more progressive in average rates. We proceed in five
steps. The starting point is to find the optimal tax-and-transfer system in 1950 in partial equilibrium
such that we can then shut off and on different channels in the next steps. Thanks to the inverse optimum
approach and relatively weak general equilibrium effects of taxes on the skill premium (see discussion
below), the optimal partial equilibrium system that we find as starting point for this exercise is virtually
indistinguishable from the optimal general equilibrium system shown in Figure 4.4.
In the second step we reduce all prices by the same factor to capture the amount of aggregate growth
that took place between 1950 and 2010. Households are richer now, but they still face the same relative
prices. Also, relative inequality in incomes is unchanged. This isolates the non-homotheticity effect.
This uniform price change has a sizeable effect on optimal redistribution. Because the economy is much
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Figure 4.5 Optimal Average Tax Rates: Decomposition
Notes: This figure decomposes the change in optimal average tax rates between 1950 and 2010.
richer after this price change consumption shifts towards luxuries and the planner’s desire to redistribute
declines. Optimal average tax rates are only mildly progressive with much higher tax rates in the bottom
income deciles.
The third step of the decomposition is to also change relative prices. Because agricultural goods get
cheaper over time and services get more expensive this is another force for less desired redistribution.
The goods that are disproportionately consumed by the poor are getting cheaper compared to the
previous step, whereas the rich face higher prices of their consumption baskets. Hence, the planner does
not have to implement as much redistribution.
Next, we adjust the skill premium to its 2010 level. This implies a higher level of inequality because
the skill premium rises from 1.44 to 2.06. As expected, this increases the progressivity of the overall
tax-and-transfer system. Tax rates for the bottom deciles fall, while tax rates at the top rise.
The effect of changing the skill premium is of similar size as the effect of adjusting population shares
from the 1950 to the 2010 levels, which is the last step of the decomposition. This also significantly
increases the optimal net transfers received by the poor and increases tax rates at the top. A larger share
of high skilled individuals raises income inequality and the number of individuals from which high
taxes can be raised, explaining the large changes to the tax system.
With this last step we are almost back at the 2010 optimal tax-and-transfer system, even though
we are ignoring general equilibrium effects of taxes in this decomposition. This suggests that general
equilibrium effects of tax changes are relatively weak in this model. This is the case because there is a
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Table 4.5 Moments for the China Calibration
Moment 1989 1999 2009
Skill premium 1.00 1.10 1.58
High-skill inc. share agriculture 2.00% 4.00% 8.00%
High-skill inc. share manufacturing 2.00% 6.00% 14.00%
High-skill inc. share services 11.00% 18.00% 34.00%
Service share 32.89% 38.57% 44.41%
Manufacturing share 42.50% 45.36% 45.96%
Real GDP per capita 0.41 1.00 2.45
Rel. price agriculture to manufacturing 1.10 1.00 0.90
Rel. price services to manufacturing 0.90 1.00 1.10
G/Y 13.00% 13.00% 13.00%
T/Y 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
AMTR Top 10% 14.00% 14.00% 14.00%
AMTR Bottom 90% 14.00% 14.00% 14.00%
Notes: This table summarizes the moments for the China calibration. Real GDP per capita and relative prices are
normalized to 1 in 1999.
lot of overlap in the income distributions of low and high skilled individuals. Therefore, changing the
tax systems does not induce large changes in the relative labor supply of low skilled versus high skilled,
so that the skill premium moves little. It requires much larger changes to the tax system to observe
significant changes to the skill premium.
4.4.7 Calibration for China
We now turn to an alternative calibration of the model to the Chinese economy. This is of interest
because we have seen that the role of non-homotheticities is larger at earlier stages of development.
The current calibration is relatively rough because some of the required data is less easily available for
China than for the United States. However, the calibration captures key features of structural change
and the dynamics of inequality in China. Also because of limited data availability we restrict ourselves
to the years 1989, 1999, 2009.
Table 4.5 shows the data moments we are targeting for China. For the aggregate growth part of the
data moments, we use data from the World Development Indicators for the sectoral contributions to
total value added. The service sector expanded from 33% in 1989 to 44% in 2009. Over the same time
period also the goods sector grew slightly from 43% to 46%. Correspondingly, the agricultural sector
shrank from 25% to 10%. This shows the potential for an even larger effect of non-homotheticities, as
households spend a large share of their incomes on necessities initially.
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Relatedly, even though we are considering a shorter time period than for the U.S., aggregate growth
was much larger for China. We take data for the growth rate of real GDP per capita from Fang and
Herrendorf (2021). GDP per capita rose by a factor of six. We also use data from this paper to infer
targets for the high-skilled income shares by sector, which determines the skill intensities in the model.
Because their sector definitions are different from ours, we cannot simply take their data. Hence, the
targets reported in Table 4.5 are approximations, but should be roughly in line with the true values. As
for the U.S., services are the high-skill intensive sector and skill intensities are going up over time. We
also use the evidence from Fang and Herrendorf (2021) to discipline the skill premium. In 1989, there
was no skill premium, but it increased to 1.58 in 2009, with the larger part of this increase happening in
the second half of the sample.
Finally, when calibrating the government parameters we have to take a stand on the size of the
welfare state, total government spending, and the progressivity of taxes. While China has a fairly
progressive income tax that has become more important over time (Li and Ma, 2017; Piketty and Qian,
2009), it raises the majority of its tax revenue through corporate taxes and value added taxes. As value
added taxes are generally considered to be less progressive than income tax, we decide to target a flat
tax rate in all periods. The total amount of revenue raised is roughly constant over time relative to GDP,
so we also keep this constant at 14% over time. The Chinese welfare state has expanded, but a large
share of this goes to the pension system, which we do not model. Hence, we calibrate a constant split
between government consumption and transfers, with G/Y of 13% and T/Y of 1%.
Our calibration strategy to match these targets closely follows what we have done for the U.S.
However, we choose slightly different parameters for the non-homothetic CES utility function, within
the range of estimates by Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021). We could alternatively keep them at
their U.S. levels, but adjusting them slightly helps improving the match for all the sector shares. Also,
we choose the evolution of sectoral relative prices such that we match the sector shares in all periods
well. As for the U.S., we match the middle year sector shares exactly, but here we also target the sector
shares in the other years explicitly.
4.4.8 Optimal Tax-and-Transfer System for China
The optimal tax-and-transfer system for China is shown in Figure 4.6. As for the U.S., we follow an
inverse optimum approach. We pick as our base year 1999, so the optimal tax-and-transfer system for
the year 1999 corresponds to our calibration. It is mildly progressive in overall average tax rates of the
entire tax-and-transfer system because there is a small lump sum transfer combined with a flat tax.
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Table 4.6 Parameters for the China Calibration
Parameter Interpretation Value
Preferences
σ Elasticity of substitution 0.500
εA Income elasticity agriculture 0.100
εG Income elasticity goods 1.000
εS Income elasticity services 1.300
ΩA Level parameter agriculture 0.081
ΩG Level parameter goods 1.000
ΩS Level parameter services 1.365
γ Coefficient of risk aversion 2.000
ϕ Labor supply elasticity 5.000
B Labor disutility 2504.842
Production
ρ Elasticity of substitution 1.420
AA Neutral technology agriculture 0.227, 0.744, 2.514
AG Neutral technology goods 0.250, 0.794, 2.614
AS Neutral technology services 0.359, 1.000, 3.092
αA Skill intensity agriculture 0.061, 0.099, 0.170
αG Skill intensity goods 0.061, 0.129, 0.242
αS Skill intensity services 0.187, 0.261, 0.418
fH Population share high skilled 0.048, 0.095, 0.160
Government
GA Government consumption agriculture 0.002, 0.004, 0.007
GG Government consumption goods 0.042, 0.011, 0.027
GS Government consumption services 0.033, 0.009, 0.025
T Transfer 0.004, 0.003, 0.003
λ Tax function level 0.140, 0.140, 0.140
τ Tax function progressivity 0.000, 0.000, 0.000
Notes: This table summarizes the calibrated parameters for China. For the time-varying parameters the values
correspond to the calibration for the years 1989, 1999, and 2009.
Moving back in time to 1989 is associated with a slightly lower skill premium. Also, to match the
skill premium at calibrated skill intensities our model requires the share of highly skilled individuals
to go up over time (in line with the data). For these reasons, standard tax theory would predict that
less redistribution is desirable in 1989. However, there is also a large increase in average income and
a significant shift away from the consumption of necessities from 1989 to 1999. This latter effect
dominates. Instead of paying net taxes as in the 1999 (inverse) optimum, the lowest income decile
would receive a net transfer. Average tax rates are also lower for the next income deciles and higher at
the top.
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Figure 4.6 Optimal Average Tax Rates
Notes: This figure shows optimal average rates given by the entire tax-and-transfer system by income decile for
China in 1989, 1999, and 2009.
The optimal tax-and-transfer-system is also more redistributive in 2009 compared to 1999. The
economy is again much richer on average and particularly the bottom income groups have moved
further away from absolute poverty. They spend a smaller share of their income on agricultural goods.
However, there is also a larger share of high-skilled who earn a much higher skill premium. Thus, the
planner prefers to impose a higher tax rate at the top. This allows to give a larger transfer providing
more redistribution towards the bottom of the distribution. When comparing the optimal 1989 and 2009
systems, the 2009 system is only slightly more redistributive even though inequality is much larger.
The effect of individuals growing out of absolute poverty with aggregate growth and non-homothetic
preferences almost cancels out the rise in inequality.
As our benchmark, we again adjusted Pareto weights for the other years as we did in the U.S.
case, keeping the ratio of the Pareto weight on the highest earning group to that of the lowest earning
group constant. In Figure D.2 in the appendix we repeat the exercise for Pareto weights that are
simply kept constant for groups characterized by a skill level and within-skill productivity. This makes
a larger difference for the results than in the U.S. case. However, the main message is unaffected:
Aggregate growth in combination with non-homothetic preferences lowers the benefits of redistribution.




In this paper we incorporate the optimal income taxation problem into a state-of-the-art model of
structural change. This allows us to show that aggregate growth matters for optimal redistribution,
beyond standard effects through relative inequality. With non-homothetic preferences, the taste for
redistribution declines with aggregate growth as households move away from absolute poverty and shift
their consumption away from necessities towards luxuries. However, aggregate growth and structural
change have additional effects on the optimal design of the welfare state through changing prices of
different commodities and changing inequality.
In our calibrated economies, growth has non-monotonic effects on the optimal size of the welfare
state. At early stages of development the effect of non-homotheticities is dominant, as many people
have to spend a large share of their incomes on necessities. At later stages of development this effect
weakens and relative inequality concerns become dominant.
These patterns naturally raise the question whether using public debt to finance the welfare state at
early stages of development could be beneficial. We explore this possibility in ongoing work.
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Per Krusell, Toshihiko Mukoyama, and Ayşegül Şahin. Labour-market matching with precautionary
savings and aggregate fluctuations. The Review of Economic Studies, 77(4):1477–1507, 2010.
Per Krusell, Toshihiko Mukoyama, Richard Rogerson, and Ayşegül Şahin. Gross worker flows over the
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data
For the empirical investigation we combine data from several Danish registry data sets provided by
Statistics Denmark.
BFL. The main data source on earnings and employment in this paper is the BFL (Beskæftigelse for
Lønmodtagere). This data set contains information on employment spells within each month from 2008
until 2018. For each of these spells we observe earnings (including and excluding pension contributions),
hours (reported hours and an imputed measure), and the start and end date of the spell. Also, for each
individual there is an identifier based on the anonymized social security number, which can be used to
link this individual to other data sets. Similarly, for each firm there is an identifier that also can be used
to match the data to other data sets. It also contains information on occupation, industry, and location.
BEF. The BEF (Befolkningen) data set contains information on demographics, which can be merged to
with the BFL data. A control variable we use from this data source is an individual’s sex.
IDAP. Another individual level data set is IDAP (Integreret Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning -
Persondata) from the integrated database for labor market research. From this data set we take variables
on individuals’ age and labor market experience.
UDDA. The UDDA (Uddannelser) database contains information on individuals’ education.
IND. The IND (Indkomst) database contains information on pre- and after-tax income which we use to
estimate the parameters of the tax function.
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FIRM. The FIRM (Generel firmastatistik) database contains general information on firms. From this
database we take information on firm-level employment and information on the source of firm-level
accounting data in the FIRE database (see below).
FIRE. FIRE (Regnskabsstatistikken) is the database for firm-level accounting information. From this
source we take information on firm level revenues, value added, and profit.
FIKS. A complementary source for firm revenue information is the FIKS (Firmaernes køb og salg)
database. This data set includes information on firms’ purchases and sales from value added tax data. In
addition to the purchase and sales numbers it contains information on the frequency at which a firm
settles its VAT accounts. For the largest firms this is done at monthly frequency; for smaller firms it is
done at quarterly or half-yearly frequency.
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A.2 Additional Evidence
Figure A.1 Annual Earnings Growth Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the annual earnings growth distribution for the entire sample. Growth rates are based on
raw labor earnings. The green line compares a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation.
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Figure A.2 Annual Earnings Growth Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the annual earnings growth distribution for the entire sample. Growth rates are based on
residual earnings taking out age, gender, education, occupation, industry, and location effects. The green line
compares a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation.
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Figure A.3 Annual Earnings Growth Distribution: Business Cycle
Notes: This figure shows the annual earnings growth distribution for the years 2009 (recession) and 2015
(expansion). Growth rates are based on residual earnings taking out age, gender, and education effects.
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Figure A.4 Annual Revenue Growth Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the annual revenue growth distribution. This is based on data from value added tax data,
which is available for more firms than the accounting information used in the main text. The green line compares
a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation.
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Figure A.5 Annual Value Added Growth Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the annual value added growth distribution. The green line compares a normal
distribution with the same mean and standard deviation.
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Figure A.6 Annual Employment Growth Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the employment growth distribution. The green line compares a normal distribution
with the same mean and standard deviation.
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Figure A.7 Worker Earnings Growth by Firm Revenue Growth: Stayers
Notes: This figure shows the the relationship between firm performance and different parts of the earnings growth
distribution for individuals who are continuously employed at the same firm for two consecutive years.
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Figure A.8 Worker Wage Growth by Firm Revenue Growth: Stayers
Notes: This figure shows the the relationship between firm performance and different parts of the wage growth
distribution for individuals who are continuously employed at the same firm for two consecutive years.
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Figure A.9 Worker Hours Growth by Firm Revenue Growth: Stayers
Notes: This figure shows the the relationship between firm performance and different parts of the hours growth
distribution for individuals who are continuously employed at the same firm for two consecutive years.
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Figure A.10 Worker Hours Growth by Firm Revenue Growth: Stayers
Notes: This figure shows the hours growth distribution conditional on firm revenue growth for workers who are
continuously employed at the same firm for two years. Hours are based on an hours measure imputed by Statistics
Denmark.
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A.3 Additional Evidence from Germany
In this appendix we provide supporting evidence from German matched employer-employee data
showing that key features we describe using Danish data are not unique to the Danish institutional
environment. We use Denmark as our benchmark as the data has some advantages, which will become
clear below. Still, it is encouraging that key patterns also hold in the German context.
A.3.1 Data
Data Set. We use data provided by the Institute for Employment Research at the German Federal
Employment Agency. Specifically, we use the “Linked Employer-Employee Data from the IAB” (LIAB)
Longitudinal Model 1993-2014.1 This data set combines establishment level information from the IAB
Establishment Panel with information on employees drawn from social security records.
The IAB Establishment Panel is a representative survey of German establishments2 with at least
one employee subject to social security.3 It is a yearly panel survey. The first survey was conducted
in 1993 with roughly 5000 establishments. The number of interviewed establishments rose to around
15000 until 2000 and stayed constant from then on. To ensure high data quality, the vast majority of the
interviews is conducted face-to-face at the establishments. The main variable of interest for the analysis
here is an establishment’s business volume.
The employee data of the LIAB is drawn from social security records. For the LIAB Longitudinal
model a subsample of establishments from the IAB establishment panel is chosen. Then, every worker
who is employed at a selected establishment for at least one day in the relevant time period is included in
the worker sample. For every individual included in the sample every employment and unemployment
spell for the period from 1993 to 2014 is added independently of whether the corresponding spell is at
one of the covered establishments. Therefore, it is possible to observe wages and benefits for individuals
before they join and after they leave a sample establishment. This is crucial to compute earnings growth
at the individual level. The wage and benefit data is of high quality as it is drawn from social security
records. This data is very accurate as misreporting by employers is penalized. The data set contains
data on roughly 1-1.5 million individuals per year.
1For a detailed description of the LIAB Longitudinal Model, see Heining, Klosterhuber, and Seth (2014) and
Heining, Klosterhuber, Lehnert, and Seth (2016).
2The data contains information on establishments and it is not possible to link establishments belonging to
the same firm. We use the terms firm and establishment interchangeably, even though they are clearly distinct
concepts.
3For details on the IAB Establishment Panel, see Ellguth, Kohaut, and Möller (2014).
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Data Preparation and Sample Selection. Despite its very good accuracy, the use of German social
security data has one drawback for the purpose of this project. Wages are censored at the social security
contribution assessment ceiling. Only wages up to this threshold are subject to social security payments
and if wages are higher, the social security limit is reported to the authorities. Therefore, we impute
top wages. This is done by estimating a Pareto tail for the wage distribution and then drawing from
the estimated Pareto distribution for those observations that are censored. This imputation is done
separately by year, gender, and age groups. Also, it is done separately for East and West Germany, as the
social security contribution limits differ. In order to not introduce excessive earnings changes through
the imputation we follow Daly, Hryshko, and Manovskii (2018) and Busch, Domeij, Guvenen, and
Madera (2018) in using a “fixed-effects” imputation: Only one random number is drawn per individual,
which is then applied to the estimated Pareto distribution in any year this individual has a censored
observation. We adjust worker earnings and firm revenues for inflation to obtain real earnings and
revenues. Specifically, we adjust both using the GDP deflator to use a consistent measure.
We impose only some mild sample restrictions, in line with the literature. We restrict the sample to
individuals older than 25 but younger than 60. This is done in order to avoid issues with individuals
still attending college or retiring early. We also drop all marginal employment spells as these are only
recorded by the social security administration since 1999. In addition, we drop all spells with a reported
wage below the highest marginal employment threshold in the sample.
As we observe firm business volume at a yearly frequency, we also adopt yearly earnings as income
concept. Therefore, we add up earnings from all spells to obtain yearly earnings. Following Busch,
Domeij, Guvenen, and Madera (2018) we drop all individuals with annual earnings below 50% of 13
weeks of full-time work (520 hours) at the minimum wage.4
A.3.2 Evidence
In this section we include evidence on the worker earnings growth distribution depending on firm
revenue growth. The analysis is performed as follows, as with the Danish data. Workers are matched to
the firms they are employed with in period t −1. Establishments are grouped by their revenue growth
from period t −1 to period t. There are ten groups, where five groups have negative revenue growth
rates and five groups have positive growth rates. The first revenue growth group contains establishments
with a drop in business of more than 20%. The next groups contain establishments with growth rates
4This sample selection procedure is similar but not exactly identical to the Danish case. This will be made
consistent in future versions.
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Figure A.11 Earnings Growth Distribution by Firm Growth for Germany
Notes: This figure shows percentiles of the annual earnings growth distribution of workers conditional on firm
growth. The data is from the matched employer-employee data of the IAB.
between -20% and -15%, -15% and -10%, and so on. Then, moments of the worker earnings growth
(also from t −1 to t) distribution are computed for each firm revenue growth group separately.
Figure A.11 shows the evidence for the sample where we do not condition on employment status in
the second year. This corresponds to the information conveyed in Figures 1.5 and 1.6 with the Danish
data.5 As in the Danish context, there is a longer left tail to the earnings growth distribution in shrinking
firms. The 10th percentile of the distribution is much lower in poorly performing firms. However, in
all firms there are many workers whose earnings change very little, reflected in a median close to zero
in all firm groups. In the fast growing firms, the 90th percentile of the earnings growth distribution is
slightly higher.
Figure A.12 shows the same figure for individuals who are continuously employed at the same firm.
As in the Danish case (Figure 1.7), the 10th percentile of the worker earnings growth distribution is
higher across all firm groups because the largest earnings losses are associated with unemployment
spells. However, it remains the case for stayers that in the shrinking firms there are more individuals with
large earnings losses, reflected in a low 10th percentile of the earnings growth distribution, compared to
growing firms.
5The presentation of the results is different across the two countries and will be made consistent when we next
take out results again from the secure servers, which is, however, a time consuming process.
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Figure A.12 Earnings Growth Distribution by Firm Growth for Germany: Stayers
Notes: This figure shows percentiles of the annual earnings growth distribution of workers who are continuously




Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Empirical Robustness Exercises
B.1.1 Employed and Unemployed Spouses
Table B.1 Joint Labor Market Transitions (Full Sample): Spouse Unemployed
Primary earner transition
EE EU EN
Cond. prob. of spousal UE transition 25.29% 26.27% 34.11%
Cond. prob. of spousal UU transition 61.97% 63.33% 46.01%
Cond. prob. of spousal UN transition 12.74% 10.41% 19.87%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from unemployment conditional on primary earner
transitions for the entire population.
Table B.2 Joint Labor Market Transitions (Full Sample): Spouse Employed
Primary earner transition
EE EU EN
Cond. prob. of spousal EE transition 97.61% 91.49% 88.84%
Cond. prob. of spousal EU transition 0.77% 5.78% 1.25%
Cond. prob. of spousal EN transition 1.62% 2.72% 9.92%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from employment conditional on primary earner
transitions for the entire population.
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B.1.2 Education
Table B.3 Joint Labor Market Transitions by Spousal Education
Primary earner transition
EE EU EN
I. Spouse College Degree (All):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.91% 11.40% 20.88%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.59% 6.43% 1.04%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.50% 82.18% 78.08%
II. Spouse No College Degree (All):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 5.55% 7.20% 15.08%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.65% 5.34% 1.45%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 92.81% 87.46% 83.47%
III. Spouse College Degree (Young):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 7.31% 13.25% 33.25%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.70% 7.22% 1.29%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 90.99% 79.53% 65.46%
IV. Spouse College Degree (Old):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.04% 7.72% 11.81%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.35% 4.87% 0.86%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 92.61% 87.41% 87.33%
V. Spouse No College Degree (Young):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.30% 8.34% 21.76%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 2.01% 6.28% 2.21%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.69% 85.37% 76.03%
VI. Spouse No College Degree (Old):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.19% 4.20% 9.41%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 0.99% 2.83% 0.80%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 94.82% 92.97% 89.79%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from out of the labor force conditional on primary
earner transitions by education of the spouse.
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B.1.3 Cohort Effects
Table B.4 Joint Labor Market Transitions
Primary earner transition
EE EU EN
I. Spouse is a Man (Young) :
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 13.54% 14.07% 44.10%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 6.19% 11.69% 2.59%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 80.27% 74.24% 53.31%
II. Spouse is a Man (Old):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.50% 4.59% 10.36%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.13% 3.23% 0.63%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 94.37% 92.18 % 89.01%
III. Spouse born between 1960-70 (Young):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.98% 8.62% 21.67%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.89% 6.70% 2.42%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.13% 84.68% 75.92%
IV. Spouse born between 1960-70 (Old)
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.28% 2.94% 12.86%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.11% 3.68% 1.04%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 94.61% 93.38% 86.10%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from out of the labor force conditional on primary
earner transitions by gender and cohort.
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B.1.4 Children




Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.26% 8.71% 28.30%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.75% 6.65% 2.31%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.98% 84.64% 69.40%
II. No Children:
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 9.68% 12.68% 23.69%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 3.40% 8.54% 1.59%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 86.91% 78.78% 74.72%
III. Have Children below 5:
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 5.63% 8.55% 30.09%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.47% 6.14% 1.96%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 92.90% 85.31% 67.95%
IV. No Children below 5:
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 8.08% 9.95% 24.82%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 2.60% 7.80% 2.35%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 89.32% 82.24% 72.82%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from out of the labor force conditional on primary
earner transitions by presence of children in the household.
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B.1.5 Reasons for Non-Participation
Table B.6 Joint Labor Market Transitions
Primary earner transition
EE EU EN
I. Excluding Retirement (Young):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.66% 9.32% 27.13%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 2.00% 6.91% 2.06%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.33% 83.77% 70.81%
II. Excluding Retirement (Old):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.95% 4.15% 11.45%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.18% 3.33% 1.00%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 93.87% 92.52% 87.54%
III. Excluding Disabled/Ill (Young):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.55% 9.34% 27.02%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.96% 6.94% 2.01%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.49% 83.72% 70.97 %
IV. Excluding Disabled/Ill (Old):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.17% 3.42% 8.53%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 0.88% 2.77% 0.50%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 94.95% 93.81% 90.97%
V. Excluding Retired and Disabled/Ill (Young):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.55% 9.36% 27.23%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.97% 6.96% 2.05%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.48% 83.68% 70.72%
VI. Excluding Retired and Disabled/Ill (Old):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.74% 3.62% 11.20%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.16% 3.40% 0.89%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 94.11% 92.99% 87.91%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from out of the labor force conditional on primary
earner transitions by reasons for non-participation.
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B.1.6 Business Cycle




Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.48% 7.74% 22.38%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.98% 8.73% 0.99%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.55% 83.53% 76.63%
NBER Recession, Old
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.14% 5.43% 7.71%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 0.83% 2.76% 0.68%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 95.03% 91.81% 91.61%
No NBER Recession, Young
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.68% 9.53% 27.45%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 2.00% 6.63% 2.14%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.31% 83.85% 70.41%
No NBER Recession, Old
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.30% 3.46% 8.80%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 0.91% 2.75% 0.54%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 94.79% 93.79% 90.66%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from out of the labor force conditional on primary
earner transitions by state of the business cycle.
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B.1.7 Income
Table B.8 Joint Labor Market Transitions by Past Income
Primary earner transition
EE EU EN
I. Low Income (All):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 5.57% 7.41% 15.89%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 2.98% 5.81% 1.64%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 92.45% 86.79% 82.48%
II. High Income (All):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 5.91% 8.93% 20.71%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.14% 4.75% 0.73%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 92.95% 86.32% 78.55%
III. Low Income (Young):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 6.22% 8.66% 23.30%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 2.37% 7.48% 2.38%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.41% 83.85% 74.32%
IV. Low Income (Old):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 3.66% 3.52% 8.11%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 0.95% 2.41% 0.66%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 95.39% 94.08% 91.24%
V. High Income (Young):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 7.24% 7.13% 40.17%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 1.19% 4.18% 0.12%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 91.57% 88.69% 59.71%
VI. High Income (Old):
Cond. prob. of spousal NE transition 4.76% 3.66% 11.121%
Cond. prob. of spousal NU transition 0.90% 2.84% 0.49%
Cond. prob. of spousal NN transition 94.34% 93.50% 88.30%
Notes: This table shows the probability of a spousal transition from out of the labor force conditional on primary
earner transitions by income.
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(b) Age 46 to 55
Figure B.1 ∆ Pr(Spouse enters LF) this month
Notes: Figure B.1 shows the change in probability that a non-participating spouse enters the labor force (either as
unemployed or as employed) if the household head loses/lost the job in two months, next month, this month, last
month or two months ago, respectively, relative to the baseline in which the household head remains employed.
The sample includes couples in which one spouse is working and one spouse is out of the labor force between age
36 and 45 (Figure B.1a) and between age 46 and 55 (Figure B.1b) from the Current Population Survey (CPS),




Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Data Appendix
We use data provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to compute average tax and transfer
rates. Given our focus on the working population we restrict ourselves to non-elderly households.
As income concept we use a broad measure of market income including wages, employee’s
contribution for deferred compensation, employer’s contribution for health insurance, employer’s share
of payroll taxes, federal unemployment tax, corporate tax borne by labor, corporate tax borne by capital,
capital gains, tax-exempt interest, taxable interest, positive rent, dividends, and other market income.
For taxes, we consider all taxes the CBO reports. This includes only federal taxes. The specific
components are individual income taxes, payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, and excise taxes. Tax
credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Child Tax Credit (CTC) are included in
taxes in the data. While these credits are at least partially refundable and therefore could be considered
transfers, we cannot separate them in the CBO data and therefore leave them in taxes.
For transfers, we only consider transfers that are meant to provide income security. Because our
model is an infinite horizon model we do not consider transfers to the elderly such as social security and
Medicare. Also, we do not model health shocks or disability, so we leave Medicaid and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) out of our transfer measure. Our transfer measure includes programs to provide
income security such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; commonly known as
food stamps), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), housing assistance, and some other
smaller means-tested transfer programs.
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C.2 Model Appendix
C.2.1 Analytical Model: First Best with a Representative Agent
As a special case of the analytical model we consider a representative agent version. Using this simple
framework we show that there is optimally a negative relationship between the size of transfers and the
progressivity of the income tax code, even absent redistributive concerns.







s.t. c = n−G. (C.1)
The first order condition implies
Bnϕ (n−G) = 1. (C.2)
Implementation with Loglinear Taxes. Consider now a government that has access to only the






s.t. c = λn1−τ . (C.3)

























⇒Bnϕ (n−G) = 1,
(C.6)
which is the condition describing labor supply in the first best, equation (C.2). Hence, according to
equation (C.5) the first best is implemented with just the loglinear tax function with a progressivity
of zero if there is no exogenous spending requirement and with a negative progressivity if required
spending is positive.







s.t. c = λn1−τ +T. (C.7)





The government budget constraint reads
n−λn1−τ = G+T. (C.9)
We can use the government budget constraint to rewrite the household first order condition as
Bn1+ϕ (n−G) = (1− τ)(n−G−T ) . (C.10)






To see this, we again plug in equation (C.11) into equation (C.10) and recover the first order condition














⇒Bnϕ (n−G) = 1.
(C.12)
Hence, in the representative agent version of the model in which the first best is implemented with
the loglinear tax function and a lump sum transfer, the optimal progressivity τ is a strictly decreasing
function of the size of the transfer T .
C.2.2 Analytical Model: Welfare without Transfers
In this section we derive the closed form expression for welfare when the government’s only available
tool is the loglinear tax function.
Idiosyncratic Productivity. For convenience, we summarize again the properties of the process
for idiosyncratic productivity zi,t . We assume logzi,t = αi,t and αi,t = ρzαi,t−1 + ωi,t with ωi,t ∼




). We can rewrite αi,t as:








z ωt− j. (C.13)
Taking the expectation, we get by linearity of the expectations operator:

















For the variance, we obtain:
















And as z = exp(α), E[zi,t ] = 1 ∀t.







1+ϕ s.t. cit = λ [exp(αit)nit ]1−τ (C.16)
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Welfare. We can now compute welfare in closed form. We plug the equilibrium value of consumption
and hours worked into the utility function:
















































We can now plug in the closed-form solution for λ .


























































And therefore, we obtain equation (3.9) in the main text:














C.2.3 Analytical Model: Welfare with Transfers
We now derive welfare as a function of progressivity τ and the transfer T . The logic of the derivation is
the same as in the previous section. However, given that we cannot express everything in closed form,
we are going to linearize around the case of a zero transfer.






s.t. cit = λ [exp(αit)nit ]1−τ +T. (C.26)





−τ exp(αit)λ (1− τ) . (C.27)




Bnϕ+τit exp(−(1− τ)αit)− (1− τ) = 0. (C.28)
From equation (C.28) let us define the function G(T,nit) s.t. G(T,nit) = 0: at the optimum the labor
decision is such that, for a given T, G(T,nit(T )) = 0.












. The implicit function theorem holds, and we can compute
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= B(1+ϕ)nϕ0 . (C.31)
We obtain a linear approximation around (T0,n0,λ0) of nit(T ) denoted n̂it(T ):











− τ2 exp(−(1− τ)αit).
(C.32)








Hence, we can compute λ as

































To obtain Ỹ we first approximate n̂1−τ around the case of a zero transfer. Using equation (C.32) we get












which we can linearize to obtain






















− τ2 exp(−(1− τ)αit)
]
exp [(1− τ)αit ]di
= n1−τ0 η

















Using these expressions we linearize λ around the case of a zero transfer:











































−τ − (ϕ + τ)
]
. (C.41)
Welfare. Finally, we approximate utility around a zero transfer. The utility of an individual agent is
given by
































which can be approximated as
û = u0 +T
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Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Partial Equilibrium Model Appendix
D.1.1 Non-Homothetic CES
We specify preferences over the three commodities using a non-homothetic CES utility function as
introduced by Hanoch (1975) and recently popularized in the structural change literature by Comin,
Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021). These preferences do not admit expressing Marshallian demand functions
in closed form, so we use the Hicksian demand function (4.5) and the expenditure function (4.4). These


















where χ is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions with respect to C j read








j ∀ j. (D.2)























We can plug this back into the constraint (4.3) for every good j such that we are left with one equation
for a generic commodity i. Solving this equation yields the Hicksian demand function. Multiplying the
expression with the respective price and summing over all commodities yields the expenditure function.
Below we are going to need the first and second derivatives of the expenditure function, which are
given by







Ω jε jCε j−1 p1−σj
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E (C)σ , (D.5)
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Ω jε j (ε j −1)Cε j−2 p1−σj
]
. (D.6)
D.1.2 Derivation of Optimal Tax Formula
We derive the optimal tax formula using standard perturbation techniques following Saez (2001). The
idea is that at the optimal tax schedule a small perturbation of the tax system may not affect welfare. To
derive the optimal tax formula, we therefore consider a small increase of the marginal tax rate, dT ′ in
the interval [y∗−dy,y∗].
The first effect of this perturbation of the tax schedule is that individuals earning incomes larger than
y∗ pay dT ′dy more taxes. This reduces their welfare, which must be weighted with their endogenous
marginal social welfare weight, but gives the government additional funds. Hence, the mechanical
effect can be written as






dF (θ) . (D.7)
The second effect is the substitution effect. Individuals whose income falls in the interval where the
marginal tax rate changes adjust their labor supply by
∂y(θ ∗)
∂T ′
dT ′ =−εy,1−T ′ (θ ∗)
y(θ ∗)
1−T ′ (y(θ ∗))
dT ′. (D.8)
This adjustment has to be weighted with the mass of individuals who are affected:






The impact of this change on individuals’ welfare is of second order by the envelope theorem. However,
the labor supply change has a first order impact on the government budget. Hence, the substitution
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effect can be written as follows:
dW S (θ ∗) =−T ′ (y(θ ∗))εy,1−T ′ (θ ∗)
y(θ ∗)
1−T ′ (y(θ ∗))






The third effect is an income effect. Given that we use preferences with income effects, labor supply
of those earnings more than y(θ ∗) adjust their labor supply even though their marginal tax rates do not
change. We denote the income effect as η (θ) = ∂y(θ)
∂T . The income effect can be written as




η (θ)T ′ (y(θ))dF (θ) . (D.11)
At the optimum it has to be the case that
dW M +dW S +dW I = 0. (D.12)
Solving this equation yields the optimal tax formula
T ′ (y(θ ∗))













+η (θ)T ′ (y(θ))
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dF (θ)
f (θ ∗)θ ∗
. (D.13)
From the first order condition for the optimal choice of the lump sum element we can obtain an












To apply the formula, we still need expressions for εy,θ (θ), εy,1−T ′ (θ), and η (θ). To derive these,







s.t. E(C) = y−T (y)+T. (D.15)








(1−T ′ (y))θ = 0. (D.16)
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Hence, it follows for the elasticity that
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Finally, we can compute the income effect as
η (θ) =−
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D.2 General Equilibrium Model Appendix
D.2.1 Firm Problem
In this section we derive equation (4.15) from the firm problem (4.14). The first order conditions of the
problem are















= wH , (D.28)


























This can be solved for the demand for low-skilled labor as a function of the skill premium and high-
skilled labor demand:









We can plug (D.30) into (D.28) to obtain

















































































































Solving this equation for p j delivers equation (4.15) in the main text.
D.2.2 Equilibrium
To solve for an equilibrium in the market for high-skilled labor, we first compute demand for high-skilled
labor. For that purpose, we use equations (4.13), (D.30), and (4.15). First, plug (D.30) into (4.13):
Yj = A j




















⇒ Yj = A jH j
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⇒ Yj = A jH j
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+(1−α j)ρ = (p jA j)1−ρ .
































Rearranging this gives equation (4.18).
D.2.3 Computation
We can solve for the equilibrium as follows.
1. Guess the wage premium wH .
2. Compute the prices implied by the guess for the wage premium using equation (4.15).
3. Guess a lump-sum transfer.
4. Solve household problem for all worker types.
(a) Guess a consumption aggregator C.
(b) Compute the expenditure function and its derivative, as given by equations (4.4) and (D.5).
(c) Guess labor supply n.
(d) Check whether the first order condition (4.12) holds. If yes, move on; if no, update guess
for n.
(e) Check whether the budget constraint (4.9) holds. If yes, move on; if no, update guess for C.
5. Check whether the government budget clears (4.17). If yes, move on; if no, update guess for T .
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6. Check whether the high-skilled labor market (4.20) clears. If yes, we have found the equilibrium;
if no, update guess for wH .
190
D.2.4 Alternative Pareto Weights
Figure D.1 Optimal Average Tax Rates: U.S.
Notes: This figure shows optimal average rates given by the entire tax-and-transfer system by income decile for
the U.S. in 1950, 1980, and 2010. Pareto weights are kept constant across years as described in the main text.
Figure D.2 Optimal Average Tax Rates: China
Notes: This figure shows optimal average rates given by the entire tax-and-transfer system by income decile for
China in 1989, 1999, and 2009. Pareto weights are kept constant across years as described in the main text.
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